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ESSAYS ON PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT DECISION-MAKING
In this dissertation, I focus on physician and patient behavior. I model patient and phy -
si cian decisions by integrating robust insights from different behavioral sciences (e.g. eco -
nomics, psychology and sociology) in econometric models calibrated on individual data.
This approach allows me to bring novel insights for managers, policy-makers and patients
on three main topics. First, when studying physician learning from patient feedback about
the quality of a new drug, I find that switching patients are 7 to 10 times more salient, in
physicians’ memory, than patients who refill their medication. Second, when studying the
relationship between patient empowerment and patient adherence to physicians’ therapy
advice, I show that it is important to go beyond the logic of self-determination theory,
which predicts that empowering patients during medical encounters is always beneficial,
and consider side effects like patient overconfidence. In the case of therapy adherence,
these side effects actually make patient empowerment undesirable, as it decreases
therapy adherence. Third, when studying the main drivers of patient drug requests by
brand name and the physician’s accommodation of such requests, I find that health
information obtained via mass-media is less important than patient values, word-of-
mouth from other patients and word-of-mouth from expert consumers (e.g. other  health -
 care professionals).
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Healthcare, nowadays, represents 6.4% of American consumers’ expenses, making it the 
5th largest expenditure category for an average household (only surpassed by (i) housing, 
(ii) transportation, (iii) food and (iv) personal insurance and pensions). In 1989, healthcare 
represented 5.1% of the expenditures of an average American household, i.e. in 20 years 
this share grew by more than 25%. In addition, a large fraction of consumer spending in 
personal insurance and pensions represents expenditures in health insurance plans. In fact, 
according to data from the OECD, in 2010, each citizen in the United States spent, on 
average, 7,538 USD in health, resulting in a total expenditure of about 15.7% of the GDP 
of the United States of America (OECD Health Data 2010).  
 
Figure 1.1 Expenditure on health (as % of GDP) vs. Doctor visits per capita 
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Source: OECD Health Data, 2010 
 
Even though per capita health expenditures in the U.S. are significantly higher than in 
other developed economies, the fact that healthcare represents a large fraction of the GDP 
2 
 
is common across many countries. Figure 1.1, above, contrasts the number of yearly 
consumer visits to doctors with health expenditures as a percentage of the GDP. We can 
see that the vast majority of countries spend between 6% and 11% of their GDP in 
healthcare and the number of yearly doctor visits ranges from 2.7 in Mexico and 2.8 in 
Sweden to 11.2 in Slovak Republic, 12.6 in Czech Republic and 13.4 in Japan.  
Moreover, consumer spending in healthcare has been rising steadily across the globe 
(see Figure 1.2), an effect that is expected to accelerate in developed economies, as 
healthcare expenditures tend to increase steadily as people age (see Figure 1.3).  
 
Figure 1.2 Expenditure on health (per capita, US $ purchasing power parity) 
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Source: OECD Health Data, 2010 
 
Given the share of wallet of health-related expenditures for consumers, it was rather 
surprising that, when I started my Ph.D., health marketing was still far from being 
considered a mainstream research topic within marketing. The situation has meanwhile 
changed. Most major marketing science conferences and journals now devote considerable 
effort to improve our understanding of consumer choices and firm strategies in the 
healthcare industry. In 2008, in response to the crescent interest in health marketing, the 
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International Journal of Research in Marketing published a special issue on the topic 
which garnered significant interest and attention (Stremersch 2008).  
 
Figure 1.3 Major expenditures of average American consumers by age of the 
reference person within a household (October 2010) 
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Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 2010 
 
In July 2009, Stremersch and Van Dyck published an article in the Journal of 
Marketing with the goal of organizing the problems faced by pharmaceutical marketers 
and proposing a research agenda for the nascent field of Life Sciences Marketing. The most 
relevant research topics in life sciences marketing – identified both by academics and 
industry practitioners - revolved around therapy creation (e.g. innovation alliances, 
pipeline optimization), therapy launch (e.g. new drug adoption, key opinion leader 
selection) and therapy promotion (e.g. sales force management, communication 
management and stimulating patient adherence).  
Figure 1.4 summarizes the healthcare value chain. In my dissertation I focus on the 
consumer side of the healthcare market. More specifically, my goal was to improve our 
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understanding of therapy choice and consumption, which differs from consumption of 
other goods in key aspects like consumer involvement in the decision process, a high-
consequential consumption context (i.e. a bad choice can have serious psychological and 
physical consequences for consumer welfare) and the fact that consumption choice 
requires specialized knowledge often possessed by an expert – the physician – who needs 
to act in accordance with patient values and preferences. Many marketing scholars have 
called for research in this area in recent years (Manchanda et al. 2005). 
A better understanding of the decision-making processes behind therapy consumption 
has the potential to generate valuable insights to academics, public health officials and 
policy makers, consumers and physicians. It can also provide key inputs for managerial 
decisions. In fact, trustees of the Marketing Science Institute have consistently rated 
deeper understanding of consumption behavior as a key research priority in marketing. 
 
Figure 1.4 The Healthcare Value Chain 
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Source: Adapted from Stremersch and Van Dyck (2009) and Burns (2005). 
 
Dissertation Outline: Exploring Patient and Physician Decision-Making 
Current medical practice is influenced by two major paradigms: evidence-based medicine 
and the fast-growing paradigm of patient empowerment (Bensing 2000). Evidence-based 
medicine defends that physicians should make prescription choices based on sound 
scientific evidence, which need to be integrated with the physician’s clinical expertise and 
intuition. Therefore, evidence-based medicine, which gained popularity among medical 
scholars during the 1990’s (Sacket et al. 1996), has a strong focus on physician expertise 
5and on available scientific evidence. However, this focus on the physician and the 
scientific basis of medicine, led many scholars to criticize evidence-based medicine for not 
being sufficiently patient-centered (Bensing 2000). 
The second major paradigm governing modern medical practice - patient-
empowerment - defends that medical practice should increasingly focus on the patient as an 
active participant in treatment choice (Epstein, Alper and Quill 2004; Krahn and Naglie 
2008). Although the roots of patient empowerment can be traced back to classical 
medicine (e.g. to the work of Plato, see Emanuel and Emanuel 1992), its popularity in 
modern medicine is more recent than evidence-based medicine (Bensing 2000). Closely 
related terms to patient empowerment are terms like patient-centered medicine, 
participatory medicine and shared decision-making, all of which suggest a more active role
for the patient than traditionally found in the more paternalistic “white-coat” model, which 
assumes physicians choose a therapy on behalf of the patient1. The patient empowerment 
paradigm also fits a more general trend towards higher customer participation in the 
marketplace (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000; Vargo and Lusch 2004). Pharmaceutical 
industry, policy-makers, physicians and patients cannot afford to ignore this emerging 
trend as it has the potential to fundamentally change the patient-physician relationship, and 
consequently the way prescription drugs are chosen during medical encounters.
The different chapters in my dissertation all reflect upon the interaction between 
patients and physicians and how such interaction reflects on therapy-related decisions. 
Specifically, in Chapter 2, I focus on the physician and how she learns from patient 
feedbacks, in Chapter 3, I provide an overview of current trends in patient-physician joint 
decision-making, and in Chapters 4 and 5, I focus on the patient. Figure 1.5 summarizes 
the common framework behind my dissertation.
1 In 2009, a group of medical scholars, concerned with the fact that patients are not 
sufficiently informed and active in therapy and health decisions, founded the Society for 
Participatory Medicine (http://participatorymedicine.org/), in order to promote “a 
movement in which networked patients shift from being mere passengers to responsible 
drivers of their health, and in which providers encourage and value them as full partners.”
The society has meanwhile launched the Journal of Participatory Medicine to promote 
active research on these topics.
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7In Chapter 2, I explore the effect of salience in physician learning (through patient 
feedbacks) about the quality of a new drug. Salience is a memory-related process through 
which some pieces of information are easier to retrieve from memory than others. I capture 
salience effects in physician learning through a Quasi-Bayesian learning structure that 
extends existing Bayesian learning models. Theoretically, salience interferes with 
physician learning because physicians become overconfident about the informativeness of 
the quality feedback signals from switching patients (vis-à-vis other patients). 
Overconfidence regarding the informativeness of vivid information is a systematic human 
tendency (Griffin and Tversky 1992). Bayesian updating models are very flexible and, in 
this chapter, I show that with adequate modification, they can be used to capture these 
predictable deviations from normative weighting of evidence whereby evidence and prior 
beliefs are integrated using Bayes’ rule. In the proposed quasi-Bayesian model, feedback 
from switching patients is allowed to receive extra weight. I calibrate this model in a Dutch 
patient and physician-level panel dataset (obtained through collaboration with the medical 
school at Erasmus University Rotterdam) with observed prescription choices and show that 
feedback from switching patients receives between 7 and 10 times more weight than 
feedback from other patients. I also show that salience results in slower physician learning 
and, consequently, in slower adoption of the newest treatment in the market I study: 
treatments for asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
In Chapter 3, I discuss new trends in patient-physician relationships, namely the 
antecedents and consequences of the emergence of patient empowerment as a new 
paradigm in medical decision-making. I first discuss how (i) demographic and lifestyle 
changes, (ii) technological changes and (iii) regulatory changes have contributed to the 
emergence of this new medical decision-making model where patients assume a more 
active role in therapy choice. I critically review existing literature and discuss the clinical 
and relational consequences of more patient participation on trust, satisfaction, therapy 
adherence and patient health improvements. The existing literature suggests that patient 
empowerment has many positive consequences in these clinical and relational variables. 
However, such literature is mostly based on conceptual and theoretical arguments and 
empirical scrutiny is still relatively rare. Moreover, it is also not clear whether the scarce 
empirical evidence, which is almost exclusively based on the U.S. and a few Western 
8nations, is generalizable across countries and cultures, which is a serious limitation of the 
medical decision-making literature (Charles et al. 2006). Therefore, in the next two 
chapters I use self-reported data from 17 countries, chosen to guarantee a large cross-
cultural variation, to empirically study drivers of key patient decisions: adherence to the 
physician’s therapy advice (Chapter 4) and drug requests using brand name (Chapter 5). 
In Chapter 4, I study whether patient empowerment leads to higher patient therapy 
adherence, a topic with high societal and economic relevance. Several scholars in medicine 
and public health, nowadays, claim that patients should be given power in treatment 
choices, with the main benefit accredited to patient empowerment being increased patient 
adherence. Using a novel and richer conceptualization of patient empowerment – one that 
distinguishes doctor-initiated and patient-initiated informational empowerment from 
decisional empowerment – I show that patient empowerment can backfire and result in 
lower therapy adherence2. Proponents of patient empowerment find theoretical support for 
their arguments on self-determination theory, which demonstrates that people tend to show 
more behavioral persistence and be more confident on their capacity to execute and 
maintain behavior that is intrinsically motivated (Ryan and Deci 2000). Thus, self-
determination theory predicts that patient empowerment leads to higher therapy adherence.
However, self-determination theory ignores important human tendencies that can 
mitigate some of its beneficial effects, for instance the tendency for people to quickly start 
overestimating their skills and abilities, a phenomenon known as overconfidence (Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 1998). In my theoretical framework I thus rely on theories 
form psychology and behavioral economics to make richer hypotheses for the effects of 
patient empowerment on therapy adherence. In particular, I rely on spreading activation 
theories to hypothesize effects of patient empowerment on the key drivers of both reasoned 
and unintentional non-adherence: comprehension (Mick 1992; Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 
1992) and recall (Anderson 1983) of therapy advice, and patient overconfidence (DeBondt 
and Thaler 1995). These theories predict effects that contradict the predictions of self-
determination theory. In short, because asking patients to make treatment choices is 
cognitively and emotionally taxing, patient comprehension and recall of therapy advice can 
2 Therapy adherence is defined as the extent to which a consumer follows a treatment plan 
- such as taking medication - in accordance with the recommendations from her medical 
care provider (World Health Organization 2003).
9be hurt by patient empowerment, in contrast to the prediction of self-determination theory. 
Moreover, when patients choose their own treatment (decisional empowerment), they tend 
to become overconfident about their capacity to make future treatment decisions (not only 
therapy choice but also decisions like stopping or altering treatment…), which can lead to 
lower adherence (e.g. because patient simply stop taking their medication based on an
erroneous belief that they do not need more therapy, contrary to the physician’s advice). 
Empirically, I demonstrate that many of these effects indeed drive patient behavior leading 
to the conclusion that, contrary to current medical wisdom, doctors may be doing a 
disservice to patients when they ask them to make their own treatment choices.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I discuss the antecedents of patients’ requests of drugs by brand 
name and its consequences on physician accommodation of such requests. I use data 
collected from the same 11,735 respondents in 17 countries used in Chapter 4. Yet, here I
develop a model aimed at understanding the roles of (i) different sources of therapy and 
health information like word-of-mouth (among patients and between the patient and other 
healthcare professionals) and mass-media information, (ii) direct-to-physician marketing 
(samples and promotional materials in the physician’s office) and (iv) patient values as 
antecedents of patient drug requests using brand name. I also study the drivers of physician 
accommodation of such patient requests and a possible feedback effect from physician 
accommodation on patients’ intention to voice more requests in the future. Two important 
findings emerge from this chapter.
First, even though mass-media information indeed leads to more patient requests, 
word-of-mouth (from peers or experts) is a significantly stronger driver of patient requests 
than mass-media. Moreover, information patients gather through mass-media (or through 
any other source) doesn’t influence physician accommodation of patient requests. 
Interestingly, we find that direct-to-physician marketing efforts (samples dispensed and 
promotion materials) do lead to more patient requests, but not to more physician 
accommodation of patient requests. These findings suggest that policy-makers may be 
looking at the wrong culprit when they concentrate their energies scrutinizing therapy and 
health information disseminated via mass-media channels. 
Second, patient values – patient goals that serve as life guiding principles and which 
tend to be trans-situational and relatively homogenous among patients from the same 
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culture (Schwartz et al. 2001) - emerge as an important driver of patient requests and 
moderator of the relationship between physician accommodation of patient requests and 
patients’ intention to request drugs by brand name in the future. In fact, patients who hold 
stronger values of openness to change (i.e. people who value self-direction and a higher 
level of stimulation) or self-enhancement (achievement and power) are more likely to 
request drugs by brand name from their physician than patients who hold stronger self-
transcendence values (benevolence and universalism). Yet, when self-transcendent patients 
do make a request for a branded medication, physician accommodation of such request 
sends a strong signal and significantly increases the likelihood that these patients will make 
more requests for branded medications in the future. 
In sum, my overarching goal, with this dissertation, is to study many important issues 
in the consumer side of healthcare industry and demonstrate that modeling consumer 
decision-making allows us to better understand key industry and market dynamics. I focus 
on decision-making models calibrated in real world individual data in order to obtain 
generalizable findings, an effort that is not only highly relevant for marketing scholars 
(Camerer, Ho and Lim 2006), it also allows us to bring novel insights for non-academic 
stakeholders like managers, policy-makers and consumers. While these models typically 
come at the cost of increased complexity (either mathematical, theoretical, or both) and 
more demanding data requirements, they allow us to better understand consumer decisions 
via the integration of robust insights from different behavioral sciences (e.g. economics, 
psychology and sociology) in our models.
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CHAPTER 2: PREDICTABLY NON-BAYESIAN: QUANTIFYING
SALIENCE EFFECTS IN PHYSICIAN LEARNING ABOUT DRUG 
QUALITY3
Scholars in marketing and economics have developed Bayesian updating models for 
consumer (e.g. Erdem and Keane 1996; Mehta et al. 2008; Roberts and Urban 1988) and 
physician learning (Coscelli and Shum 2004; Crawford and Shum 2005; Narayanan et al. 
2005; Narayanan and Manchanda 2009). Bayesian learning enables researchers to 
structurally model the evolution of an agent’s belief about any uncertain attribute, e.g. 
about the quality of a product, by integrating new information and prior beliefs using 
Bayes’ rule. Bayes’ rule is the normative way to update probabilistic beliefs, i.e. these 
models assume that decision-makers learn using an optimal rule. However, many scholars 
claim that the assumptions behind Bayesian learning are not psychologically or cognitively 
valid (see e.g. Camerer and Loewenstein 2004).
In particular, consumers often deviate from Bayes’ rule by giving more weight to 
more easily accessible, i.e. more salient, pieces of information they retrieve from memory. 
To model salience effects we propose a quasi-Bayesian learning model. Quasi-Bayesian 
learning models apply Bayes’ rule to subjectively revised evidence or prior beliefs (Epstein 
2006; Rabin and Schrag 1999) and may “become the standard way for translating the 
cognitive psychology of judgment into a tractable alternative to Bayes’ rule” (Camerer and 
Loewenstein 2004, p.13). 
However, identification and estimation of quasi-Bayesian models is often difficult and 
empirical applications using revealed preference data are still rare (for notable exceptions, 
see Mehta et al. 2004 and Mehta et al. 2008). In this paper, we study physician learning 
about the quality of a new treatment, a context where consumers are particularly 
sophisticated and involved in the choice process, as the stakes are high. Our proposed 
model fits in the rapidly growing field of behavioral modeling, a field that seeks to enrich 
3 This chapter is based on Camacho, N., B. Donkers and S. Stremersch (2011), 
“Predictably Non-Bayesian: Quantifying Salience Effects in Physician Learning about 
Drug Quality,” Marketing Science, 30(2), 305-320.
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mathematical models of consumer behavior, which are typically normative models, with 
robust psychological regularities (Häubl et al. 2010; Ho et al. 2006; Narasimhan et al. 
2005).
Despite their specialized training, physicians often rely on their intuition and are 
selective in the use of new information, deviating from normative rules in predictable 
ways, very much like humans in general (e.g. Croskerry 2002; Elstein and Schwartz 2002; 
Redelmeier 2005). However, the evidence accumulated about physicians’ deviation from 
optimal reasoning and decision-making so far relies solely on experimental and survey 
research with physicians (Bornstein et al. 1999; Estrada et al. 1997; Poses and Anthony 
1991) and participants role-playing as physicians (Medin et al. 1982) rather than research 
on actual physician decisions for real patients, as presented in the present paper. 
We calibrate our model on a unique panel dataset of Dutch general practitioner 
prescription behavior in the obstructive airways diseases category (i.e. treatments for 
asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease). The data was retrieved from the 
Integrated Primary Care Information database, which is maintained by the School of 
Medicine of the Erasmus University Rotterdam (for a detailed description see Vlug et al. 
1999). This data is particularly well-suited to test whether salience interferes with 
physicians’ formation of treatment quality beliefs and if yes, to what extent. First, 
physicians in our dataset use paperless offices guaranteeing that the full clinical history of
their patients gets stored in the database, which allows us to model treatment4 choices 
using both new prescriptions and repeat prescriptions. Second, at the start of our 
observation period, a new treatment - AstraZeneca’s Symbicort - was introduced in the
category we study, which facilitates identification of dynamics in physicians’ quality 
beliefs. 
Our central hypothesis is that patients who the physician switches away from a 
specific treatment to a clinically equivalent alternative5 become salient in the physician’s 
4 We use the term treatment instead of drug because our empirical application is focused 
on treatments with two molecules, a preventive (anti-inflammatory) and a reliever 
(bronchodilator) either prescribed in two distinct inhalers or combined in a single inhaler 
device.
5 Clinically equivalent alternatives are those that can be considered as substitutes in terms 
of therapeutic indication. Clinical equivalence among the set of treatments we use in our 
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memory. Consider the case of Dr. Jones, an imaginary general practitioner who sees about 
five or six patients with asthma complaints per week. Dr. Jones decides to prescribe a new 
brand - Symbicort - to twenty patients, i.e. about half of the asthma patients he sees in the 
first eight weeks after the launch of Symbicort. Two of these patients, Mrs. Smith and Mr. 
Miller, later complain that Symbicort made them dizzy, nauseated and tired. In order to 
avoid future complaints, Dr. Jones switches Mrs. Smith and Mr. Miller to an older 
treatment alternative. 
In the coming weeks, while meeting with other asthma patients, Dr. Jones recalls the 
experiences of patients who tried Symbicort and continuously updates his quality beliefs 
about the new brand. He recalls, from his medical training, that he should consider the 
experiences of all his patients with the new drug (as large a sample as possible). Yet, Dr. 
Jones seems to recall the complaints of Mrs. Smith and Mr. Miller much more readily than 
the feedbacks provided by other patients. The complaints of Mrs. Smith and Mr. Miller 
are, therefore, particularly influential in Dr. Jones’ quality belief-formation about 
Symbicort and in his adoption decision. 
The objective of our model is to extend the Bayesian learning framework to enable it 
to accommodate the type of salience effects that Dr. Jones experiences while he learns 
about the quality of Symbicort. We find that a salience effect is indeed present and it 
affects physician learning. As to its magnitude, we find that feedback from patients who 
are salient in the physician’s mind receives between 7 and 10 times more weight than 
feedback from other patients. Physicians’ choices also exhibit within-patient persistence, 
suggesting that physicians (and patients) perceive a cost to switching treatment. 
Finally, our model brings valuable insights for firms launching new therapies, a high-
research priority area according to life sciences managers and marketing scholars 
(Stremersch 2008; Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009). In particular, salience slows down the 
adoption of new treatments. Using counterfactual simulations, we show that AstraZeneca 
could have increase its market share by as much as8.5 percentage points by eliminating 
salience for its new brand (Symbicort). Furthermore, if a policy maker is able to reduce 
model was confirmed by two experts (a lung specialist and the head of the pharmacy 
department of the medical school at our University).
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salience across all treatments, physicians adopt newer combination treatments significantly 
faster. We explore the managerial and policy implications of these findings. 
2. Salience in Physician Learning
We now discuss the antecedents and consequences of salience of patients subject to 
treatment switching. We also discuss other drivers of prescription choices.
Antecedents of salience of patients subject to treatment switching
Salience may result from medical ethics, cognition and emotion, which we discuss next, 
each in turn. First, medical practice rests on strong ethical foundations. The motto primum 
non nocere (first, do no harm) is a central ethical principle that guides the practice of 
medicine (Brewin 1994). Thus, physicians are under ethical and legal pressure to avoid any 
(unnecessary) risk that could potentially harm patients. This pressure may enhance the 
salience of patients who did not react to a treatment as expected and, consequently, had to 
be switched to a substitute treatment (an experience the physician wants to minimize in the 
future).
Second, psychological and neurological research suggests that we react more strongly 
to undesirable outcomes than to desirable ones (for an overview, see Baumeister et al. 
2001 and Rozin and Royzman 2001).During learning and information processing, negative 
information receives more attention and more elaboration than positive information 
(Baumeister et al. 2001). Switching a patient to a clinically equivalent treatment is an 
undesirable outcome for the physician, as it means the patient’s reaction to the treatment 
was different from what the doctor had hoped. Thus, the salience of switching patients may 
have a cognitive rationale.
Third, treatment switching usually reveals disconfirmation of physician or patient 
expectations from a treatment. Along the reasoning of Oliver (1993), disconfirmation of 
expectations provokes not only a cognitive response but also a negative affective response. 
Moreover, treatment switching can be seen by some patients as a correction to a prior 
decision and, consequently, perceived by the physician as a threat to her reputation. The 
ensuing negative emotions alert the physician to the need to eliminate or reduce the trigger 
of such threats (Taylor 1991). Salience of switching patients will then emerge as a natural 
15
consequence of these affective responses and of the human tendency to respond more 
strongly to negative than to positive emotions (Cacioppo and Gardner 1999). 
Consequences of salience of patients subject to treatment switching
Salience interferes with belief formation through the dynamics of over- and under-
confidence about different information signals. Griffin and Tversky (1992) show that when 
weighting evidence, humans tend to overreact to the extremeness and vividness of 
information (strength) irrespective of its predictive validity (weight). Compared with a 
normative statistical model- where evidence and prior beliefs are integrated using Bayes’ 
rule -experimental subjects in their studies were overconfident about evidence when 
strength was high and weight was low, but under-confident when strength was low and 
weight was high. 
According to Griffin and Tversky (1992) the overconfidence about salient information 
results from the combination of two cognitive shortcuts: anchoring and adjustment and 
representativeness (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). A third cognitive shortcut that can 
contribute to the influence of salience in belief formation is the availability heuristic 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Experimental and survey-based research indeed suggests 
that these heuristics interfere with medical decisions (Klein 2005; Poses and Anthony 
1991; Redelmeier 2005). 
As a result, we hypothesize that physicians give extra weight to feedback provided by 
easier to recall patients, i.e. those who are switched to an alternative treatment. The 
influence of feedback provided by switching patients will thus be systematically stronger 
than what is predicted by a pure Bayesian learning model.
Other drivers of prescription choices
In addition to quality beliefs, other effects might also drive treatment choices. First, we 
expect patients to face a switch cost whenever they change treatment, a cost the physician 
takes into account in her treatment choices. This switch cost is estimated controlling for 
quality perceptions, so it captures a non-quality based persistence, e.g. the psychological 
impact of changing treatments or the time and effort associated with switching drugs (see 
also Chan et al. 2010). Second, treatments can have serious side effects, so physicians may 
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be risk averse in their treatment choices. Thus, we allow for risk-aversion in our model 
specification. Note that substantial debate exists on physicians’ risk attitude, with some 
studies finding physicians to be risk neutral (Chintagunta et al. 2009; Narayanan et al. 
2005; Narayanan and Manchanda 2009), while others find physicians to be risk averse 
(Ching and Ishihara 2010; Coscelli and Shum 2004; Crawford and Shum 2005). Third, we 
control for marketing effects using a reduced-form approach, i.e. by letting marketing 
expenditures shift the utility levels of each treatment alternative (for a similar approach see 
Chintagunta et al. 2009). 
3. Model Specification
In this section, we first lay down the pure Bayesian learning component of our model. 
Next, we extend this specification by introducing salience in a quasi-Bayesian fashion. 
This structure clarifies that our quasi-Bayesian model nests its pure Bayesian counterpart. 
We close the section with the utility specification. Whenever we use mathematical 
symbols, i indexes physicians (i=1,…,N), p indexes patients (p=1,…,Pi being the patients 
of physician i), k indexes encounters (k=1,…,Ki being the encounters of physician i)and j
indexes treatments (j=1,…,J).
Pure Bayesian learning framework
We define mean quality of treatment j for physician I (Qij) as a general attribute that 
summarizes how well, across all patients of physician i, the treatment provides 
symptomatic relief (i.e. relief during asthma attacks) and maintains patient health (i.e. 
avoids recurrence of such attacks),while avoiding severe side effects (for a similar 
definition see, e.g., Narayanan et al. 2005). However, a certain treatment j will not work 
equally well for every patient. Therefore, we explicitly model patient heterogeneity, i.e. the 
across-patient variability of treatment quality ( 2,ipjqV ), in line with the work of 
Chintagunta et al. (2009). Thus, we define the true quality of treatment j for patient p,
visiting physician i, as the sum of the true mean quality of treatment j across all patients of 
physician i and a patient-specific deviation from this mean quality, i.e.:
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ipjijipj qQQ  , with ),0(~ 2,ipjqipj Nq V (2.1)
Next, we assume that, at the start of our data, each physician has a prior (uncertain) 
belief about Qij, treatment j’s mean quality and about qipj, the patient-treatment 
idiosyncratic deviation. We specify a normal distribution for these initial beliefs:
),(~
2
,0,0,0 ijQijij QNQ V (2.2)
),(~
2
,0,0,0 ipjqipjipj qNq V (2.3)
Here we assume that 0,0  ipjq , i.e. that when seeing a new patient, physician i
believes that the quality of treatment j, for that particular patient, is equal to the population 
mean. We also assume rational expectations, a common practice in Bayesian learning 
models (e.g. Crawford and Shum 2005; Narayanan and Manchanda 2009). Under this 
assumption physicians have correct initial beliefs about mean quality and quality 
dispersion across patients, even though they do not know the quality of each treatment for 
a specific patient. In our model this assumption means that ijij QQ  ,0 and 
2
,
2
,0 ipjqipjq VV  .Starting from these prior beliefs, physicians learn about treatment quality 
in order to(i) reduce the uncertainty surrounding their mean quality belief and (ii) learn 
about each patient’s idiosyncratic deviation from a treatment’s mean quality.
We assume physicians learn from their clinical experience, i.e. from the feedback 
provided by their patients. At the start of each medical encounter, a patient provides a 
feedback signal about the treatment that was prescribed in her last encounter. These 
feedback signals are truthful but noisy. That is, if at encounter k physician i receives a 
feedback signal from patient p about treatment j, we assume this feedback signal to be 
normally distributed:
 2 ,, ,~| iFipjipjkipj QNQF V (2.4)
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Note that Bayesian learning guarantees that, even though patients only provide 
feedback about the last treatment their physician prescribed them, physician i’s treatment 
choices are influenced by the feedbacks from all patients on all treatments. The 
information set of physician i, at encounter k, is then the clinical history of all her patients, 
which can be summarized by the average of each patient’s feedback signals up to and 
including encounter k (denoted kipjF , ).
Our assumptions of normally distributed prior beliefs and feedback signals guarantees 
that physician i's posterior beliefs are also normally distributed. Specifically, physician i’s 
posterior belief, at encounter k, about the mean (across-patient) quality of treatment j is:
),(~~
2
,,,, kijQkijkij QNQ V (2.5)
The mean and the variance in Equation (2.5) result from the assumption that physician 
i integrates each patient’s clinical history ( kipjF , ) with her prior beliefs according to Bayes’ 
rule (Chintagunta et al. 2009; DeGroot 1970; see online Appendix II.A for the derivation). 
That is, denoting the number of feedbacks provided by patient p to physician i about 
treatment j up to and including encounter k by p kijn , we can write:
¦ 
 
p
kipj
ipjq
p
kijiF
kijQ
p
kij
ij
ijQ
kijQ
kij Fn
n
QQ ,2
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2
,
2
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2
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V
V
V
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where
  12,,2 ,,2 ,02 ,, 1

»¼
º«¬
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p
ipjq
p
kijiF
p
kijijQkijQ nn VVVV . (2.7)
Similarly, physician i’s posterior belief, at encounter k, about patient p’s idiosyncratic 
deviation from this mean quality is defined as:
),(~~
2
,,,, kipjqkipjkipj qNq V (2.8)
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The mean, in Equation (2.8), results from physician i’s Bayesian updating of her initial 
prior belief about this deviation ( 0,ipjq ) with the observed difference between the mean of 
patient p’s feedback signals about treatment j up to and including encounter k ( kipjF , ) and 
physician i’s belief, at encounter k, about the mean quality of treatment j across patients 
( kijQ , ), i.e.: 
 
  kijkipj
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where 
   12 ,,2 ,02 ,, 1  iFp kijipjqkipjq n VVV . (2.10) 
 
The expected quality (i.e. the mean belief of physician i) of prescribing treatment j to the 
patient visiting at occasion k is obtained by adding Equations (2.6) and (2.9).We now 
introduce salience and, afterwards, discuss dynamics in physicians’ uncertainty about the 
quality of each treatment. 
 
Introducing salience 
We modify Bayesian learning in order to incorporate the different roles of information 
weight and information salience, or strength as referred by Griffin and Tversky (1992).  
Specifically, weight depends on (i) the variance of patient feedback signals ( 2 ,iFV ), (ii) the 
variances of physician i’s prior quality beliefs ( 2 ,0 ijQV and 2 ,0 ipjqV ) and (iii) the number of 
feedback signals provided by each patient. We introduce a salience parameter, Ȧipj,k, which 
quantifies the extra weight - when compared with the pure Bayesian learning weight – 
given by physician i to the feedbacks of a patient, p, who was subject to treatment 
switching. We define SWITCHipj,k as a dummy variable that assumes the value one if, 
before encounter k, patient p has been switched away from treatment j and has not yet been 
prescribed treatment j again (until the start of encounter k). We then introduce the impact 
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of salience in physician i’s posterior belief about the mean quality of treatment j as 
follows:
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Please note that the expression in Equation (2.12) is not the variance of physician i’s 
belief about the mean quality of j as would be the case in a pure Bayesian setting. This is 
because in our model physicians’ beliefs are affected by salience and, hence, they learn in 
a quasi-Bayesian manner (see Boulding et al. 1999; Rabin and Schrag 1999). After a 
treatment switch, a physician changes the relative weight she gives to the feedbacks of the 
switching patient about the abandoned treatment vis-à-vis her prior belief and the feedback 
of other patients. The resulting posterior belief will, therefore, necessarily depart from a 
pure Bayesian belief. Given that Bayes’ rule is the optimal way to learn, we expect this 
departure to be manifested in slower learning. In sum, we specify a quasi-Bayesian 
learning model which incorporates salience effects but is equivalent to a pure Bayesian 
learning model in case Ȧipj,k= 0.
Note that salience predicts a systematic misinterpretation of patient feedbacks about 
the quality of abandoned treatments. In contrast, salience does not predict any systematic 
bias in physicians’ belief-updating for any other treatment alternative. Therefore, 
physicians’ choice of a new treatment will always reveal physician’s preference for that 
treatment, irrespectively of whether the patient was switched from another treatment or is a 
new patient6.
In order to test whether salience is a temporary or permanent phenomenon, and 
whether its magnitude changes with temporal distance from the focal switch, we 
operationalize salience using three parameters:
6 We thank the Associate Editor and an anonymous reviewer for pointing out to us the 
need to clarify this issue.
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with the weight given to the immediate magnitude of salience ( i,0Z ), vis-à-vis the long-
term magnitude of salience ( i,fZ ), decreasing over time as follows: 
 > @^ `)()(exp12, swipjikipj tk WWOO ZZ  . Here, ĲN denotes the calendar date of 
encounter k and )( ,
sw
kipjtW the calendar date of the last occasion when patient p had to be 
switched away from treatment j in favor of one of the clinically equivalent treatments. The 
rate of decay is governed by the parameter ZOi , which is assumed positive. 
If salience interferes with the formation of mean quality beliefs, as specified in 
Equation (2.11), indirectly, it will also interfere with physicians’ beliefs about patient-
treatment idiosyncratic deviations, i.e.:
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The posterior belief of a quasi-Bayesian physician about the quality of treatment j for 
patient p, visiting at encounter k is then again the sum of her posterior belief about the 
mean quality of treatment j ( ZkijQ ,
~
) and her posterior belief about patient p’s idiosyncratic 
deviation from this mean ( Z kipjq ,~ ), i.e.:
 2 ,,,,,, ,~~ kipjQkipjkijkipj qQNQ ZZZZ V (2.15)
The posterior variance in Equation (2.15) describes how the uncertainty about the 
quality of treatment j for patient p, for a quasi-Bayesian physician, evolves over time, i.e.:
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We provide the derivation of 2 ,,, kipjQ ZV in online Appendix II.B. If the estimated 
salience ( kipj ,Z ) is different from zero, it provides evidence in favor of our hypothesized 
deviation from Bayesian updating. As a final note, the distribution of physician i's beliefs, 
across all patients at encounter k, results in a structure like the one derived in Chintagunta 
et al. (2009).
Utility specification
In line with previous research (e.g. Erdem and Keane 1996; Narayanan and Manchanda 
2009), we assume that, at each encounter k, physician i chooses the treatment j that, 
according to her beliefs, maximizes the expected utility of patient p, which is given by:
kipjkijkipjikipjQikipjkijkipj MARKETINGLASTCHOICErqQU ,,,
2
,,,,,, 2
1 HGV ZZZ  (2.17)
In this specification ri is the absolute risk aversion coefficient, which measures each 
physician’s risk attitude. A positive ri indicates that physicians are risk averse, i.e. less 
inclined to prescribe a treatment when quality uncertainty is larger. Quality uncertainty 
enters the utility function via 2 ,,, kipjQ ZV , the posterior variance of
Z
kipjQ ,
~
, as defined in 
Equation (2.16). LASTCHOICEipj,k is a dummy variable assuming the value one if the 
physician prescribed treatment j to patient p in their last encounter and įi is a parameter 
capturing switch costs, i.e. a propensity of physician i to prescribe to patient p the same 
treatment j that had been prescribed in their last encounter. To control for the impact of 
marketing efforts we use MARKETINGij,k, which is a flexible function of the market-level 
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marketing expenditures7. Finally, İipj,k is an error term capturing unobserved drivers of 
utility at encounter k. We assume these errors to be normally distributed and allow for 
between-treatment co-variation, i.e. İip,k[Jx1] ~ N(Ȉ). Our data provides a natural structure 
for the correlations across treatments8.
4. Data
The market we study is the obstructive airways diseases category (i.e. asthma and chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease or COPD), more in particular the class of inhaled 
corticosteroids (ICS) plus long-DFWLQJ ȕ2-agonist (LABA) combinations, in the 
Netherlands. By 2017, global sales of medications for asthma and COPD are expected to 
reach $25 billion with ICS plus LABA combinations becoming the leading class in value 
(Datamonitor 2008). ICS plus LABA combinations are recommended for patients with 
moderately severe asthma (GINA - Global Initiative for Asthma 2006) and chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (Calverley et al. 2007). 
We model treatment choice among eight clinically equivalent treatments. These 
include six two-inhaler combinations of the three ICS’s (Beclomethasone, Budesonide, 
Fluticasone) and two LABA’s (Formoterol and Salmeterol) recommended by clinical 
guidelines (GINA 2006), and two newer single-inhaler brands – GlaxoSmithKline’s 
Seretide (Fluticasone + Salmeterol; approved in 1999; branded as Advair in the U.S.) and 
AstraZeneca’s Symbicort (Budesonide + Formoterol; approved in 2001). Our data contains 
the introduction of Symbicort and covers a period of growing popularity, among 
physicians, of ICS plus LABA combinations, which is an ideal setting to model physician 
learning about the quality of different treatment alternatives within this category.
7 In short, in MARKETINGij,k we integrate two components: (i) temporal responsiveness to 
marketing actions, assumed equal across physicians and molecules but changing over time 
and (ii) physician-specific marketing responsiveness, which is assumed constant over time. 
We will discuss in greater detail our specification of marketing after we have introduced 
our data.
8 We distinguish between (i) treatment- and encounter-specific shocks which are 
independent across treatments and (ii) ingredient- or administration-specific shocks which 
can affect all treatments which share a certain molecular ingredient or route of 
administration.
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Figure 2.1 depicts the evolution of prescription shares over time, in our sample, of the 
older two-inhaler treatments and the two newer combination brands. Roughly one year 
after the start of the observation period, Seretide had a higher prescription share than all 
the two-inhaler treatments together. Symbicort eventually reached a prescription share 
similar to Seretide, but only five years after its entry.
Figure 2.1 Prescription shares (three month moving average)
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We obtained electronic patient records from July 2001 to June 2006, from the IPCI 
(Integrated Primary Care Information) database9, a panel of General Practitioners, 
maintained by the School of Medicine at our university (for a detailed description see Vlug 
et al. 1999). These physicians use paperless offices, meaning that the system records the 
full prescription history of each patient, including all refills. The data from this panel is 
often used for research publications in medicine and pharmaco-epidemiology. Usage of the 
9 In fact, we have access to prescription data before July 2001 but we were only able to 
gather marketing data, which we will describe shortly, from July 2001 onwards. Still, we 
used data before July 2001 to initiate the switch cost variable. Moreover, although the 
formal approval of Symbicort was in January 2001, in our data only two prescriptions are 
recorded before July 2001. 
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data is supervised by a board of medical professionals and linking the data to other sources 
at the individual physician level, is prohibited. 
The panel contains both single- and multi-physician practices. To ensure that we 
model belief-formation using all the relevant clinical experience for each physician, we 
only use data on single-physician practices. The data contains 2,398 patients across 22 
physicians, and 12,186 prescription choices (of ICS plus LABA treatments)10. We 
obtained data on monthly expenditures on marketing (including detailing, journal 
advertising and conferences), for the respective treatments and time period from IMS 
Health. We use this data to construct, for each treatment and occasion the marketing 
variable introduced in Equation (2.17) as follows:
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Here, L=6 represents the number of lagged monthly marketing expenditures that, in 
our model, affect a treatment’s utility, I(two-inhalers) is an indicator function assuming the 
value one if treatment j combines the preventive (ICS) and reliever (LABA) molecules in 
two distinct inhalers, and zero if these two molecules are combined in the same inhaler and 
m(k) indicates the calendar month of encounter k (contemporaneous marketing 
expenditures, i.e. when l=0, are adjusted for the timing of the encounter within a given 
month).
Table 2.1 presents a switching matrix among two-inhaler treatments, Seretide and 
Symbicort. It shows that physicians tend to switch patients away from two-inhaler
treatments to Seretide (140 switches, i.e. 30.1% of the 458 switches) or to Symbicort (84 
switches, i.e. 18.3% of the 458 switches). Yet, we also observe 43 switches from Seretide 
and 35 from Symbicort to two-inhaler treatments (i.e. 78 switches in total, or 17% of the 
458 switches) as well as between the Seretide and Symbicort. Column five shows the 
10 In order to avoid concerns with patient drop-out in our data, we have compared the 
prescription shares in the full sample with the shares among patients who have dropped of 
the panel and found no significant differences.
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switching rate as a percentage of the total number of prescriptions (which are, in turn, 
displayed in column six).
Table 2.1 Switching matrix
From         To Two-inhaler treatments Seretide Symbicort Switch rate
Total 
number of 
prescrs.
Two-inhaler 
treatments 67 140 84 6.24% 3,592
Seretide 43 0 50 1.69% 5,506
Symbicort 35 39 0 2.40% 3,088
Let us now define a spell as a sequence of consecutive prescriptions of the same 
treatment (Crawford and Shum 2005). Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics for our data. 
On average, a patient receives five prescriptions. The average number of spells per patient 
is 1.22 (we observe a total of 2,926 spells across the 2,398 patients) and, on average, each 
spell consists of 4.16 prescriptions. The average number of spells is very close to previous 
studies (Chintagunta et al. 2009; Crawford and Shum 2005). The mean length of each spell 
is larger than prior studies because we deal with patients having a moderate to severe 
chronic disease. 
Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics – Patient visits
Measure Mean SD Min. Max.
Number of prescription occasions 
per patient 5.08 5.85 1 50
Number of spells per patient 1.22 0.68 1 10
Spell length 4.16 4.84 1 41
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5. Estimation and Identification
Estimation
We estimate our model in a Bayesian fashion, using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) approach. We sample the parameters from their posterior distributions using a 
Gibbs sampler (see Casella and George 1992 for a review) together with data augmentation 
that allows us to sample the latent utilities and patient feedbacks alongside the model 
parameters (Tanner and Wong 1987). In addition, in line with Narayanan and Manchanda 
(2009), we use a hierarchical Bayes structure to model unobserved physician 
heterogeneity. We adapt McCulloch and Rossi’s (1994) Gibbs sampler for hierarchical 
multinomial Probit models to account for Bayesian or quasi-Bayesian learning. The main 
difference, besides having to use data augmentation to sample patient feedbacks, is that we 
do not have a closed form solution for the posterior distributions of (i) the variances 
characterizing physicians’ initial uncertainty and patient heterogeneity ({ 2 ,0 ijQV } and 
{ 2 ,0 ipjqV }), (ii) the variance of patients’ feedbacks ( 2 ,iFV ) and (iii) the salience parameters 
(Ȧ0,i, ȦL and ZOi ). To sample these parameters, we apply a Metropolis-Hastings step 
(Chib and Greenberg 1995) within our Gibbs-sampler. We specify proper but diffuse priors 
for all parameters. The exact implementation of our Gibbs sampler is given in online 
Appendix II.C. We let all chains converge and use 5,000 subsequent draws to obtain 
parameter estimates.
Identification
The structure of Bayesian learning and the dynamics in prescription shares– including the 
introduction of a new treatment (Symbicort) – help us in identification of the learning 
parameters. When Symbicort is introduced, physicians are uncertain about its quality and 
learning helps them reduce such uncertainty over time. The velocity of this reduction 
depends on the noise in feedback signals ( 2 ,iFV ) and on the variances characterizing prior 
quality uncertainty and patient heterogeneity ( 2 ,0 ijQV and 2,ipjqV ).
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To identify 2 ,0 ijQV and 2,ipjqV , we rely on the attractiveness of a treatment for new 
versus old patients. Bayesian updating guarantees that the uncertainty surrounding the 
mean quality of a treatment ( 2 ,0 ijQV ) tends to zero after a large enough number of signals. 
At this point, the reluctance of a physician to prescribe that treatment to a new patient 
(which also does not depend on switch costs) enables identification of 2,ipjqV .
The assumption that physicians have rational expectations enables the dynamics in the 
choices of treatments with higher versus lower quality uncertainty to identify risk-aversion 
(ri) and switch costs (įi). If quality expectations are on average correct, relative 
sluggishness in prescribing treatments with higher associated uncertainty to new patients is 
driven by risk aversion (ri>0). Sluggishness in switching revisiting patients to treatments 
that the physician has already adopted for new patients enables identification of the switch 
cost parameter (įi). Thus, an overall unwillingness to try more uncertain treatments 
identifies risk-aversion while an unwillingness to switch revisiting patients away from a
certain treatment identifies switch costs.
The salience parameters (Ȧ0,i, ȦL and ZOi ) are identified by systematic changes in 
behavior triggered by the decision to switch a patient to a clinically equivalent alternative. 
For instance, if a physician starts adopting Symbicort to several patients at a certain pace 
but, after switching a patient away from Symbicort, slows down this adoption process 
more than what Bayes’ rule would predict, this reduction in the speed of adoption is 
captured by Ȧ0,i. If the strength of this effect changes over time, our model will capture 
such dynamics through ZOi and ȦL. Please note that it is not possible to identify the sign of 
the decay parameter separately from the levels of the two salience parameters. We avoid 
this identification issue by restricting ZOi to be positive.
For the marketing parameters ( Mkt1ȕ and Mkti2,ȕ ) identification is straightforward. 
Controlling for learning and switch costs, the effect of marketing efforts on the 
attractiveness of alternative treatments is identified by the responsiveness, in terms of 
prescription choices, of physicians to variations in the marketing effort variables. For 
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identification purposes, we assume that the temporal marketing responsiveness parameters 
add up to one.
Unrestricted multinomial Probit models suffer from additional identification issues as 
choice probabilities are invariant to location or scale transformations of the latent utilities 
(Rossi et al. 2005). Hence, we normalize the scale and location of the utility levels by 
restricting the quality of a reference alternative - the two-inhaler combination of 
Fluticasone and Salmeterol – to zero and the variance of the error term of the reference 
alternative to 1. Note that especially the latter has implications for comparability of 
estimation results across models (c.f. Swait and Louviere 1993). Estimates of the utility 
levels, variances, marketing effects, but also risk aversion and switch costs, will be 
affected by the restriction in the variance of the error terms and by the amount of 
unexplained variation actually present in the behavior under consideration. 
As a final note, this type of models is demanding in terms of identification. To 
guarantee that our results are robust, we have run our focal models using a different set of 
priors. Even though we made priors much more diffuse, by increasing prior variances by a 
factor of 10, results were largely unchanged which suggests that identification of our 
model is achieved without relying on information contained in the priors. Furthermore, we 
have also simulated data according to our model and were able to recover the parameters 
very well.
6. Results
Posterior estimates of the relevant parameters are obtained directly from the sample of 
MCMC draws. In order to isolate the contribution of salience, we compare the following 
models: (M0) a pure Bayesian learning model,(M1) a quasi-Bayesian learning model with 
static salience (i.e. iii ,0, ZZZ   f ) and (M2) a quasi-Bayesian learning model with 
dynamic salience. Following the suggestion of Rossi et al. (2005, p.168) to focus on the 
log-likelihood to verify convergence, we apply Raftery and Lewis’s (1992) I-stat and 
Geweke’s (1992) convergence tests on the log-likelihood for all three models, which 
confirmed that the chains have converged. 
Next, we compare the fit of the models using log-marginal densities (LMDs) and log-
Bayes factors (Kass and Raftery 1995). The two quasi-Bayesian learning models (LMDM1=
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-19,518and LMDM2 = -19,509) clearly outperformed the pure Bayesian learning 
benchmark (LMDM0 = -27,845). This provides strong evidence that any of the quasi-
Bayesian learning models is a posteriori more likely than the pure Bayesian learning 
model, assuming equal prior probabilities for all models. The log-Bayes Factor of the 
model with dynamic salience (M2) with respect to the model with non-dynamic salience 
(M1) is also above 5, the threshold suggested by Kass and Raftery (1995, p.777) for strong 
evidence in favor of the best fitting model, which supports dynamics in salience effects. 
Lastly, including two different patient feedback signal variances (one for the first 
encounter and another for subsequent encounters) in order to accommodate experience 
effects in the patient-physician relationship, did not improve the quasi-Bayesian learning 
models (M1 and M2) based on log-Bayes factors. We now turn to the parameter estimates 
and their interpretation. 
 
Parameter estimates: Salience 
A key finding from our model is the strong salience effect triggered by the decision to 
switch a patient to an alternative treatment option (see first three rows of Table 2.3). When 
learning about the quality of a treatment, feedback from patients subject to treatment 
switching receives between 7 and 10times more weight ( 05.9,0  iZ  with SD = 
0.432, 31.6,  f iZ  with SD = 0.435, and 27.1 ZOi with SD = 0.566)11 than a pure 
Bayesian learning model would predict. 
We now turn to the dynamics in salience effects. We fix ZOi  at its mean and compute 
the magnitude of salience since the time of a switch until one year after the switch based 
on the medians of i,0Z and i,fZ . We find that 56% of the total decay from the immediate 
level of salience ( i,0Z ) to its steady state level ( i,fZ ) occurs in one year time. Thus, we 
find evidence for a significant but slow decay in salience. 
                                                          
11 The values of 7 and 10 are obtained by adding one to our estimates of 
i,fZ and i,0Z , as 
the impact of salience in the utility is determined by )1( ,, kipjkipj SWITCHZ . We use SD to 
denote the standard deviation across all the MCMC draws used for posterior inference. 
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We also find significant physician heterogeneity in salience effects. In order to 
determine whether physician heterogeneity is significant, we follow Narayanan and 
Manchanda’s (2009) approach of contrasting each parameter’s across-physician standard 
deviations with the within-physician standard deviations. If the physician-specific 95% 
credible intervals for a certain parameter do not overlap, then the across-physician standard 
deviation of that parameter needs to be larger than the corresponding within-physician 
standard deviation. From the last two columns of Table 2.3, we can see that the across-
physician variation is substantially larger than the within-physician variation, suggesting 
significant heterogeneity in salience effects.
Table 2.3 Parameter estimates (salience, switch costs, risk aversion and feedback 
error)
Parameter
Posterior 
median 
[95% credible 
intervals]
Across-
physician 
standard 
deviation
Within-
physician 
standard 
deviation
Immediate salience effect ( i,0Z ) 9.05 1.21 1.04
[8.18; 9.89]
Long-run salience effect ( i,fZ ) 6.31 1.56 1.05
[5.43; 7.11]
Salience decay ( ZOi ) 1.27 2.18 1.32
[0.14; 2.28]
Switch costs ( iG ) 2.78 0.18 0.16
[2.57; 3.03]
Absolute risk aversion ( ir ) 0.60 0.86 0.60
[-0.53; 1.76]
Patient feedback error ( 2 ,iFV ) 0.66 0.39 0.14
[0.53; 0.81]
Notes. The estimates reported in the second column are the medians, across all MCMC 
draws, of the population mean parameter in the second level of our hierarchical model 
(i.e. the mean in the random coefficients distribution). In parentheses, we report the 2.5th
and the 97.5th percentiles of the distribution of these MCMC draws. In the last two 
columns we report the across-physician standard deviations (the standard deviation of the 
physician-specific means of each parameter) and within-physician standard deviations 
(the mean of the physician-specific standard deviations of each parameter), in line with 
Narayanan and Manchanda (2009). 
32 
 
Salience has two major effects on prescription behavior. First, because it represents a 
departure from optimal Bayesian learning, it tends to slow down physician learning about 
the quality of new treatments, which delays its adoption by physicians. Second, in the long 
run, it benefits treatments that generate fewer switches (i.e. that have higher quality, lower 
treatment heterogeneity or that are targeted to patients that will benefit the most from 
them). In the next section, we will quantify the overall impact of the salience effect on the 
market. 
 
Parameter estimates: Switch costs 
The parameter measuring patient switch costs ( iG =2.78 with SD =0.121) suggests that, on 
top of uncertainty-driven persistence, physicians exhibit a strong tendency to prescribe the 
same treatment for a certain patient even when they believe that an alternative treatment 
could perform better for this specific patient. This finding is in line with the findings of 
Chan et al. (2010) and Coscelli (2000). Physician heterogeneity in these switch costs 
seems only marginally significant, as the across-physician and the within-physician 
standard deviations are close to each other.  
 
Parameter estimates: Absolute risk aversion 
The mean risk-aversion parameter is positive and the standard deviation of the draws is of 
similar magnitude ( ir = 0.60, SD = 0.584). We computed the percentage of draws 
indicating risk aversion (i.e. 0!ir ) for each of the physicians in our sample and found 
that all except one physician have the majority of the MCMC draws with positive risk 
aversion and, for more than half of the physicians, at least 90% of the draws indicate risk 
aversion. Finally, we find that physicians show significant heterogeneity in their risk 
attitudes, with the across-physician standard deviation being much larger than the within-
physician standard deviation (0.86 vs. 0.60), a finding in line with evidence from medicine 
(Fiscella et al. 2000). 
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Parameter estimates: Patient feedback error 
To understand the magnitude of patients’ feedback errors ( 2 ,iFV =0.66 with SD= 0.07) we 
simulated physician uncertainty about the mean quality of Symbicort and analyzed how 
long it takes a physician to reduce such uncertainty. On average, a pure Bayesian physician 
needs to receive 26 patient feedback signals (each patient providing a single feedback) to 
reduce her uncertainty by 90%. If the same physician learns in a quasi-Bayesian fashion, 
i.e. giving more weight to the feedbacks of salient patients, then she needs 38 signals, all 
from salient patients, to obtain the same reduction in uncertainty. Thus, as we would 
expect from the fact that salience represents a deviation from optimal Bayesian learning, 
salience reduces physicians’ speed of learning, which, everything else constant, results in 
slower adoption. We explore managerial and patient welfare implications of salience in the 
next two sections. 
 
Parameter estimates: Marketing efforts 
We now discuss the impact of marketing efforts on treatment utility and choice. We divide 
marketing responsiveness in two effects: (i) temporal marketing responsiveness, which we 
use to describe how the effect of pharmaceutical companies’ marketing efforts builds up 
over time (an effect we assume common across physicians and treatments) and (ii) 
molecule- and physician-specific marketing responsiveness, which is assumed constant 
over time.  
In order to describe temporal marketing responsiveness, in Figure 2.2 we depict the 
cumulative temporal marketing responsiveness effect since the period a marketing 
investment is effected until L months have passed since such investment 
(i.e. ¦
 
 
1
0
,1
L
l
Mkt
lLCTMR E with L=1,…,7). For identification, the sum of the temporal 
marketing responsiveness parameters is restricted to one. Hence, the curves in Figure 2.2, 
represent the fraction of the total marketing responsiveness that has already affected 
physician i's prescription behavior when L months have passed since marketing was 
expended. We can conclude that marketing effects gradually build up from the first to the 
seventh month after the investment is made. 
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Figure 2.2 Cumulative temporal marketing responsiveness 
 
Notes. In the horizontal axis we depict the number of months elapsed since the focal 
marketing investment. For illustrative purposes we start the graph from zero, hence ‘1’ in 
the horizontal axis refers to the contemporaneous marketing and ‘7’ refers to the 6th lag of 
temporal marketing responsiveness. In the vertical-axis, we depict the sum of the temporal 
marketing responsiveness parameters up to and including the lag indicated in the 
horizontal axis. The lines depict the 2.5th (lower dashed line), the median (solid line) and 
the 97.5th (upper dashed line) percentiles, across all MCMC draws, of CTMRL (for L = 
1,…,7). 
 
In terms of the molecule- and physician-specific marketing responsiveness, our 
estimates show that marketing efforts to promote Seretide and Symbicort 
( 12.0.,2  CombiE , SD = 0.05 and 95% Cred. Int. = [0.03; 0.22]) significantly drive 
prescription choices. In contrast, marketing expenditures for ICS’s ( 01.0,2  ICSiE , SD = 
0.05 and 95% Cred. Int. = [-0.11; 0.08]) and for LABA’s ( 06.0,2  LABAiE , SD = 0.05 and 
95% Cred. Int. = [-0.03; 0.16]) do not significantly affect prescription behavior, in line 
with prior research showing effectiveness of pharmaceutical marketing to be higher for 
new than for mature treatments (Narayanan et al. 2005; Neslin 2001). 
Parameter estimates: Treatment characteristics 
Table 2.4, below, summarizes the posterior medians (and 95% credible intervals) for each 
treatment’s true mean quality ( ijQ ), initial physician uncertainty about the mean quality 
belief ( 2 ,0 ijQV ) and patient heterogeneity ( 2,ipjqV ). 
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Table 2.4 Parameter estimates: Treatment quality perceptions
Treatment
Alternative ijQ
2
,0 ijQV 2,ipjqV
1 – Fluticasone + Salmeterol 0.87 0.80
[0.68; 1.09] [0.60; 0.97]
2 – Fluticasone + Formoterol -0.06 0.69 1.34
[-0.30; 0.22] [0.57; 0.85] [1.10; 1.67]
3 – Beclomethasone + Salmeterol -0.04 1.06 0.76
[-0.30; 0.17] [0.81; 1.41] [0.61; 0.90]
4 – Beclomethasone + Formoterol -0.24 0.68 1.09
[-0.46; 0.00] [0.56; 0.88] [0.91; 1.29]
5 – Budesonide + Salmeterol -0.02 0.92 0.98
[-0.24; 0.18] [0.79; 1.07] [0.81; 1.16]
6 – Budesonide + Formoterol 0.14 0.67 1.04
[-0.10; 0.38] [0.57; 0.80] [0.88; 1.23]
7 - Seretide 0.25 0.74 0.80
[0.04; 0.46] [0.60; 0.94] [0.65; 0.93]
8 - Symbicort 0.10 1.30 0.89
[-0.12; 0.33] [1.05; 1.61] [0.74; 1.03]
Notes. Fluticasone + Salmeterol, is the reference treatment alternative; Seretide contains 
Fluticasone and Salmeterol and Symbicort contains Budesonide and Formoterol.
In terms of true mean qualities, we find that the fourth treatment alternative (two-
inhalers combining Beclomethasone and Formoterol) is the one with lowest quality while 
Seretide is perceived as the best treatment, on average. This finding is consistent with the 
results from a pure Bayesian learning model. In fact, the only relevant difference between 
the two models is that, in the quasi-Bayesian learning model, Seretide’s quality is 
significantly higher than the remaining alternatives. In contrast, in the pure Bayesian 
learning model, the estimate for the mean quality of Seretide was very close to zero.
In terms of face validity, the results from our quasi-Bayesian learning model (M2) are 
consistent with medical studies, which show that the different treatment alternatives in this 
category are equivalent in terms of efficacy and side effects (Marks and Ind 2005). The 
fact that Seretide seems to be perceived, by the physicians in our sample, as having higher 
mean quality than the remaining treatments is also consistent with evidence from the 
industry indicating that AstraZeneca’s initial differentiation strategy – which was to allow 
patients to adjust the dosing of the ICS’s component - may have been received with 
skepticism by many physicians, who believed that a fixed dosing of ICS was actually one 
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of the advantages of combination treatments12. These differences indicate that treatments 
are also characterized by other dimensions such as dosage, administration method and 
convenience (Venkataraman and Stremersch 2007).
The estimates for initial uncertainty about the mean quality of each treatment also 
have high face validity in our model. Symbicort, the newest treatment, shows the highest 
mean quality uncertainty ( 30.12 ,0  iSYMBIQV , SD = 0.142), while Seretide, which had 
been introduced two years before the start of our data and was, at the time, already the 
most prescribed treatment shows significantly lower prior mean quality uncertainty 
( 74.02 ,0  iSEREQV , SD = 0.089, with all draws having 2 ,0 iSYMBIQV > 2 ,0 iSEREQV ). Finally, 
physicians perceive patient heterogeneity (
2
,ipjqV ) as similar across all treatments.
7. Effects of Salience on Market Shares
Having established the presence of strong salience effects in physician learning, we now 
quantify the consequences of this behavioral regularity at the market level. We use the 
posterior draws from the quasi-Bayesian learning model with dynamic salience (M2) to 
simulate market shares under two counterfactual experiments:  (i) our model with salience 
set to zero only for Symbicort and (ii) our model with salience set to zero for all 
treatments. The first counterfactual experiment tests whether reducing salience can be a 
useful objective for firms to pursue while the second tests whether salience produces 
significant deviations from normative prescription behavior (a potential welfare concern).
Figure 2.3 depicts the results of our counterfactual experiments. Each bar represents 
the mean predicted market share for two-inhaler treatments, Seretide and Symbicort. Each 
of the three blocks represents one of the scenarios we compare. The first thing to note is 
that, if AstraZeneca would have been able to eliminate salience for Symbicort (second 
block in Figure 2.3), it would have significantly increased its market share. The share of 
12 See for example Datamonitor’s report named “Symbicort and Seretide's battle for the 
respiratory market”: 
http://www.datamonitor.com/store/News/symbicort_and_seretides_battle_for_the_respirat
ory_market?productid=489DA887-A5B9-4660-B285-29D22EC64F6A, last accessed April 
2010.
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Symbicort increased, on average, by 8.5 percentage points (from 0.279 to 0.364) with 
99.6% of the simulations showing an increase in market share13.This significant increase in 
Symbicort’s share was mainly achieved at the expense of older two-inhaler alternatives, 
which lost an average of 5 percentage points (from 0.284 to 0.234) with more than 98% of 
the simulations resulting in a decrease of these treatments’ share. Hence, if a company 
alone is able to eliminate, or at least reduce, salience effects, it can reap significant market 
benefits. Moreover, with an additional counterfactual experiment we find that a reduction 
of 50% in salience achieved about one third of the total market share effect of a full 
elimination of salience. Thus, in the managerial implications section we discuss possible 
salience-reducing strategies to achieve such goal.
Finally, the shares predicted by a model with salience set to zero for all brands shows 
that, in general, newer treatments benefit from salience elimination. The share of two-
inhaler treatments decreased, on average, by 6 percentage points (from 0.284 to 0.224), 
with 99% of the simulations resulting in a decrease for these older treatment alternatives. 
In contrast, Seretide’s share increased on average, by 1.5 percentage points (from 0.437 to 
0.453). We observed increases in 74% of the simulations. The prescription share of the 
newest entrant – Symbicort – increased 4.5 percentage points (from 0.279 to 0.324), with 
89% of the simulations showing an increase.
These results indicate that, in the market we study, the prevalence of salience effects 
in physician learning resulted in systematic changes in prescription shares, potentially with 
an associated welfare loss: salience (of the feedbacks) of switching patients slows 
physician learning and significantly delays the adoption of newer treatments in favor of 
older treatments. 
13 Note that we compare the realizations of the market shares for the two models that are 
based on the same set of realizations for the patient quality matches, feedback signals, etc.
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Figure 2.3 Mean predicted market shares with and without salience
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
0.350
0.400
0.450
0.500
Quasi-bayesian learning w/ 
salience
Salience eliminated for 
Symbicort
Salience eliminated for all 
treatments
Two-Inhalers Seretide Symbicort
8. Additional Analyses on Salience
Realizing that some concerns may persist regarding the psychological process behind the 
treatment switching effect we document, we conducted additional analyses to test the 
robustness of our salience interpretation. We have run a survey among 156 GPs and asked 
these physicians to rate the importance of different drivers of their decision to prescribe an 
older or a newer treatment. Specifically, we compared our salience explanation with 
competing psychological explanations (fear about the new treatment’s side effects, need to 
justify the decision, or potential regret). Salience was rated as significantly higher, 
confirming our expectations. 
Another possible concern is that, in addition to salience, the treatment switching effect 
may be driven by a correlated unobservable like detailing. If a physician’s decision to
switch patients away from a certain treatment and the choice of the new treatment are 
driven by detailing, and if detailing also alters long-term market shares, our salience 
estimate could be inflated. We used two strategies to alleviate this concern14. First, in the 
physician survey we conducted, we also included detailing as a possible driver of 
14 We thank the review team for bringing this issue to our attention and suggesting 
strategies to deal with this problem.
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prescription choices. Detailing was rated as significantly less important than salience by 
the 156 physicians. Second, please note that – if we consider a switch from treatment A to 
treatment B - salience predicts a penalty effect in the utility of treatment A while detailing 
predicts a bonus effect in the utility of treatment B. Hence, we estimated a pure Bayesian 
learning model where we allow the number of switch-outs and the number of switch-ins to 
affect each treatment’s utility. We find that in more than 95% of the draws the (negative) 
effect of switch-outs is substantially stronger than the (positive) effect of switch-ins. This 
implies that switches affect the treatment that was abandoned most, in line with our 
salience interpretation.
9. Managerial and Public Policy Implications
Two major findings emerged from our counterfactual experiments. First, a firm that is able 
to eliminate or reduce salience for its treatment can gain an important competitive 
advantage. Considering that Symbicort had global sales, in the period 2001-2006, of 
$3,918 million, the significant increase of 8.5 percentage points in its prescription share 
when its salience was set to zero would have represented a gain of $333 million in sales. 
Second, setting salience to zero for all treatments confirmed that salience delays physician 
adoption of new treatments, suggesting a potential patient welfare loss. But what can one 
do to reduce salience effects?
Prior research has demonstrated that several cognitive debiasing strategies can 
effectively reduce biases like salience (Arkes 1991; Bradley 2005; Croskerry 2003). In the 
case of salience there are at least three possible debiasing strategies we can think of. First, 
psychological effects, like salience, often exert their influence on judgment because people 
are unaware of their impact on judgments and decisions. Thus, increasing physician 
awareness about salience effects should help reducing its impact (Croskerry 2003).  
Second, prescription support systems that decrease physicians’ reliance on memory in their 
decisions should help reducing salience effects (e.g. Bradley 2005; Croskerry 2003). Third, 
refreshing physicians’ knowledge about the use of Bayes rule should also help reducing 
salience effects (Hall 2002; Nisbett et al. 1983). 
A second type of salience-reducing strategies involves streamlining marketing actions, 
early in a treatment’s life cycle. For example, firms could invest in innovations aimed at 
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reducing patient heterogeneity in a new treatment’s quality. If a firm is able to reduce 
patient heterogeneity for a new treatment -for instance through new product development 
efforts aimed at reducing quality dispersion - it benefits both from a direct and from an 
indirect increase in the new treatment’s utility. The former effect occurs because treatment 
heterogeneity increases the uncertainty about the quality of the new treatment, while the 
latter effect occurs because lower treatment heterogeneity reduces switching which, in 
turn, reduces salience effects.
Finally, our model also suggests that a controlled roll-out of a new drug may help 
speed-up its adoption. Instead of aggressively targeting all patients simultaneously, firms 
may be better off by helping physicians to more accurately target new therapies to the 
patients who will most likely benefit from them. Such a strategy would represent a win-
win situation whereby physicians avoid prescribing the new therapy to patients that lie on 
the lower tail of the quality distribution and, as a consequence, avoid undesirable switches, 
reducing salience effects.
10. Alternative Applications of our Model in Marketing Science
Beyond the phenomenon studied in this paper, it is possible to adapt the model we specify 
to study other behavioral regularities that can be of interest to marketing scientists. First, 
our model can be adapted to test - using scanner panel data - whether there is empirical 
evidence for positive (or negative) spillovers among different elements of a new brand’s 
marketing mix. For instance, one could expect advertising messages to become more 
influential in consumer learning when the product is also featured or on display. Re-
specifying our salience dummy to account for these interactions would allow a researcher 
to quantify such spillover effects. 
Second, our model can also be used to quantify the disproportionate weight given to 
word of mouth by dissatisfied versus satisfied consumers (e.g. Goldenberg et al. 2007). 
Following this route would require data on consumers’ (i) purchase histories, (ii) social 
network and (iii) satisfaction. Our salience parameter could then be used to quantify the 
extra weight given to feedback signals from dissatisfied peers in consumer learning, a 
metric for the disproportionate influence of unfavorable information (Mizerski 1982).
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Third, our model can also be used to model confirmatory bias, i.e. consumers’ 
tendency to pay more attention and weight more heavily information that confirms their 
prior beliefs (see also Boulding et al. 1999 and Mehta et al. 2008). Our specification allows 
a researcher to model confirmatory bias directly through the weight they give to different 
consumption signals. For example, if we re-specify the switch dummy, in our model, as a 
dummy indicating whether a certain signal confirms a consumer’s prior expectation, then 
positive estimates for i,0Z and i,fZ can be used to directly quantify the magnitude of 
confirmatory bias. 
11. Conclusion
In this paper, we show that salience interferes with physician learning. Patients that switch 
to alternative treatments are more influential during physician’s quality belief formation 
than patients that continue their therapy. We extend the Bayesian learning model to
account for these salience effects. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
uncover salience effects in physician learning using actual data on physicians’ prescription 
choices for real patients. We find that feedback from switching patients receives between 7 
and 10 times more weight, in physician learning, than feedback from other patients. Our 
finding is in line with experimental evidence that suggests that physicians are prone to use 
cognitive shortcuts like availability, representativeness and anchoring and adjustment. 
Salience results in slower physician learning about the quality of new treatments, delaying 
adoption. Consequently, reducing salience effects ahead of or to a greater extent than 
competition, all else equal, may be very beneficial for firms that market new treatments (in 
our case, AstraZeneca with Symbicort). Also public policy officials may find reduction of 
salience effects a worthwhile goal, as it represents a welfare loss. We have discussed how 
cognitive debiasing strategies and marketing actions may reduce salience.
Limitations and directions for future research
A first limitation is our interpretation of the treatment switching effect we quantify as a 
salience effect. The data we use allows us to establish that the feedback of patients who 
switch treatments receives significantly more weight, in physicians’ belief-formation about 
the quality of a new treatment, than Bayesian updating predicts. We used robust findings 
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from psychology and medical decision-making theory and discussed additional self-
reported data and analyses that reinforced our confidence that salience effects drive this 
treatment switching effect. Nevertheless, it would be interesting if future research, possibly 
using laboratory experiments, could establish that the psychological process that underlies 
the treatment switching effect we document is indeed the salience of the feedbacks from 
switching patients. 
Second, we model learning solely through patient feedbacks. The context we have 
chosen (single-physician practices in a geographical market that has strict regulations on 
pharmaceutical marketing) limits the impact of alternative sources of information (like 
word of mouth and direct-to-consumer advertising). Still, if physicians’ decisions to switch
a patient away from a certain treatment and the choice of the new treatment are driven by 
unobserved detailing or advertising, and if detailing also alters long-term market shares, 
our salience estimate could be inflated due to the well-known issue of correlated 
unobservables. In order to alleviate these concerns, we have conducted additional analyses 
showing that salience is significantly more likely to be the driver of the treatment 
switching effect we document. It would be valuable if future studies would examine the 
potential for informative marketing to reduce salience effects.
Third, we assume that, at each encounter, the visiting patient only provides feedback 
about the last treatment she or he has been prescribed. We don’t expect this assumption to
introduce bias in our estimates. Still, modeling physician learning from multivariate patient 
feedbacks could allow researchers to better understand how patient and physician 
perceptions about different treatment alternatives interact with each other. 
Operationalization of such a model would require either additional data (e.g. survey data 
on which treatments, and what aspects of the treatment, were discussed in a certain 
encounter) or additional assumptions (e.g. structurally model the amount of feedback 
allocated to each of the treatments a patient has previously tried). This is a very promising 
area for future research on consumer learning. 
Finally, although we control for unobserved heterogeneity both at the patient and 
physician level, observed heterogeneity could also be explored by introducing patient and 
physician characteristics explicitly in the model specification. Modeling across-consumer 
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learning effects, and quantifying which consumers are more influential, is another area that 
deserves future study.
Overall, this study confirms the usefulness of quasi-Bayesian learning models. While 
such models come at the cost of increased complexity, they allow for the integration of the 
robust insight that human decision-makers often deviate from normative rules in 
predictable ways into the well-established normative Bayesian learning framework.
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Appendix II.A – Derivation of Mean Quality Learning Weights
We first derive the variance of patient feedback signals for a physician learning about the 
quality of treatment j. Let us write patient p’s feedback signal about treatment j provided at 
encounter k as follows:
kipjFipjijkipj qQF ,,, H 
With  2 ,,, ,0~ iFkipjF N VH and ),0(~ 2,ipjqipj Nq V (A.2.1)
The sequence of unobserved feedback signals provided by patient p to physician i about 
treatment j up to and including encounter k can be summarized by its sample mean ( kipjF , ). 
Conditional on the mean quality of treatment j ( ijQ ), the variance of this sample mean 
depends on patient feedback noise and patient quality heterogeneity, i.e.:
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ijQV , in a Bayesian way (in line with DeGroot 1970), results in Equations (2.6) and 
(2.7) in the main paper. 
45
Appendix II.B – Derivation of the posterior variance of a physician’s patient level quality 
beliefs
Please recall that the posterior belief of physician i about the quality of treatment j for 
patient p, visiting at encounter k ( Z kipjQ ,
~
), specified in Equation (2.15) in the main paper, is 
normally distributed with posterior mean ZZ kipjkij qQ ,,  and posterior variance 2 ,,, kipjQ ZV .  It 
is straightforward to see, from the structure of our model, that this posterior belief can be 
divided into (i) a posterior belief about treatment j’s mean quality ( ZkijQ ,
~
) and a posterior 
belief about the patient-treatment idiosyncratic deviation ( Z kipjq ,~ ). The posterior variance of 
physician i's belief about the quality of j for patient p, visiting at k, is then simply obtained 
from:
     ZZZZZV kipjkijkipjkijkipjQ qQqQ ,,,,2 ,,, ~,~cov2~var~var  (A.2.3)
The posterior variance in Equation (A.2.3) is therefore driven by physician i’s initial 
beliefs ( ijQ ,0 and ipjq ,0 ) and all patients’ feedback signals about j. Consequently we can 
determine the posterior variance in terms of the variances of each of these components.
First, we collect the updating weights, defined in Equation (2.11) in the main paper, in:
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each patient’s average feedback about treatment j, with 2 ,,, kijQ Z\ defined in 
Equation (2.12).
Second, we collect the updating weights, defined in Equation (2.14) in the main paper, 
in:
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patient’s idiosyncratic deviation from the mean quality, and
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Introducing the weights just defined ( ZD kij ,,0 , ZD kipjF ,, , kipj ,,0E and kipjF ,,E ) in Equations 
(2.11) and (2.14) in the main text, together with the assumption of prior independence and 
the assumption of independence between the priors and patient feedback signals, clarifies 
that we can write each of the three components of 2 ,,, kipjQ ZV as follows: 
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Appendix II.C – Model Estimation
In order to facilitate exposition of our estimation scheme, we first define the symbols 
we will be using in this Appendix in Table A.2.1.  
Table A.2.1 – Variable definitions
> @1)( uJKiiU - a vector stacking the utilities of each treatment alternative at each 
of the Ki encounters of physician i;
> @1)( uJKiiy - a vector of dummy variables indicating which alternative is 
prescribed at each of the Ki encounters of physician i;
> @1uiPipjQ - a vector stacking the true quality of treatment j for each of the Pipatients of physician i (Qipj’s);
> @17uMkt1ȕ - a vector stacking the temporal marketing response parameters ^ `Mkt lkm )(,1E , l=0,…,6, where Mkt lkm )(,1E captures the impact that 
marketing expenditures in month m(k)-l in any of the molecules of 
treatment j have on this treatment’s utility; 
> @13u
Mkt
i2,ȕ - a vector stacking the physician-specific marketing responsiveness parameters, which we also allow to differ across molecule types, i.e.  TCombiLABAiICSi .,2,2,2 EEE Mkti2,ȕ ;
 > @3)1()( u nlagsJKiiM - matrix with the log of contemporaneous plus six lags of monthly marketing expenditures for ICS, LABA and Combination 
treatments, mapped to each treatment at each of physician i's Ki
encounters. Contemporaneous marketing expenditures are adjusted 
for the timing of the encounter within a given month15.
> @1)( uJKiiLC - a vector stacking, for each treatment and encounter of physician i,
the LASTCHOICEipj,k dummies;
We refer to a subset of the vectors in table A.2.1 by adding the relevant subscripts. For 
instance, > @1uijNFijF refers to the feedbacks about treatment j received by physician i.
Before providing details on the implementation of our Gibbs sampler, we clarify the 
structure of our errors, introduce our joint posterior distribution, detail the specification of 
marketing and discuss the priors we used. Recall that we index physicians by i=1,…,N,
treatments by j=1,…,J (we consider eight possible alternative ICS plus LABA combination 
15 For instance, contemporaneous marketing for an encounter in the first day of the month 
equals the log of one plus 1/30 of that month’s marketing expenditure for all molecules 
contained in the treatment.
48
treatments) and that each physician sees Pi patients in a total of Ki encounters. Moreover, 
we define ningrs = 5, as the number of molecular ingredients that are used in the 
composition of the treatment alternatives in our model: three ICS’s (Fluticasone, 
Beclomethasone and Budesonide) and two LABA’s (Formoterol and Salmeterol). Each 
treatment alternative is a combination of one out of three ICS’s and one out of two 
LABA’s. The first six alternatives combine these ingredients in two separate inhaling 
devices (two-inhalers) while the last two alternatives are the newer single-inhaler, or 
combination, brands (Seretide and Symbicort). 
(I) Structure of the Errors
We now clarify the structure we use for the errors. First, we introduce TC, a Jx(ningrs+1) 
treatment composition matrix which maps ingredient-specific unobserved shocks (first five 
columns of TC) and unobserved shocks specific to Seretide and Symbicort (last column of 
TC), into the utility of each treatment alternative based on their composition, i.e.,
TC = 
Inhaled Corticosteroids 
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Next, we assume that, in Equations (2.17) in the main paper, kipj ,H can be separated into 
an unobserved shock that independently affects the utility of each treatment alternative 
( iid kipj ,H ) and unobserved shocks ki,Ș~ that independently affect (i) the utility of treatments 
sharing the same molecular ingredients or (ii) the utility of the combination treatments. 
The structure of the treatments then implies that ki,
iid
kip,kip, ȘTCİİ ~ . For both 
iid
kip,İ and ki,Ș~ we assume a mean zero normal distribution with diagonal covariance 
matrices iidȈ and ȘȈ , respectively, i.e. at each choice occasion we have:
),(~
]1[,
Ȉ0İ kip MVNJu (A.2.7)
where Ȉ=Ȉiid+TCāȈȘ·TCT, (A.2.8)
ȈȘ =
diag( 222222 ,,,,, nCombinatioFormoterolSalmeterolBudesonidesoneBeclomethaeFluticason VVVVVV ), 
and
(A.2.9)
Ȉiid = diag( 221 ,..., JVV ). (A.2.10)
The separation of the two types of unobserved shocks allows us to circumvent some of 
the computational difficulties associated with the estimation of off-diagonal elements in 
error covariance matrices, which are known to be difficult to estimate in Multinomial 
Probit models (e.g. Rossi et al. 2005, p. 173).
(II) Physician heterogeneity and joint posterior distributions
We follow Narayanan and Manchanda’s (2009) approach and add a hierarchical 
Bayesian structure to our model in order to model physician heterogeneity. For each 
physician, we collect her individual-level parameters, so: 
^ ` ^ `^ CombiLABAiICSiiJjijiFiiiJjipjqijQ rQ EEEVOZZVV Z ,,,,),ln(,,,,)ln(),ln( .,2,2,2,...,12 ,,,0,...,12 ,02 ,0  f  iș (A.2.11)
Next, we model physician heterogeneity by assuming that these individual-level 
parameters are distributed as:  
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),(~ și Vșș N (A.2.12)
Given this assumption for the specification of the physician-specific parameters and our 
model specification, we now introduce the joint posterior distribution of the model 
parameters conditional on our data: 
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(III) Marketing specification
We have data on monthly expenditures on marketing (i.e. detailing, journal advertising and 
conferences) at the molecule level and for the period 2001-2006, which we obtained from 
IMS Health. kijMARKETING , , introduced in Equations (2.17) and (2.18) in the main 
paper, captures both temporal marketing responsiveness, which we assume equal across 
physicians but varying over time, and molecule-type-specific marketing responsiveness, 
which we assume constant over time but varying across physicians. The construction of 
this marketing variable deserves some more explanation. In particular, we compute the log 
of contemporaneous monthly marketing expenditures or any of the 6 lags of these monthly 
marketing expenditures at the molecule level. For instance, ICS lkmjMKT )(, , in Equation 
(2.18), refers to the actual amount, in Euros, spent to promote the ICS molecule contained 
in treatment j, in The Netherlands, l months before the month when encounter k occurred 
(m(k)). If l=0, ICS lkmjMKT )(, represents contemporaneous marketing, which we adjust for 
the day, within month m(k), where encounter k occurred. For two-inhalers, we consider the 
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marketing expenditures associated with each of the molecules used in each treatment 
alternative. For single-inhalers, we use the brand-level expenditures (i.e. the marketing 
support for Seretide or Symbicort).
Thus we use L+1 parameters to capture temporal marketing effects 
(^ `Mktl,1E l=0,…,L). Recall that, for identification we assume that 1
0
,1  ¦
 
L
l
Mkt
lE , so we only 
sample six temporal marketing responsiveness parameters. Molecule- and physician-
specific marketing responsiveness parameters, in turn, are gathered in 
 .,2,2,2 CombiLABAiICSi EEE Mkt2,iȕ .
(IV) Prior distributions
We have five sets of priors for our hierarchical model: (i) a prior on ȈȘ (the variance-
covariance matrix of ingredient errors), (ii) a prior on Ȉiid (the variance-covariance matrix
of the treatment-specific errors), (iii) a prior on ș (the mean vector characterizing the 
heterogeneity distribution of the și‘s (i=1,…,N)), (iv) a prior on șV (the covariance matrix 
of the heterogeneity distribution), and (v) a prior on Mkt1ȕ , the vector of temporal 
marketing response parameters. 
1. Prior on ȈȘ = diag( 222222 ,,,,, nCombinatioFormoterolSalmeterolBudesonidesoneBeclomethaeFluticason VVVVVV ):
For each of the (ningrs+1) variances in the diagonal of ȈȘ we define an inverse-
gamma prior:
),(~ ,200
2 KKXV sGammaInverseu (A.2.14)
with
^ `nCombinatioFormoterolSalmeterolBudesonidesoneBeclomethaeFluticasonu ,,,,,
and where we set 30  ningrsKX and 1,20  Ks , which makes these priors quite 
diffuse.
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2. Prior on ),...,( 221 Jdiag VV iidȈ :  
 ),(~ ,200
2 HHXV sGammaInversej  (A.2.15)  
with j=2,…,J ( 121  V , for identification) and where we set 20  JHX and 1,20  Hs . 
 
3. Prior on ș : 
 ),(~ ș0,ș0, Vǻș N  (A.2.16)  
where 0ǻ ș0,   is a vector of zeros with dimension equal to the number of physician-
specific parameters and 
 2 ,,02 ,,02 ,,0 ,,,,,,, iiriF sssdiag G2 iȕ0NW2 ijQ,2 iȦ0,2 ipjq0,0,2 ijQ0,0,ș0, sssssV  . For parameters 
following a lognormal distribution (i.e. 2 ,0
2
,0 , ipjqijQ VV and 2 ,iFV  in Equation (A.2.11)) we 
set the prior variance to 5 and for parameters following a normal distribution (i.e. 
.
,2,2,2,,0 ,,,,,,,
Comb
i
LABA
i
ICS
iiijiii rQ EEEOZZ Zf and iG ) we set the prior variance to 50. Both result 
in diffuse priors for the parameters of interest. 
 
4. Prior on șV : 
 Vș~ Inverted-Wishart( 00 ,Gg ) (A.2.17)  
where, defining the number of parameters in iș  as NPAR, we set g0 = NPAR+3 and G0 = 
g0*INPAR. 
 
5. Prior on Mkt1ȕ : 
We define a normal prior for contemporaneous and the first five lags of the temporal 
marketing responsiveness parameters, so: 
 )50,0(~,1 N
Mkt
lE  for l=0,…,L-1 (A.2.18)  
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where L=6 represents the number of lagged monthly marketing expenditures that, in our 
model, affect a treatment’s utility. For MktL,1E , the last element of Mkt1ȕ , the prior is implied 
by the identification restriction (the sum of all the elements in Mkt1ȕ adds up to one).
(V) Full-conditional distributions and the Gibbs Sampler
First, we use using the updating weights introduced in online Appendix II.B ( ZD kij ,,0 ,
ZD kipjF ,, , kipj ,,0E and kipjF ,,E ) to write the mean beliefs ( Z kijQ , and Z kipjq , ), used in the 
utility specification introduced in Equation (2.17), as follows:
¦  
p
kipjkipjFijkijkij FQQ ,,,,0,,0,
ZZZ DD (A.2.19)
 ZZ EE kijkipjkipjFipjkipjkipj QFqq ,,,,,0,,0,  (A.2.20)
Introducing the expressions in Equations (A.2.19) and (A.2.20) in Equation (2.17) in the 
main paper, and replacing kipj ,H by the sum of the ingredient-specific and the treatment-
specific errors ( iid kipjkipj ,, HK  for j=1,…,J), we obtain:
iid
kipjkipjkijkipji
kipjQi
p
kipjkipjFipjkipjijkijkipj
MARKETINGLASTCHOICE
rFqQU
,,,,
2
,,,,,,,0,,0,0,,0, 2
1
HKG
VGEG ZZZ

 ¦
(A.2.21)
Here, )1( ,,,,0,,0 kipjFkijkij EDG ZZ  and kipjFkipjFkipjFkipjF kppI ,,,,,,,, ))(()1( EEDG ZZ   , where 
))(( kppI  is an indicator function assuming the value one for p(k), the patient visiting 
at encounter k.
For certain sets of parameters, we obtain closed form solutions for the full-conditional 
posterior distributions by rearranging the utility specification in order to isolate, in the 
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right-hand side, the focal elements of utility and the treatment-specific error term, and, in 
the left-hand side, the remaining utility components, including the ingredient-specific 
errors. We then combine the rearranged terms with the natural conjugate prior for each 
parameter being sampled and use least squares to determine the mean and variance of the 
full-conditional posterior distribution of interest, in line with standard results from 
Bayesian linear regression (c.f. Rossi et al. 2005, sections 2.8 and 2.12). 
Estimation proceeds by selecting a set of starting values and subsequently drawing the 
model parameters by iterating over their full-conditional posterior distributions (specified 
below). Thus, indexing each draw by m, our Gibbs sampler proceeds by cycling through
the following steps:
1. Sampling of kipj
U ,
We draw the utilities of the different treatment alternatives, for each physician-patient-
encounter combination, from a truncated multivariate normal distribution. We use the 
property of conditional independence and data augmentation to draw the utilities 
conditional on the data and the last available draw of the remaining parameters. So, for 
each physician we sample:
),(~
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with kipj ,P being the expression introduced in Equation (A.2.21) conditional on the latest 
available draws of all parameters of interest. Recall as well that we assume 0,0  ipjq and 
rational expectations entails ijij QQ  ,0 and 2,
2
,0 ipjqipjq VV  .
The truncation indicated in Equation (A.2.22) guarantees that 
jlkiplkipjipk UUjy z! ,,, . Finally, to draw the choice-specific latent utilities 
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from truncated univariate normal distributions, we use the approach proposed by 
McCulloch and Rossi (1994) and detailed in Rossi et al. (2005, p.108).
2.  Sampling of kipjF ,
Define > @1uijNFijF as a vector containing all the feedbacks provided, across all encounters, 
by the patients of physician i about treatment j. We then collect the belief-updating weights 
given by physician i, at each encounter, to each of the NFij feedback signals she receives 
about treatment j in a Ki x NFij matrix 
Ȧ
ijF,į , such that the kth element in ijȦ ijF, Fį  equals 
¦ 
p
kipjkipjF F ,,,
ZG . Next, we rearrange terms in Equation (A.2.21) in order to isolate in the 
right-hand side ij
Ȧ
ijF, Fį  . Combining this with Equation (2.4) in the main paper – which 
we use as our normal conjugate prior for the feedbacks – we apply standard results from 
Bayesian linear regression and reach a closed form solution for the full-conditional 
distribution of the patient feedback signals. That is, for each treatment alternative we 
sample: 
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We repeat this process for all physicians (i=1,…,N) and treatment options (j=1,…,J).
3. Sampling of ipjQ and ijQ
We start by sampling the true quality of each treatment for each of the Pi patients of 
physician i (Qipj) and, on a second level we sample the mean quality of each treatment 
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across physicians and patients (Qij), using the fact that Qipj ~ N(
2
,, ipjqijQ V ). We are thus 
using a hierarchical approach to draw both the patient-specific treatment qualities and the 
mean qualities themselves, in two levels of the hierarchical model. In other words, the true 
quality of treatment j for all patients of physician i, according to Equation (2.1) in the main 
paper can be defined as: 
ipjqijipj QQ ,H , with ),0(~ 2,, ipjqipjq N VH (A.2.24)
From Equation (2.4), in the paper, we also know that patient feedbacks about the quality 
of treatment j are normally distributed around ipjQ , i.e.:
kipjFipjkipj QF ,,, H , with ),0(~ 2 ,,, iFkipjF N VH (A.2.25)
Using Equations (A.2.24), (A.2.25) we apply Bayesian linear regression to obtain a 
closed form solution for the full-conditional distribution of ipjQ :
)ˆ,ˆ(~,,,| )1(2)1(,2,
)1()()(
QipjQipjijipj ȈȝFQ NQ
m
Fi
m
ipjq
m
ij
mm  VV (A.2.26)
Next, we sample the true mean quality of treatment j ( ijQ ). First, please note that the 
rational expectations assumption (which implies ijij QQ  ,0 ) requires us to also consider 
the information contained in physicians’ choices about their prior mean beliefs. Therefore, 
we rearrange the utility components in Equation (A.2.21) to isolate in its right-hand
side ijQ ,0Ȧ ij,Q0į , combine this expression with Equation (A.2.24) and define, as our 
normal conjugate prior:
),(~ ș|Qijș|Qij VșNQij (A.2.27)
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where ș|Qijș and ș|QijV are, respectively, the mean and variance of ijQ conditional on all 
the remaining physician-level parameters in the physician heterogeneity distribution 
introduced in Equation (A.2.12), using the last available draws for its mean and variance 
(i.e. )1( mș and )1( mșV and other parameters in iș ). We then apply standard Bayesian 
linear regression and reach a closed form solution for the full-conditional distribution of 
ijQ :
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4. Sampling of 
2
,0 ijQV , 2 ,0 ipjqV , i,0Z , i,fZ , ZOi and 2 ,iFV
In this step we sample the variances that govern learning and the salience parameters 
(please recall also that rational expectations implies 2,
2
,0 ipjqipjq VV  ). For these parameters 
we use a random-walk Metropolis-Hastings step (Chib and Greenberg 1995). First, we 
define ^ `iCombiLABAiICSiiiJi rQQ GEEE ,,,,,,...,\ .,2,2,21   LEARNINGiiLEARNINGNONi șșș . Next, we specify the 
following physician-specific posterior likelihood function:
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(A.2.29)
wherex refers to all remaining drivers of the utility of the different treatments excluding 
the iid kipj ,H ’s. Next, we propose candidate parameters using:
),(~,)1(.)( RWRWRW
LEARNING
i
LEARNING
i Ȉȅİİșș   iRWmcand N J 16 (A.2.30)
16 Where for simplicity ȈRW = diag(S[(2J+5)x1]) is a matrix of parameter-specific scaling 
constants and ȖRWi is a physician-specific scaling parameter. These parameters are fine-
tuned during the burn-in phase to ensure good navigation of the sampler through the 
posterior distribution (Rossi et al. 2005).
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Finally, we accHSW RU UHMHFW WKH SURSRVHG FDQGLGDWH SDUDPHWHUV ZLWK SUREDELOLW\ Į
which is computed using the ratio of the posterior likelihood at the candidate and current 
parameter values, as standard in random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithms (see Rossi 
et al. 2005). 
5. Sampling of ir ,
Mkt
i2,ȕ and iG
Rearranging our original expression, in Equation (A.2.21), to isolate the risk-aversion, 
marketing responsiveness and switch costs parameters in its right-hand side, and using, as 
a natural conjugate prior: 
 įȕr,įȕr,Mkt2,i Vșȕ ,~,, Nr ii G (A.2.31)
where ^ `)(.,2)(,2)(,2)( ,, mCombimLABAimICSim EEE Mkti2,ȕ , and where įȕr,ș and įȕr,V are, respectively, the 
mean and variance of iir G,, Mkti2,ȕ conditional on all the remaining physician-level 
parameters in the physician heterogeneity distribution introduced in Equation (A.2.12), 
using the last available draws for its mean and variance. We again apply standard Bayesian 
linear regression in order to reach a closed form solution for the full-conditional 
distribution of iir G,, Mkti2,ȕ :
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6. Sampling of 
Mkt
1ȕ
First, we substitute the last element in Mkt1ȕ using the fact that ¦
 
 
1
0
,1,1 1
L
l
Mkt
l
Mkt
L EE and 
rearrange Equation (A.2.21) in order to isolate, in its right-hand side, the temporal 
marketing responsiveness parameters. We then combine this expression with its natural 
conjugate prior, defined in Equation (A.2.18), and apply standard Bayesian linear 
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regression in order to reach a closed form solution for the full-conditional distribution of 
Mkt
1ȕ :
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7. Sampling of kij ,K and ȘȈ
First we define i,kȘ~ , a (ningrs+1) vector collecting the ingredient-specific unobserved 
shocks (first ningrs elements) plus the unobserved shocks specific to Seretide and 
Symbicort. We have, conditional on ȘȈ , the following normal prior for ki,Ș~ :
 Șki, ȈȘ ,0~~ N (A.2.34)
Substituting, in Equation (A.2.21), ki,j ȘTC ~,  kijK (where jTC denotes the jth row of 
the treatment-composition matrix), we can rearrange Equation (A.2.21) in order to isolate 
the realizations of the ingredient-specific errors for each treatment in the right-hand side 
( ki,j ȘTC ~ ) and use Equation (A.2.34) as our natural conjugate prior in order to reach, 
using standard Bayesian linear regression, a closed form solution for the full-conditional 
distribution of ki,Ș~ , which we sample across physicians:
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Next, for 
^ `nCombinatioFormoterolSalmeterolBudesonidesoneBeclomethaeFluticasonu ,,,,, , we 
collect in uȘ~ all sampled errors for u. We then sample the ingredient-specific error 
variances from:
60
> @ ),(~,~| ,211)1()()(2 KKXV ummmu sGammaInverseİȈȘ , (A.2.36)
where the posterior degrees of freedom is defined as n KK XX 01 , and the posterior sum 
of squared errors as uu ȘȘ ~~,200,21 Tu ss  KKK X . Having sampled the ingredient-specific error 
variances, we use Equation (A.2.9) to obtain ȈȘ.
8. 6DPSOLQJRIȈLLG
Rearranging Equation (A.2.21) to obtain the value of iid kipj ,H and stacking these across 
encounters and physicians in a NT-dimensional vector jİ , we sample each of the J
diagonal elements of Ȉiid from:
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where the posterior degrees of freedom is defined as n HH XX 01 , and the posterior sum 
of squared errors as jj İİ Tj ss  HHH X ,200,21 .
9. Sampling of ș and șV
To sample the mean and variance of the physician heterogeneity distribution we apply 
standard results for Hierarchical Bayesian linear models (see Rossi et al. 2005, section 
3.7), which allows us to obtain closed form solutions for the two full-conditional 
distributions for ș and șV :
^ `^ `  șșșMkti2,LEARNINGi ȈȝVȕșș ,~,,,,,| )1(,...,1)()()(,...,1)()(,)( NrQ mNimimmiJjmijmm   G (A.2.38)
^ `^ ` ),(~,,,,, 000)(,...,1)()()(,...,1)()(,)( TG SșȕșV Mkti2,LEARNINGiș   GgNgIWrQ mNimimmiJjmijmm (A.2.39)
Finally, we set m = m+1 and iterate until convergence.
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CHAPTER 3: ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
PATIENT EMPOWERMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING17
When in 1992 Laura Landro, a journalist at The Wall Street Journal, was diagnosed with 
chronic myelogenous leukemia she decided to gather as much information as possible 
about her disease and to become an informed patient. At this time, the use of the Internet 
was still not sufficiently widespread, and physicians were not accustomed to patients 
bringing documents and medical data to the medical encounter. As a result, challenging 
doctors “was no picnic” and, in order to find the “accessible, wonderful, caring doctors” 
she deserved, Laura had to sever ties with a few more “impersonal physicians and medical 
workers who were simply annoyed at a patient who was trying to be her own best 
advocate” (Landro 1999, p.56). 
At the same time pharmaceutical companies, perceiving changes in the role of patients 
in medical decision-making, initiated a trend that would soon become controversial. The 
amount invested in direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) by the American 
pharmaceutical industry rose steadily from the mid-1990’s onwards. Indicative of recent 
changes in the healthcare systems, DTCA expenditures reached, in 2006, $4.8 billion 
(Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 2008). 
In this chapter, we review evidence supporting the claim that a fundamental shift in 
the role of the patient (and, consequently, of the physician) in medical decision-making is 
taking place. There is a trend toward more participatory decision-making in which doctors 
and patients together bear responsibility for medical decisions. This change has 
implications for patient welfare and for firms operating in the life sciences industry18.
17 This chapter is based on Camacho, N., V. Landsman and S. Stremersch (2010), “The 
Connected Patient,” in The Connected Customer: The Changing Nature of Consumer and 
Business Markets, S.H.K. Wuyts, M.G. Dekimpe, E. Gijsbrechts, F.G.M.(Rik) Pieters, eds. 
London, UK: Routledge Academic.
18 Throughout the chapter we adopt Stremersch and Van Dyck’s (2009) definition of the 
life sciences industry as an industry that develops science-based knowledge and improves 
consumers’ quality of life. When we refer to life sciences firms we refer to pharmaceutical, 
biotechnology and therapeutic medical devices companies.
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In this new paradigm, physicians are expected to establish a dialogue with their 
patients and apply their medical knowledge in order to connect scientific evidence to 
patient needs and preferences (Emanuel and Emanuel 1992; Epstein, Alper, and Quill 
2004; Morgan 2003). Despite its renewed appeal, this idea of reaping benefits from a 
strong collaboration between patient and physician has a very long tradition in medicine. 
For example, in an influential paper about patient-physician relationships, Emanuel and 
Emanuel (1992) quoted Plato who, more than 2,000 years ago, wrote:
The free practitioner, who, for the most part, attends free men, treats their 
diseases by going into things thoroughly from the beginning in a scientific way… 
He does not give his prescriptions until he has won the patient’s support, and 
when he has done so, he steadily aims at producing complete restoration to health 
by persuading the sufferer into compliance.
Until recently, however, the relationship between patients and doctors could still, by 
and large, be characterized by a white-coat model, according to which the physician uses 
her or his knowledge to prescribe treatments in a paternalistic way (Charles, Gafni, and 
Whelan 1999). Limited patient participation in medical decisions was generally accepted 
because (i) the utility of different health outcomes was considered objective and 
independent of the subjective thoughts of doctors and/or patients, and (ii) society at large 
empowered physicians to use their knowledge to decide, on behalf of the patient, what 
treatment and tests were the most appropriate given her or his condition (Emanuel and 
Emanuel 1992). 
Today, the expectations and views of both physicians and patients regarding medical 
encounters are changing, and a trend toward patient empowerment is emerging. These 
changes are occurring based on a commonly held belief that patient participation in 
medical decisions has many desirable health consequences. For instance, scholars in 
medicine have argued that patient participation in medical decisions leads to improvements 
in adherence to treatment plans (Golin, DiMatteo, and Gelberg 1996; Horne 2006), and 
they have shown that empowered patients are more satisfied and have better perceived 
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improvement in symptoms than patients who are treated according to a white-coat model 
(Brody et al. 1989; Lerman et al. 1990; Little et al. 2001). 
Yet, the transition toward a more active participation of patients is not free of 
controversy. First, many scholars in medicine claim that the empirical evidence to support 
patient empowerment is still too scarce to warrant an evidence-based change in medical 
decision-making paradigm (Bensing 2000). Second, the transition toward patient 
empowerment requires a transformation of the tie between patient and doctor, which may 
entail changes in the amount, content and directionality of information flow and in the 
level of reciprocity in the relationship. Neither all doctors nor all patients are equally 
prepared or motivated for this change.
In this chapter, we review antecedents and consequences of the trend toward increased 
patient participation in medical decisions. A better understanding of patient needs and 
preferences will help us uncover how patient satisfaction, health outcomes, effective
healthcare delivery and life sciences firms’ marketing strategies can be improved. This 
understanding will also provide insights on several open research topics. Figure 3.1
illustrates a conceptual overview of this chapter.
Figure 3.1 Antecedents and Consequences of Patient Empowerment
As can be seen from Figure 3.1, the primary focus in this chapter is the dyadic 
connectivity between patients and their physicians. However, in order to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of the underlying processes in these relations, we consider –
in an admittedly cursory manner – the broader context of these relations and investigate 
other types of ties in medical decision-making. Such “surrounding connections” may be 
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among patients, among physicians, or between heath-related entities (e.g., pharmaceutical 
companies, health insurance companies, pharmacists, nurses) and patients or physicians. 
2. From a White-Coat Model to Shared Decision-Making
Figure 3.2 presents a typology for possible models for the patient-physician relationship 
according to the dual power structure within this relationship. The white-coat model on 
the lower right part of Figure 3.2 was the mainstream approach until the 1980’s and is 
characterized by a relationship in which the physician takes a paternalistic role and acts as 
a guardian of the patient and his or her health. Under the white-coat model, the final goal 
of improving the patient’s health status is treated as an objective goal that has priority over 
both patients’ autonomy and personal choices (Emanuel and Emanuel 1992). In such a 
model, the patient is expected to cooperate and comply with the physicians’ orders and 
recommendations. The relationship usually assumes a biomedical tone, with the emotional 
and psychosocial components of medical care garnering relatively less importance 
(Morgan 2003). 
Figure 3.2 Models of Patient-Physician Relationships
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Adapted from Roter (2000), © 2000, with permission from Elsevier.
Moving away from the white-coat model, however, is neither easy nor consensual. 
Different physicians react differently to patient participation in medical decisions. Some 
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argue that there is a lack of practical guidelines to guide physicians in the process of 
adapting their behavior to the new reality of patient empowerment (Taylor 2007). Others 
fear that physicians might start interpreting their role solely as providers of important 
information to the patient rather than as influencers of patient decisions. In such cases, a 
consumerist model would be established and patients would turn to physicians for 
medical information but assume the control of their medical decisions (upper left part of 
Figure 3.2). Many physicians feel uncomfortable with these challenges, which might 
explain why today, despite the increasing agreement on the need for more patient 
participation, many physicians still adopt a white-coat approach to medical care (Young et 
al. 2008).
In fact, a risk entailed in the process of empowering patients is that physicians might 
practice reactive, rather than proactive, medicine. Reactive medical care - a tendency to 
offer only the advice and information requested by patients - can be particularly 
undesirable when patients are not able or willing to take the lead in making medical 
decisions. In effect, if the physician assumes erroneously that the patient wants to make his 
or her own decisions and prematurely hands over relational power and control to the 
patient, the patient-physician relationship can suffer from lack of direction. We labeled 
such situations as a disordered model19.
This discussion suggests that it is important (i) to distinguish shared decision-making 
from other alternative models of the patient-physician relationship (a topic explored in 
detail in Chapter 4), (ii) to better understand whether and how shared decision-making can 
be promoted (a topic explored both in Chapter 4, which studies the link between patient 
empowerment and therapy adherence, and Chapter 5, which studies the relationship 
between patient requests for medications using brand name and physician accommodation 
of such requests) and (iii) to understand the role of patient expectations in shaping patient-
physician relationships. In essence, the medical literature tends to rely on self-
determination theory – which predicts that self-motivated behavior leads to better 
performance and higher persistence (Ryan and Deci 2000) - to argue that patient 
empowerment is a desirable goal for XXI century medicine. Patient empowerment should, 
19Roter (2000) suggested that in such cases, the relationship can be transformed into a 
dysfunctional standstill in which misunderstandings and frustrations can be frequent and 
often lead to a breach in the relationship.
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according to this literature, ideally lead to a shared decision-making model, which entails 
a mutual involvement of patients and physicians in clinical decisions. According to 
Charles, Gafni, and Whelan (1999; 1997), four necessary conditions must be met in order 
for a relationship to be classified as shared decision-making:
(1) Mutual participation - both the physician and the patient participate in the 
decision-making process20;
(2) Mutual sharing of information – the physician shares information about existing 
treatment alternatives and listens to information the patient might have gathered from other 
sources; 
(3) Value-sharing - the patient expresses his or her preferences, and the physician 
shares his or her knowledge-based values about the best course of action; 
(4) Mutual agreement – this last condition, which focuses on the decision outcome 
rather than the decision process, claims that more than mutual participation, the physician 
and the patient need to reach mutual agreement about the best course of action. 
In sum, there is an increasing number of proponents of the shared decision-making.
This paradigm change entails opportunities and challenges for all stakeholders involved in 
healthcare. In particular, for life sciences firms, this new model suggests the need to invest 
in marketing strategies that address the increasingly active role of patients in treatment 
decisions. For policy-makers and physicians, the biggest challenge at the moment is the 
lack of empirical evidence to support the benefits and best practices that should guide 
patient empowerment.
3. Antecedents of Patient Empowerment
Now we turn to the antecedents of the trend from a white-coat model toward a shared 
decision-making model, i.e. the antecedents of patient empowerment, and address the 
magnitude of this trend. Patient-physician ties are based on the flow of information 
between these two actors and are, therefore, directional. That is, one can ask whether the 
information flows from Actor A to Actor B, or vice versa. This directionality allows us to 
20 In some cases, other participants, such as relatives, might also play an important role in a 
medical encounter. These triadic relationships are frequent in the case of elderly and 
adolescent patients (Charles, Gafni, and Whelan 1997).
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look at levels of reciprocity or symmetry in the patient-physician relationship21.
Reciprocity can serve as a ‘starting mechanism’ in early relational phases to induce higher 
levels of cooperation (Gouldner 1960). For example, many scholars in medicine defend 
that patient empowerment needs to be initiated by the physician. That is, according to these 
scholars, physicians have to take the first step by taking the initiative to share non-
biomedical information (e.g. regarding the fit of therapy with the patient lifestyle or family 
obligations, meaning of the illness for the patient, and so on…) with their patients, in order 
to create, during medical encounters, a more participatory atmosphere (Charles, Gafni and 
Wheelan 1999; Epstein, Alper and Quill 2004; Lerman 1990).
Symmetry refers to the degree of power-sharing in the dyad and, therefore, can also be 
used to capture the trend towards patient empowerment, that is, the extent to which one 
observes a shift away from a sole focus on the “voice of medicine” to an increasing 
emphasis on the “voice of the patient” (Morgan 2003, p.55).
We can identify three major drivers triggering the move toward more patient 
autonomy and participation in medical care: (i) demographic changes, (ii) technological 
advances, and (iii) changes in the regulatory environment. 
Demographic and lifestyle changes
Demographic and lifestyle changes are important contributors to the trend toward more 
patient participation in medical decisions. Ongoing shifts in demography (for example, an 
aging population) and lifestyle (such as increased urbanization, exposure to pollutants, or 
stress) contribute to an increased focus on chronic conditions worldwide (Murray and
Lopez 1996). Leading public health concerns include ischemic heart disease, the continued 
spread of HIV/AIDS, and several forms of cancer (see Figure 3.3, adapted from Mathers 
and Loncar 2006).
21 In our context, reciprocity or symmetry refer to a directed and bi-directional tie between 
a physician and a patient, i.e. a tie that is directed and flows from the physician to the 
patient as well as from the patient to the physician (Van den Bulte and Wuyts 2007).
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Figure 3.3 Projections for Major Causes of Death Globally 2002-2030
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The increase in the prevalence and importance of chronic diseases creates two forces 
that encourage more informed and more connected patients, that is, shared decision-
making. First, chronic patients have a strong incentive to collect information and discuss 
their health with friends or through patient support groups; hence, they will typically be 
more knowledgeable about their diseases than patients suffering from acute diseases. The 
increased knowledge possessed by chronically ill patients equips such patients with a 
greater ability to participate in their own medical care. Second, public health initiatives 
increasingly promote the need for lifestyle changes like smoking prevention and cessation 
(Pauwels et al. 2001) and eating a well-balanced diet (Grundy et al. 2004). This need to 
persuade healthy consumers to make lifestyle changes (with the objective of avoiding 
future health hazards) is facilitated by more patient involvement, and thus by a shared 
decision-making approach (Roter and Hall 2006; Sheridan, Harris, and Woolf 2004). 
Technological changes
Technological advances also contribute to the obsolescence of the white-coat model. 
Specifically, two major technological shifts have facilitated the transition toward shared 
decision-making: (i) the advent of the Internet and the consequent democratization of 
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access to medical information, and (ii) the sequencing of the human genome, which 
triggered the emergence of personalized medicine.
The Rise of the Internet and E-health. The first important technological development that 
impacts patient-physician relationships involves the advent of the Internet and the 
consequent consumer access to health information. A recent survey conducted by 
iCrossing (2008), which is a research firm specialized in digital marketing, found that 59% 
of all American adults look for health information on the Internet. This makes the Internet 
the most popular source of health information, as 55% stated that they look for health 
information by visiting their physicians and only 29% acknowledged looking for such 
information by talking with friends, relatives or co-workers. Scholars in medicine indeed 
recognize that the massive accessibility of online health information has contributed to the 
“most important techno-cultural medical revolution of the past century” (Ferguson and 
Frydman 2004, p.1149).
In fact, the Internet affects the structure of the patient-physician network in two ways: 
it lowers the access barriers to medical information, and it facilitates the connection and 
sharing of information among actors (i.e. among patients, among physicians, between 
physicians and patients and between firms and the other stakeholders). The first effect –
easier access to medical information – directly facilitates patient empowerment, because 
patients can now easily collect information that they can later discuss with their physicians. 
The second effect – increased connection among actors – also operates by increasing 
patients’ knowledge but it typically interferes with the patient-physician relationship in an 
indirect manner. Virtual networking among patients, for example, facilitates the patient-to-
patient word-of-mouth, i.e. sharing of experiences, information and support that can help 
patients understand and participate in therapy choice (Mukherjee and McGinnis 2007). On 
the physician side, the advent of e-healthcare is also strengthening social networks by 
facilitating the establishment of new ties among physicians and health professionals, 
allowing for more information to flow directly in the system. The increased importance of 
such virtual communities of physicians has the potential to improve the lives of many 
patients (Mukherjee and McGinnis 2007). Moreover, patients also have easier access to the 
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opinions of healthcare professionals other than their doctor via blogs and health-related 
webpages like WebMD.com.
It is important for all stakeholders in the healthcare industry to understand the 
implications of these changes and to learn how to leverage the potential of the Internet in 
general, and social media in particular. Marketers, for example, can serve an important role 
in convincing both patients and physicians to use these new tools to improve the quality of 
their mutual relationship and promote shared decision-making. 
Genomics and Personalized Medicine. A second critical technological development in the 
life sciences has been the sequencing of the human genome and the ensuing rise of 
genomics as a revolution in medicine and drug discovery (Zerhouni 2003). Genomics is the 
study of the genetic material of an organism. Launched in 1990 by the U.S. government, 
the Human Genome Project (HGP) was a large research project involving more than 350 
laboratories from several countries in order to study human genetic material (Enriquez and 
Goldberg 2000). In 2003, the HGP completed the mapping of the human genome, which 
opened a vast array of new possibilities in tailoring medicine to the needs of individual 
patients.
A good example of the impact of genomics on the prescription drug market is the 
growth of the biotechnology sector as compared to the pharmaceutical industry overall. 
Table 3.1 shows the largest 25 companies in the world in terms of sales of human 
prescription drugs and vaccines. The table shows that companies like Amgen and 
Genentech have grown faster than the market and thus have climbed up in ranking. 
Between 2005 and 2006, for example, the biologics sector grew 17.1% and reached sales 
figures above $52 billion, while the pharmaceutical market as a whole only grew 7% 
(Pharmaceutical Executive 2006). 
Although the rise of personalized medicine cannot be considered an antecedent of the 
recent trend toward patient empowerment, we can certainly expect it to reinforce such a 
trend. Developments in genetics and biotechnology will boost personalized medicine, 
which requires detailed information flows between patients and their physicians for both 
diagnosis and treatment decisions. Therefore, we expect the rise of personalized medicine 
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to accelerate the trend toward shared decision-making by enhancing the volume and 
frequency of information flow between patients and physicians.
Table 3.1 Top 25 Companies in Terms of Prescription Drug Sales
Rank 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1 Pfizer Pfizer Pfizer Pfizer Pfizer Pfizer Pfizer
2 GlaxoSmithKline GlaxoSmithKline GlaxoSmithKline GlaxoSmithKline GlaxoSmithKline GlaxoSmithKline GlaxoSmithKline
3 Merck Merck Merck Sanofi-Aventis Sanofi-Aventis Sanofi-Aventis Sanofi-Aventis
4 AstraZenca AstraZeneca Johnson & 
Johnson
Johnson & 
Johnson Novartis Novartis Novartis
5 Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Aventis Aventis Merck AstraZeneca AstraZeneca AstraZeneca
6 Aventis Johnson & 
Johnson AstraZeneca AstraZeneca
Johnson & 
Johnson
Johnson & 
Johnson
Johnson & 
Johnson
7 Johnson & 
Johnson Novartis Novartis Novartis Merck Merck Merck
8 Novartis Bristol-Myers 
Squibb
Bristol-
MyersSquibb
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Wyeth Roche Roche
9 Pharmacia Pharmacia Wyeth Wyeth Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Eli Lilly Wyeth
10 Lilly Wyeth EliLilly Abbott Labs Eli Lilly Wyeth Eli Lilly
11 Wyeth Eli Lilly AbbottLabs Eli Lilly Abbott Labs Bristol-Myers 
Squibb
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb
12 Roche Roche Roche Roche Roche Amgen Bayer
13 Schering-Plough Abbott Labs Sanofi-
Synthlabo
Amgen Amgen Abbott Abbott
14 Abbott 
Laboratories Schering-Plough
Boehringer-
Ingelheim
Boehringer-
Ingelheim
Boehringer-
Ingelheim
Boehringer-
Ingelheim
Amgen
15 Takeda Sanofi-
Synthelabo
Amgen Takeda Takeda Bayer Boehringer-
Ingelheim
16 Sanofi-
Synthelabo
Boehringer 
Ingelheim Takeda Schering Plough Astellas Takeda Schering-Plough
17 Boehringer 
Ingelheim Takeda Schering-Plough Schering AG Schering-Plough Schering-Plough Takeda
18 Bayer Schering AG ScheringAG Bayer Bayer Teva Genentech
19 Schering AG Bayer Bayer Eisai Schering AG Genentech Teva
20 Akzo Nobel Amgen Sankyo Teva Genentech Schering AG Novo Nordisk
21 Amgen Sankyo Eisai Merck KGaA Novo Nordisk Astellas Pharma Astellas
22 Sankyo Akzo Nobel Yamanouchi Genentech Eisai Novo Nordisk Daiichi Sankyo
23 Merck KGaA Eisai NovoNordisk Yamanouchi Teva Merck KGaA Merck KGaA
24 Novo Nordisk Yamanouchi MerckKGaA Otsuka Merck KGaA Eisai Eisai
25 Shionogi Merck KGaA Teva Novo Nordisk Sankyo Otsuka Otsuka
Source: Pharm Exec 50 - http://www.pharmexec.com/
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Regulatory changes
Increases in patient-physician connectedness have also been triggered by changes in 
existing regulations. Examples of such changes include greater flexibility in DTCA 
regulation, especially in the United States and New Zealand, and the increased use of 
malpractice suits by patients against physicians. Together with health and therapy 
information distributed via mass-media in general, and the Internet in particular (which is 
often seen with suspicion by doctors and policy-makers), DTCA is perhaps the most 
controversial topic in the pharmaceutical industry, thus triggering strong regulatory 
reactions in many countries around the Globe.
Regulation of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising. There is a generalized belief that direct-to-
consumer health and therapy information distributed via mass-media contributes to an 
increase in patient requests for certain medication brands, eventually leading to 
overprescription and unnecessary healthcare costs. DTCA, in particular, has been pointed 
as the culprit of the current rise in costs with prescription drugs in the U.S. where, from the 
mid-1990s, the increase in DTCA expenditures became quite evident (see Figure 3.4).
There exists strong controversy about DTCA and the need for stricter regulation. On 
the one hand, some authors defend DTCA as a means to educate and empower patients to 
take a more active role in their treatment (Holmer 1999). On the other hand, other authors 
suggest that such efforts mainly boost consumer demand and distort the role of patients in 
the (traditional) relationship with their physicians (Hollon 1999; Moynihan, Heath, and 
Henry 2002), which may result in a consumerist or, even worse, a disordered model  (see 
Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.4 Growth in Annual Spending per type of Marketing (1996-2005)
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Still, almost everyone agrees that the main effects of DTCA are to prompt patients to 
visit their physicians, possibly in order to request a specific drug (Bell, Wilkes, and Kravitz
1999). Venkataraman and Stremersch (2007), for example, have found that patient requests 
for a certain drug increases physicians’ prescriptions of that drug. Moreover, physicians’ 
refusals to accommodate such requests have been associated with patient dissatisfaction 
and even with intentions of switching physicians (Bell, Wilkes, and Kravitz 1999). Thus, 
DTCA might contribute to an increase in patient power in medical decisions, leading some 
scholars to recognize that “DTC advertising has the potential to fundamentally alter the 
roles of doctor and patient” (Wilkes, Bell, and Kravitz 2000, p.122). 
A network perspective can help uncover important consequences of DTCA. For 
instance, social network theory suggests that different network properties, and different 
positions in a network, can make some actors more or less influential in marketing events 
(Van den Bulte and Wuyts 2007). Physician and patient beliefs can be influenced by the 
decisions of (i) those who are close to them (that is, contagion by direct contact, which is 
promoted by cohesion), (ii) those who are similar to them (that is, contagion by structural 
equivalence) or (iii) those who are particularly respected by them (Burt 1987; Nair, 
Manchanda, and Bhatia 2010). Both the Internet and DTCA can contribute to changes in 
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these properties. In particular, from a social network perspective, we can see the entities 
behind both DTCA and Internet websites targeting patients as additional “actors” who 
provide patients with information regarding their health conditions. 
Thus, DTCA can influence patient power in medical decisions by increasing their 
degree centrality and closeness centrality in the social network and, consequently, 
lowering the informational advantages of physicians22. In fact, on top of their specialized 
training and knowledge, physicians used to monopolize the brokering of information 
across patients. That is, their contact with many patients gave them yet another 
informational advantage, that of building knowledge from learning about the experiences 
of different patients. These bridge positions – that is, network locations that span structural 
holes in the network – are a typical source of informational advantages (Burt 1992). 
However, DTCA (and the Internet) contributes to a new network structure that has fewer
structural holes and, as a result, fewer actors occupying bridge positions in the network.
Previous literature has connected informational advantages with power (Brass et al. 
2004; Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan 1996). In the patient-physician context, this implies 
that physicians in the new network structure have less ‘power’ in their relationship with 
patients than before. This leads us back to Figure 3.2 and to the general trend toward 
relationships that are characterized by shared decision-making (see also Figure 3.1). 
Nonetheless, physicians are still expected to keep their role as major players in patient-
physician relationships. Their specialized training is not replaceable by either DTCA or by 
health information available on the Internet. In fact, it is well-accepted that patients, even 
though more knowledgeable about their own values and preferences, should not simply 
takeover the power over physicians, who are still experts on diagnoses and treatments 
(Roter and Hall 2006). Thus, we anticipate a trend toward shared decision-making 
involving the mutual participation of more informed patients with more facilitative, less 
authoritative physicians, rather than a shift toward a consumerist model. Moreover, more 
evidence is needed to support this shift, and inform physicians, marketers and policy-
makers about the desirable degree of patient empowerment.
22 Degree centrality reflects the number of ties an actor has in the system. Closeness 
centrality measures how close the actor is to each of the other actors in the social system 
(Van Den Bulte and Wuyts 2007).
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Frequency and Severity of Malpractice Suits against physicians. Another regulatory factor 
that may promote patient involvement in medical decisions involves the climate created by 
increases in the frequency and severity of malpractice claims. In the U.S., there are on 
average 15 claims per 100 physicians per year (Danzon 2000). Physicians practicing in 
high-risk specialties, such as surgery or obstetrics, can expect to be sued once every six 
years, and although the vast majority of suits are either dropped or won by physicians, 
legal defense is still very expensive (Danzon 2000; Gawande 2005). This liability climate 
impacts patient-physician relationships. 
First, appropriate involvement of a patient in medical decisions might help the 
physician share the responsibility of the decisions made with patients and, thus, reduce the 
likelihood of being sued. Failure to obtain informed consent23 from patients, for example, 
is treated as medical negligence and can be used in court as equivalent to careless medical 
practice (Faden and Beauchamp 1986). Second, a way to reduce the threat of litigation is to 
promote open communication between the patient and the physician. In fact, when they 
proposed the National Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation Bill, Senators Hillary 
Clinton and Barack Obama believed in open communication within the patient-physician 
relationship as a way to reduce litigation (Clinton and Obama 2006).
In sum, technological, demographic and regulatory changes affect the structure of the 
social system of patients and physicians and contribute to increased connectedness in this 
network. We now turn to the consequences of shared decision-making.
4. Clinical and Relational Consequences
Increased patient connectedness entails structural changes in patient-physician 
relationships and in the health system that are capable of affecting the performance, 
productivity or innovativeness of existing ties. Cohesion in social networks, for instance, 
can be translated into performance improvements because of the increased capacity of such 
a network to encourage knowledge transfer, enhanced collaboration and learning. In a 
study of the performance of corporate R&D teams, Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) show 
23 Informed consent implies that the physician has a duty to provide information to his 
or her patients. If harm results from a certain medical treatment, and the patient is able to 
show in court that he or she would have opposed that medical decision, then the doctor 
runs a high risk of being found negligent (Faden and Beauchamp 1986).
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that both cohesion and diversity among actors contribute to team productivity. We expect 
stronger ties between physicians and patients to contribute to improvements in clinical and 
relational outcomes, including patient trust in physicians, patient satisfaction, adherence to 
physician recommendations and general health outcomes. 
Trust
In medicine, trust is typically considered to be the cornerstone of the patient-physician 
relationship (Kao et al. 1998). It is also a core construct in relationship marketing, and it 
can be defined as “a willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has 
confidence” (Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992, p.315). The current trend toward 
more patient involvement has consequences for patient trust in physicians. Partnership-
building efforts from physicians, for instance, facilitate the transfer of important 
information between the patient and the physician, reinforcing the patient’s trust in his or 
her physician (Epstein, Alper, and Quill 2004). Patients also are more likely to trust 
physicians who explore their disease and illness experience and provide longer 
consultations (Fiscella et al. 2004). Thus, we expect the trend toward shared decision-
making to foster patients’ trust in their physicians.
Trust has important health, social and economic consequences. In Kao et al.’s (1998) 
study, patients with lower trust levels are more than twice as likely to have considered 
changing physicians. This may have direct implications for managers in the healthcare 
industry looking to foster patient loyalty. Patients with a low level of trust are also more 
likely to report a lower satisfaction with care, weaker intentions to adhere to their 
physician’s recommendations and lower improvements in health (Thom et al. 2002). 
Finally, patient trust in physicians promotes the spread of positive word-of-mouth, reduces 
conflicts between patient and physician and encourages perceived effectiveness of care 
(Hall et al. 2001).
Patient Satisfaction
Increased patient connectedness can also affect a second important health-related outcome, 
patient satisfaction. Research in medicine suggests a clear link between a physician’s 
practice style and patient satisfaction. Flocke, Miller and Crabtree (2002) conducted a 
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study based on 2,881 patients and 138 family physicians to quantify the extent to which the 
style of interaction between patients and physicians influences patient satisfaction. They 
classified physicians into four mutually exclusive categories: (i) person-focused physicians 
(49%) were personable, friendly and more focused on the patient than on the disease; (ii) 
biomedical physicians (20%)  focused on the disease and were unlikely to invest time 
exploring bio-psychosocial information; (iii) bio-psychosocial physicians (16%) elicited 
some psychosocial clinical information, such as information on social and psychological 
issues, but  overall were more focused on the disease; and (iv) high-physician-control
physicians (15%) dominated the clinical encounter and disregarded the patient’s agenda. 
They found that patients visiting person-focused physicians were significantly more 
satisfied with the care they received (Flocke, Miller and Crabtree 2002). Therefore, in 
general, we expect the trend toward shared decision-making to lead to higher levels of 
patient satisfaction. 
Adherence to Treatment Plan and Preventive Behaviors
Adherence to treatment plans is a very important health issue for all stakeholders in the 
medical care system. We adopt the definition of adherence provided by the World Health 
Organization: “the extent to which a person’s behavior – taking medication, following a 
diet, and/or executing lifestyle changes, corresponds with agreed recommendations from a 
healthcare provider” (2003, p.3). Scholars in medicine have suggested that adherence 
might be a key mediator between medical practice and health outcomes (Kravitz and 
Melnikow 2004). Increased adherence, besides being a very important health outcome on 
its own, has also been linked to higher patient satisfaction (Dellande, Gilly, and Graham 
2004) and to lower healthcare costs. Hence, improving patient adherence has the potential 
to improve societal welfare.
A better understanding of patients, physicians and the relationships they establish 
should help in designing better, perhaps branded adherence programs for patients. 
Facilitating shared decision-making could be an important step in this direction. For 
example, some authors defend the need to replace terms like compliance, which suggests a 
passive role for the patient, with the term adherence, which implies patient involvement 
and mutual decision-making (Osterberg and Blaschke 2005). 
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Furthermore, the economic costs of non-adherence are very high. In the United States 
alone, non-adherence causes 33 to 69 percent of all medication-related hospital admissions 
and an overall economic burden in excess of $100 billion a year (Dunbar-Jacob and 
Mortimer-Stephens 2001). Moreover, lost sales due to non-adherence cost the 
pharmaceutical between 15 and 20 billion annually (Wosinska 2005). Thus, adherence is 
an important topic for many stakeholders in the health system, like pharmaceutical firms 
and insurance companies.
Therefore, programs aimed at improving patient adherence, even when promoted by 
pharmaceutical companies, should be well received by other players in the health system 
(namely physicians and regulators). Ongoing regulatory changes in Europe, for example, 
should facilitate direct targeting of adherence-related information to patients (European 
Commission 2008). 
Unfortunately, there is only scarce empirical evidence on the link between patient 
empowerment and therapy adherence, which indicates that this is a topic that deserves 
urgently to be addressed (Joosten et al. 2008). As such, future research should strive to 
better understand non-adherence form a social network perspective and to clarify strategies 
that marketers can use to promote adherence.
Health improvements
Finally, shared decision-making may translate into better health outcomes, such as less 
patient discomfort, greater alleviation of symptoms and better general health condition 
(Brody et al. 1989). Di Blasi et al. (2001) reviewed the results of 25 randomized controlled 
studies and concluded that there is consistent evidence that physicians who adopt a warm, 
friendly and reassuring approach are associated with better patient outcomes - for example, 
less pain and improved speed of recovery - than physicians who adopt a more formal and 
less reassuring approach. Still, the authors acknowledge that more evidence is needed to 
confirm the robustness of these findings. 
In another review, Guadagnoli and Ward (1998) concluded that although many studies 
find that shared decision-making yields positive consequences, other studies offer 
conflicting results. These conflicting results might be a reflection of patient heterogeneity. 
Not all patients seem to be willing to participate in their medical decisions. So, it is 
79
important to understand what type of patient-physician relationship is most suitable for 
different types of patients. We will now use existing evidence to suggest new ways of 
understanding different segments of the patient population.
5. Considering Patient Types in Patient-Centered Marketing
We define patient-centered marketing as a strategic orientation whereby life sciences firms 
aim their marketing efforts at holistically targeting both patients and physicians in order to: 
(i) provide treatment solutions that match the specific needs of distinctive patient niches; 
(ii) offer objective, unbiased, transparent and up-to-date information about available 
treatments; and (iii) stimulate patient intrinsic motivation towards her health and towards 
therapy choice. These patient-centered marketing principles should lead to marketing 
strategies that contribute to improved interactions between patients and their physicians 
and, ultimately, to improvements in treatment effectiveness and desirable patient 
behaviors, such as adherence to medical treatment, even though some of these links still 
need empirical scrutiny. We argue that the current trend toward shared decision-making 
will accelerate the importance of patient-centered marketing for life sciences firms and 
influence the ongoing transformation of their business models. To more fully understand 
these trends, we now analyze market segmentation.
Market segmentation entails the development of specific marketing activities for 
homogenous sub-groups in the consumer population that exhibit significant differences in 
their consumption patterns (Kamakura and Russell 1989). Note that in the specific case of 
prescription drugs, the “consumer” is both the patient and the physician. Traditionally, the 
pharmaceutical industry has focused on segmentation strategies for the physician side of 
the market. This focus is coherent with the typical pattern of allocation of marketing 
resources in the pharmaceutical industry. Despite the significant rise in DTCA 
expenditures in recent decades, in 2005, DTCA still represented only 14.2% of total 
industry expenditures in the promotion of prescription drugs in the United States; direct-to-
physician efforts like detailing, journal advertising and drug samples represented the bulk 
of pharmaceutical marketing expenditures (Donohue, Cevasco and Rosenthal 2007). In 
most other countries in which DTCA is typically not allowed, direct-to-physician efforts 
are even stronger. 
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Pharmaceutical marketers tend to focus on direct communication to physicians, with 
resource allocation being determined by physician characteristics, such as market potential, 
prescription volume, responsiveness to marketing, or capacity to influence other 
physicians. The models used for segmentation in the pharmaceutical industry also tend to 
be disease-focused, with the nature and severity of illnesses together with the nature of 
third-party payment agreements assuming key roles (Smith et al. 2002). In fact, for a 
certain disease category, the focus of most firms has been to convince physicians that they 
are capable of offering the best-in-class treatment, i.e., a treatment alternative that offers 
superior value for the average patient when compared with competing alternatives. We 
call this type of approach a mass therapy marketing approach; it is depicted in Figure 3.5.
This traditional mass-therapy approach is closely related with the prevailing 
‘blockbuster’ model in the pharmaceutical industry; this business model focuses on finding 
innovative drugs, which are then converted into brands capable of generating annual 
revenues in excess of US$1,000,000,000. Despite its popularity during the last decades, the 
blockbuster model seems to be losing its appeal. Recent evidence suggests that life science 
firms need to shift away from blockbuster drugs to niche remedies and personalized 
medicine (The Economist 2007).
The current trend toward higher patient connectedness suggests that firms need to 
segment patients and address each patient niche with customized marketing strategies. 
There are two particular dimensions of patient heterogeneity worth discussing here: (i) 
heterogeneity in patient preferences for involvement; and (ii) heterogeneity in patient goals 
and expectations from medical treatment. We explore these in order to suggest how firms 
can understand underlying patient segments and improve the effectiveness of their 
marketing activities targeted at patients. 
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Figure 3.5 Mass-therapy Marketing Approach
Patient-level segmentation based on the desired level of involvement in healthcare 
decisions
Not all patients are moving toward shared decision-making at the same rate. Some patients 
seek higher involvement in their health decisions, while others prefer to maintain a 
traditional paternalistic relationship with their physicians. Different preferences for 
involvement translate into differences in patient trust in their physician’s capability of 
making the right choice, patient health information needs, and patient adherence to 
recommended treatment plans. Thus, segmenting patients according to their desired level 
of involvement in healthcare decisions is of great value to marketers. Such an approach can 
help determine which patients are more responsive to information provided through DTCA 
or other direct-to-patient channels such as websites with health information. 
Prior research has already shown that for some segments of patients, DTCA has 
positive effects, while for others it has negative effects (Bowman, Heilman and 
Seetharaman 2004). One important implication for the life sciences industry is that patients 
who wish to have an active role in medical decisions are the most valuable targets of 
DTCA. These patients want to play an active role in their own care and, therefore, are 
more likely to decide to visit their physician after seeing an advertisement. Ironically, 
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however, patients who are more in control of and involved in health decisions are also 
more likely to actively decide to not fill a prescription or adhere to a treatment regimen 
(Roselund et al. 2004). Therefore, firms need to understand the needs of different patient 
segments in order to leverage on their unique opportunities while addressing their specific 
threats.
In order to segment patients based on involvement, it is important to pinpoint what 
drives involvement preferences. Once such drivers are recognized, pharmaceutical firms
can fine-tune their marketing activities in order to effectively and profitably influence 
these patient segments. Some demographic characteristics, for instance, have been found to 
affect the level of patient participation and interest in medical decisions. For example, 
someone who is white, female, relatively educated and enjoys a relatively high level of 
health is likely to have a higher preference for involvement in medical decisions (Flynn, 
Smith and Vanness 2006; Street 2005). Age also plays a role, with younger patients 
desiring more active participation in their medical decisions (Cassileth et al. 1980; Rotter 
and Hall 2006). This correlation between age and participation might be explained by 
physician stereotypes about older patients, their weaker health status, the presence of a 
visit companion during medical encounters (which is common among older patients), and 
an unwillingness to challenge the authority of physicians (Roter and Hall 2006). 
Consistent with the importance of various patient characteristics, Stremersch, 
Landsman and Venkataraman (2008) found that physician responsiveness to patient 
requests is correlated with the demographic composition of the area in which the 
physician’s practice is located24. This finding suggests that physicians do not treat all 
patient requests equally. Therefore, patient demographic characteristics (e.g., education, 
ethnicity, income) can moderate how physicians interpret and respond to patient requests. 
Other, less explored patient characteristics that could lead to different preferences for 
involvement include differences in attitudes toward health and health providers as well as 
cultural or individual values. All of these characteristics may vary among people, regions 
24 We cannot directly infer participatory style from a physician’s response to patient 
requests. Responsiveness to patient requests may occur even if participation is low (such as 
automatic accommodation of requests in the case of a consumerist relationship) and low 
responsiveness can also occur under participatory encounters (for example, a physician 
may persuade a patient against a certain medicine). 
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and countries. Contextual effects, such as the specific condition suffered by a patient, can 
also trigger higher or lower levels of desired involvement (Cassileth et al. 1980). Under 
some circumstances, patients might prefer to discuss treatment alternatives and illness-
related information but still delegate final medical decisions to the physician. 
Patient-level segmentation based on needs and expectations
Apart from a patient’s desire for involvement, patient health needs and expectations about 
treatment can distinguish different niches of patients that subsequently can be addressed by 
distinct marketing strategies. We define patient needs as a feeling of dissatisfaction that 
motivates the patient to set specific goals to be achieved through medical treatment; patient 
expectations comprise the information the patient expects to receive about the treatment, 
the risks he or she is willing to incur and the effort he or she is willing to invest in reaching 
these predefined health goals.  
The different psychological reactions of patients to disease, including stress, emotional 
arousal and distress, have been related to different health behaviors and distinct ways of 
coping with disease (Baum and Posluszny 1999). Similarly, we argue that patients with 
different lifestyles, family and personal needs, pain tolerance and risk attitudes will require 
different types of information and treatment approaches. In terms of marketing strategy, a 
deeper acknowledgement and integration of this distinction should engender better ways of 
conveying information and even treatment solutions to different niches of patients. 
Towards a patient-centered marketing approach
The critical and defining characteristic of the patient-centered philosophy is its focus on 
the patient, rather than on the patient’s disease or the physician. Yet, by considering the 
pivotal role of the patient-physician relationship, and of mutual participation in treatment 
decisions, our call for more patient-centered marketing should not be confused with a call 
for more dissemination of health and therapy information online, or for more DTCA or, in 
any way, for a more consumerist view of healthcare. Rather, in order to adopt a patient-
centered marketing philosophy, firms should focus their strategies, including those directed 
at physicians, on (i) offering the best treatment for each patient niche; (ii) promoting more 
productive patient-physician relationships (which may, or may not, entail more patient 
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empowerment); and (iii) achieving more desirable patient behaviors, for example, greater 
adherence to medical recommendations. We depict this approach in Figure 3.6, which 
summarizes the ideas developed in prior sections.
Figure 3.6 Patient-Centered Marketing Approach
The challenge for firms is to find creative ways to address both the opportunities as 
well as the threats (including regulation, potential for physician backlash and public 
backlash) that a patient-centered approach makes possible. It is important to understand 
which sources of health and therapy information are perceived by the patient as credible 
and leverage those channels to achieve the desirable goals of patient-centered marketing. 
In addition, firms and scholars need to gather empirical evidence on the benefits and risks 
of patient empowerment, in order to understand its limits and the opportunities it offers. 
The Internet, for example, might still provide many new opportunities for firms to interact 
with patients and their physicians (Lerer 2002). AstraZeneca’s MySymbicort.com is a good 
example of how a pharmaceutical company can develop a channel to directly communicate 
with patients, share information about a specific brand and promote tips and ideas aimed at 
increasing patient quality of life and adherence to medical treatment. Life science firms are 
becoming more alert to these challenges. Consulting companies like DKI Direct and The 
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Patient Practice25, for example, are offering services aimed at improving the effectiveness 
of direct-to-patient marketing efforts. As this trend develops, there are many opportunities 
for scholarly research to positively impact the transition from a mass-therapy to a patient-
centered marketing approach. Firms would certainly benefit from new tools and answers to 
the many open questions. 
Limitations of the patient-centered approach
There are three major barriers that may slow down the transition from a mass-therapy to a 
patient-centered marketing approach. First, there exists a “clash of mentalities.” Sales and 
marketing managers have developed very high levels of expertise in steering marketing 
efforts toward physicians; they thus may be reluctant to adopt a patient-centered view. 
Second, regulators, physicians and the general population are not used to seeing 
pharmaceutical companies communicate directly with patients. This is especially true 
outside the U.S. and New Zealand. Third, a reinforced focus on the patient suggests that 
pharmaceutical firms may need to develop new skills and use new, potentially costly, 
consumer channels to promote their products. 
The arguments we have presented suggest that the change toward patient-centered 
medicine is already in progress. Failure to adapt marketing strategies to this new paradigm 
for medical practice will be even costlier than investing in these new skills. Therefore, 
firms should look for opportunities, rather than ruminate on the threats, in these trends. 
Some opportunities may even help ameliorate the three major barriers just discussed.
First, it is important to integrate patient-directed efforts with existing marketing 
actions directed at physicians and other stakeholders. Investing in a patient-centered 
marketing approach should not be seen as a replacement for other marketing channels. On 
the contrary, the objectives defined above for patient-centered marketing can only be 
achieved by promoting a greater integration between marketing and sales as well as among 
25 DKI Direct (http://www.dkidirect.com/) works with pharmaceutical companies to 
elaborate profitable patient relationship marketing strategies. The Patient Practice 
(http://www.thepatientpractice.com/) is a consulting firm specialized in providing advice 
on how firms and organizations can interact with patients. It was founded by Di Stafford, 
former head of patient-focused marketing at Pfizer UK.
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the different existing channels, which include patients, physicians, hospitals, pharmacies 
and wholesalers, regulators, and insurers. 
Second, marketing researchers in life sciences firms will need to gather information 
about patient treatment goals and expectations as well as in-depth knowledge about the 
meanings that patients attach to the biomedical aspects of their diseases. The knowledge 
they obtain from these research efforts should be used to craft valuable information that is 
not only targeted at the patient but also coordinated with physicians and the views of other 
stakeholders. This will help guarantee that the life sciences industry is perceived as a “life 
saving” rather than “sickness selling” industry. 
Third, in order to gather such information, firms may need to develop further patient-
focused market research competencies and invest resources in new marketing and 
communication channels. However, some reallocation of resources from physician 
channels to patient channels seems appropriate and might appease potential cost concerns 
that arise with increased patient-level segmentation. The rationale for this substitution lies 
in the recognition that the law of diminishing returns might already be affecting direct-to-
physician marketing. Evidence shows that nowadays, direct-to-physician marketing is not 
as effective as firms would expect and desire (Venkataraman and Stremersch 2007). 
Therefore, reallocating marketing resources from direct-to-physician channels to less 
saturated marketing channels, such as direct-to-patient channels, should bring new profit-
improving opportunities for firms.  We now conclude with a summary of the key strategic 
implications of patient connectedness.
6. Strategic Implications of Patient Connectedness
The discussion above highlights several important research topics that may be of interest to 
life sciences firms, patients, physicians and policy makers, as is synthesized in Figure 3.7. 
First, more effort needs to be devoted to motivate physicians to encourage patient 
participation in medical decisions. Most physicians do not engage in shared decision-
making (Street et al. 2005; Young et al. 2008). One possible reason for this lack of 
enthusiasm is that physicians may still feel uncomfortable with patient empowerment. 
Another possible reason is that they fear that patients are unprepared and thus may react 
negatively to patient empowerment. In fact, there is evidence that many patients, when 
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asked to choose among therapies for instance (an empowerment act), feel that therapy 
choice is a competence of the physician and react negatively to such transfer of 
responsibility (McNutt 2004). Other patients may become overconfident when empowered 
by physicians, leading them to make health and therapy decisions on their own, which can 
be undesirable (see Chapter 4). However, if a patient is intrinsically motivated to 
participate in therapy choice, physicians should be able to leverage on that motivation and 
use it to maximize treatment effectiveness, for instance via increased patient adherence to 
therapy advice. If firms, patients and policy makers want to promote shared decision-
making, some work still needs to be done to persuade physicians of the importance of 
shared decision-making. Other stakeholders such as payers (insurance companies, or 
governments), financial intermediaries, and pharmaceutical firms26 may also indirectly 
benefit from increased patient participation in medical decisions. 
Second, firms should strive to understand patient needs and preferences regarding 
participation in medical decisions. Whenever deemed possible and desirable, firms can 
provide more information to patients in order to trigger self-motivated participation in 
medical decisions. This can be accomplished through DTCA, by supporting patient 
organizations, or promoting websites directed to patients. However, if firms are too 
forthright in motivating patients to participate in treatment decisions without also 
persuading physicians regarding the usefulness of such an approach, they may be accused 
of interfering in undesirable ways with the patient-physician relationship (Hollon 1999; 
Moynihan, Heath, and Henry 2002; Wilkes, Bell, and Kravitz 2000). Therefore, it is 
important to consider all the direct and indirect effects of marketing actions on the health 
system. Especially during the first trials of new patient-centered marketing strategies, pre-
testing the proposed marketing actions in limited geographic areas or therapeutic markets 
may be wise.
26 See the value chain in the pharmaceutical industry in Stremersch and Van Dyck 
(2009).
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Figure 3.7 Policy Recommendations to Leverage the Trend toward Patient 
Empowerment
Third, firms can use these reinforced patient-physician relationships to promote 
adherence to treatment and medical advice. Please note that for patients to adhere more to 
therapy, the effects of patient empowerment in patient comprehension, persuasion, recall, 
treatment confidence and persistence need to be carefully considered. We have taken a first 
step towards a better understanding of patient empowerment and therapy adherence (see 
Chapter 4), but this is an area that needs further research. In short, patient empowerment 
needs to be intrinsically motivated to increase therapy adherence, so firms, physicians and 
policy-makers need to use a pull, rather than push, approach to motivate patients to 
participate in therapy choice. Increasing therapy adherence is a desirable goal from the 
perspective of all involved stakeholders (Wosinska 2005; World Health Organization 
2003). Thus, it is a particularly useful objective to pursue, since more collaboration among 
all agents involved in the health value chain can be expected as a result (according to 
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Stremersch and Van Dyck (2009), stimulating patient adherence is one of the most 
impactful research topics in life sciences marketing).
Fourth, given the above analysis, firms may choose to focus more on smaller patient 
niches. Life science firms should complement their business model, which still is very 
dependent on the blockbuster model discussed above, with niche-marketing strategies. 
This can be achieved through careful patient segmentation in which segments are defined 
using traditional demographic and health status variables as well as through more 
psychological constructs like patient beliefs, expectations, needs and their level of 
involvement in their health in general. Another important strategy in this realm relates to 
the launch of new therapies. As discussed in Chapter 2, a controlled roll-out of a new 
therapy – targeting first those patient niches to whom the firm knows, based on clinical 
trial data, the new therapy will have the highest efficacy and lowest side effects –
contributes faster physician learning and adoption of the new drug.
Future research in marketing should address the challenges and opportunities that 
increases in patient connectedness create to life science firms. We hope this chapter has at 
least achieved the following two goals: (i) to stimulate interest among marketing scholars 
to examine patient-physician relationships; and (ii) to emphasize the role of the patient as 
increasingly central in medical decision-making research.
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CHAPTER 4: TOWARDS A MODEL OF INTRINSICALLY-
MOTIVATED PATIENT EMPOWERMENT FOR THERAPY
ADHERENCE27
Marketing scholars have taken a keen interest in consumer or customer compliance with, 
or adherence to, marketers’ recommendations in domains ranging from suppliers’ requests 
to channel partners (Payan and McFarland 2005), advice on product-usage (Hoffer, Pruit 
and Reilly 1994; Taylor and Bower 2004), advice on product and service choices 
(Gershoff, Mukherjee and Mukhopadhyay 2003). Customer adherence to 
recommendations and advice is particularly important in credence services like medical 
care, financial or legal services and management consulting. In such services, customers 
often need expert advice to choose between alternative services, products or actions 
(Pesendorfer and Wolinsky 2003). Due to its economic and social consequences, the topic 
of medical therapy adherence has already received some attention in the marketing 
literature (Bowman, Heilman and Seetharaman 2004; Dellande, Gilly and Graham 2004; 
Kahn and Luce 2003; Luce and Kahn 1999; Wosinska 2005). 
Therapy adherence is the extent to which a consumer follows a treatment plan, such as 
taking medication, in accordance with the recommendations from her medical care 
provider (World Health Organization 2003). Non-adherence to medical therapy may result 
in low efficacy of the treatment for the patient, additional costs to society, and lost business 
for the firm. Non-adherence contributes to disease progression and unnecessary morbidity 
and mortality, resulting in direct and indirect healthcare costs in excess of $177 billion in 
the U.S. (National Council on Patient Information and Education 2007).Between a third 
and half of all patients - irrespectively of their health status, social status, income and 
education - are typically considered non-adherent, which makes therapy non-adherence “a 
worldwide problem of striking magnitude” (World Health Organization 2003, p.7). 
The costs of non-adherence for pharmaceutical firms are also enormous. For instance, 
analysts at the Datamonitor Group estimated that lost sales due to non-adherence cost 
27 This Chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Stefan Stremersch and 
Martijn De Jong. It is currently being revised for first submission to Journal of Marketing 
Research, please do not reproduce or cite without authors’ permission.
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pharmaceutical companies over $30 billion a year, i.e. an increase of 5% in adherence can 
generate $30-$40 million in additional sales for a $1 billion blockbuster drug (Greener 
2007). For these reasons, medical adherence is seen as a high-impact research area in life-
sciences marketing (Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009; Wosinska 2005), and a primary 
concern for pharmaceutical firms (Lee, Fader and Hardie 2007). Managerial interest in the 
topic of therapy non-adherence is also clear from industry conferences dedicated to the 
topic (for instance EyeForPharma’s annual patient adherence and engagement summit) and 
research publications on non-adherence emanating from industry (e.g. McHorney 2009).
Given the magnitude of the therapy non-adherence problem, researchers have 
proposed non-adherence reduction strategies. Some scholars suggest that an effective way 
to decrease therapy non-adherence is to increase patients’ power in the medical encounter 
(e.g. Loh et al. 2007; McGinnis et al. 2007; Roth 1994; Wilson et al. 2010). More 
generally, the marketing literature has documented the positive impact of multiple forms of 
consumer participation in the marketplace, namely word-of-mouth activity (Trusov, 
Bucklin and Pauwels 2009; Villanueva, Yoo and Hanssens 2008) and consumer reviews 
for products or services (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006). Given this accumulated evidence, it 
is not surprising that both managers and scholars have converged to a belief that the 
customer should be seen as an active participant in the value-creation process (Prahalad 
and Ramaswamy 2000; Vargo and Lusch 2004). Thus, even in high-stakes decisions 
requiring specialized training and knowledge – like the choice of medical treatments –
consumer empowerment is nowadays seen as the normative standard (e.g. Epstein, Alper 
and Quill 2004; Krahn and Naglie 2008). 
Even though prior research on therapy non-adherence and on consumer empowerment 
has provided valuable insights, three main shortcomings remain. First, the literature has 
not adopted a unified definition of patient empowerment, often looking at different 
dimensions of physician-patient interaction in isolation (e.g. Horne 2006; Lerman et al. 
1990). Second, empirical evidence to inform managers, physicians and policy-makers 
about the effect of patient empowerment on non-adherence to medical therapy is very 
scarce (e.g. Joosten et al. 2008). Third, prior research is not culturally sensitive and is often 
situated in the U.S. or a selected set of Western nations, endangering the generalizability of 
its findings (Botti, Orfali and Iyengar 2009; Charles et al. 2006).
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Against this backdrop, the present study seeks to address these three shortcomings. 
We conceptually discern informational and decisional empowerment and organize 
different medical decision-making models according to these dimensions of empowerment.
We then examine which of these different empowerment dimensions leads to lower non-
adherence. To achieve this goal, we study the role of patient empowerment on therapy 
non-adherence using self-reported data from 11,735 patients in 17 countries in 4 
continents. To the best of our knowledge, this is, by far, the largest and geographically 
most diverse test of the relationship between patient empowerment and therapy adherence 
to date.
We empirically demonstrate that there are important differences in the effects of 
different dimensions of consumer empowerment on therapy non-adherence. We show that 
decisional empowerment leads to higher therapy non-adherence and informational 
empowerment is only helpful when initiated by the patient, rather than the physician.
These results show that the optimal treatment decision-making model, in terms of therapy 
adherence, is not to maximize patient empowerment as currently assumed by physicians, 
policy makers and pharmaceutical marketers. In fact, external pressure to boost patients’ 
participation in treatment choice should be avoided as it increases non-adherence to 
medical treatment. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first review the 
existing literature and discuss why self-determination theory (Ryan and Deci 2000) has 
contributed to a commonly held belief that patient empowerment improves therapy 
adherence. Next, we organize the literature on patient empowerment to discern two 
dimensions, informational and decisional empowerment, and organize medical decision-
making styles according to these two dimensions. In section 3, we discuss competing 
predictions from well-established psychological theories and develop the hypotheses to be 
tested. We then introduce the method, discuss the results and conclude with managerial 
and public policy implications of our findings.
2. Theoretical Background
Therapy Non-Adherence
Therapy non-adherence has received particular attention in the marketing literature 
(Bowman, Heilman and Seetharaman 2003; Dellande, Gilly and Graham 2004; Luce and 
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Kahn 1999; Kahn and Luce 2003; Wosinska 2005). Bowman, Heilman and Seetharaman 
(2003) infer non-adherence from the actual versus expected time-to-refill a medication. 
They find that therapy non-adherence tends to increase between doctor visits, as patients 
may become complacent (Bowman, Heilman and Seetharaman 2004). Wosinska (2005) 
uses a 4-year panel of prescription claims and shows that direct-to-consumer advertising 
(DTCA) decreases patient non-adherence, even though the economic impact is small. 
Most studies of therapy non-adherence in marketing rely on self-reported data. 
Dellande, Gilly and Graham (2004), for instance, ask weight-clinic patients whether they 
adhered to their nurses’ recommendations. They estimate a structural equation model and 
show that provider characteristics (patient-nurse similarity, or homophily, and nurse 
expertise) and patient characteristics (role clarity, perceived ability to handle medical 
treatment and motivation) are important antecedents of non-adherence. Specifically, 
homophily increases role clarity and motivation. Role clarity, perceived ability and 
motivation, in turn, translate into higher patient adherence. Kahn and Luce (2003) asked 
women in mammography waiting rooms to imagine different results of their test and 
indicate their planned adherence to future mammography tests. They found that false-
positive results reduce planned adherence.
The antecedents and consequences of therapy non-adherence have also been studied 
by scholars in medicine and medical decision-making, mostly using self-reports, which is a 
simple and effective method to measure non-adherence (Gehi et al. 2007; Osterberg and 
Blaschke 2005), that correlates highly with objective measures like pill counts (Haynes et 
al. 1980), electronic monitoring systems or biological measures like plasma viraemia 
(Walsh, Mandalia and Gazzard 2002). We provide an overview of the major medical 
publications studying therapy non-adherence in Appendix IV.A. An important insight from 
the medical literature is that patients are heterogeneous in their propensity for therapy non-
adherence but that the exact drivers of such heterogeneity are poorly understood. In 
addition, most empirical applications, both in medicine and marketing, have not 
distinguished between unintentional and reasoned non-adherence. Yet, these two forms of 
therapy non-adherence may have very distinct behavioral and attitudinal antecedents 
(Wroe 2002). Unintentional non-adherence is a patient’s unintentional failure to follow the 
treatment advice of her physician, triggered by, for example, forgetfulness or incapacity to 
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meet the treatment plan requirements. Reasoned non-adherence is a patient’s deliberate 
decision to not follow the treatment advice of her physician (e.g. due to a lack of belief in 
the treatment, fear of side effects, financial reasons). A better understanding of these 
distinct constructs is crucial to help inform marketing and public health interventions 
aimed at reducing therapy non-adherence.
Patient Empowerment
Empowerment is defined as mechanisms that equip people with sufficient knowledge and 
skills to allow them to exercise greater control over a certain event (Ozer and Bandura 
1990). In the case of treatment decision-making, patient empowerment encompasses two 
dimensions that characterize the interaction between a patient and her physician during 
clinical encounters:  (i) decisional empowerment and (ii) informational empowerment. 
Decisional empowerment refers to patients’ perceived control over the actual choice of a 
treatment, which may range from decision delegation (the choice is made by the physician) 
to autonomy (the choice is made by the patient). Informational empowerment depends on 
the level of information exchanged between the patient and the physician. Proponents of 
patient empowerment defend that both diagnostic information (information the physician 
needs to identify the illness suffered by the patient) and non-diagnostic information -
knowledge about the interaction between the illness, the treatment, and the patient’s 
preferences and values - need to be taken into account in treatment choices (Epstein, Alper 
and Quill 2004). Hence, informational empowerment increases as patients and physicians 
exchange non-diagnostic information (e.g. patient’s opinions about different treatments, 
details about a treatment’s risks and benefits) during a clinical encounter. 
Furthermore, the initiative to share, during a clinical encounter, non-diagnostic 
information can rest with the patient (patient-initiated information exchange) or with the 
physician (doctor-initiated information exchange). Patient-initiated information exchange 
refers to patients’ intrinsically motivated initiative to exchange non-diagnostic information 
with their physicians (e.g. asking the physician to explain treatments in detail, voicing her 
opinion about alternative treatments). Doctor-initiated information exchange refers to 
physicians’ initiatives to promote the exchange of non-diagnostic information with the 
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patient during a clinical encounter (e.g. asking the patient’s opinion about the medical 
treatment or the disease).
Patient Empowerment and Alternative Treatment Decision-Making Models
Figure 4.1 organizes different treatment decision-making models proposed in the literature 
along decisional and informational empowerment (either doctor-initiated of patient-
initiated). The vertical axis (z-axis) depicts decisional empowerment. The hyperplane at 
the bottom of the graph describes choice delegation, the traditional view of medical 
decision-making whereby the final choice of a medical treatment is made by the physician. 
Choice delegation is normally defended on the grounds that patients are not experts in 
biomedical issues and, therefore, “physicians, by training and obligation, will not and 
should not let patients have more power over them” (Ding and Eliashberg 2008, p. 831). 
The top hyperplane describes the opposite situation, i.e. treatment decision-making 
models characterized by patients who are in charge of therapy choice. Typical examples 
include physician accommodation of patient requests for a specific brand of medication 
(pure consumerism), or situations where the physician informs the patients about 
alternative treatment options but asks the patient to make the final choice (informed 
autonomy). The regions in between the upper and lower hyperplanes in Figure 4.1 describe 
decision-making models where the final choice is negotiated between the patient and the 
physician. 
In the horizontal axes we depict different levels of informational empowerment, either 
doctor-initiated (x-axis) or patient-initiated (y-axis). Moving Eastwards in the x-axis means 
increasing levels of doctor-initiated exchange of non-diagnostic information, while moving 
Northeastwards in the y-axis means increasing levels of patient-initiated exchange of non-
diagnostic information. This figure thus facilitates our goal of organizing different medical 
decision-making models proposed in the literature according to their levels of patient 
empowerment. 
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Figure 4.1 Patient (decisional and informational) empowerment and alternative 
treatment decision-making models
In the bottom left of the graph, we depict the traditional white-coat model which is 
characterized by choice delegation and by low informational empowerment (both patient-
initiated and doctor-initiated). In a white-coat model, the physician is in charge of the 
clinical encounter and only needs to exchange diagnostic information with the patient in 
order learn about the illness suffered by the patient, and choose the best therapy 
conditional on such diagnosis (this model has also been referred to as the paternalistic 
model, see Charles, Gafni and Wheelan 1999). The patient is a largely passive actor who is 
Consumerism
Patient-initiated
Information Exchange (y-axis)
Doctor-initiated
Information Exchange 
(x-axis)
Patient has more 
power in final choice (z-axis)
(high decisional empowerment)
Physician has more 
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(low decisional empowerment)
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expected to be cooperative and facilitate the application, by the physician, of specialized 
medical knowledge to reach the choice of the best treatment plan for the patient (Arrow 
1963). Despite the increasing number of proponents of patient empowerment, the white-
coat model still describes how treatment choices are made by many physicians (Epstein, 
Alper and Quill 2004; Young et al. 2008). Please note that in the white-coat model, non-
diagnostic information is not needed as the physician maximizes the patient’s health status 
conditional on her medical knowledge and beliefs alone. In order words, in the white-coat 
model a physician is “paternalistically valuing patient functioning instead of patient utility” 
(De Jaegher and Jegers 2000, p. 250).
Closely positioned to the white-coat model are informed delegation models. Informed 
delegation is a concept akin to perfect agency, as it requires patients and physicians to 
exchange information regarding the preferences and values of the patient (i.e. exchange of 
non-diagnostic information), to allow the physician to choose the best treatment on behalf 
of the patient (Phelps 1992). In other words, conditional on the non-diagnostic information
she collects during the clinical encounter, the physicians applies her biomedical knowledge 
to choose the treatment that maximizes the patient’s utility (Phelps 1992, p. 214). Thus, in 
informed delegation models patients have access to non-diagnostic information but that the 
final choice still rests with the physician. 
The top hyperplane of Figure 4.1 depicts informed autonomy models, which deviate 
from informed delegation as patients not only discuss non-diagnostic information with 
their physician but they also determine the final treatment choice. The consumerist model, 
for example, maintains that physicians and patients often have conflicting interests and, 
therefore, it is up to the patient to communicate her preferences for information or for a 
specific treatment to the physician and retain sovereignty over the final choice (Charles, 
Gafni and Whelan 1999). If the physician feels obliged to elucidate and interpret patient 
values and preferences (i.e. to facilitate patient exchange of non-diagnostic information)
but still leaves the final therapy choice to the patient, then we move away from the 
consumerist model in the direction of an informed autonomy model, sometimes simply 
called informative model (Emanuel and Emanuel 1992), or enhanced autonomy model 
(Quill and Brody 1996).
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Finally, the regions between the bottom and top hyperplanes of Figure 4.1 depict 
situations where a treatment decision is made both by the patient and the physician, which 
is one of the pillars of shared decision-making models (Charles, Gafni and Whelan 1999; 
McNutt 2004). In sum, in the patient-physician relationship, patients decide whether or not 
to delegate a specific decision (the choice of a therapy) to an expert (the physician). The 
extent of delegation is conditional on the control preferences of both the patient and the
physician (Li and Suen 2004). Hence, different levels of decisional empowerment, patient-
initiated information exchange and doctor-initiated information exchange lead to different 
treatment decision-making models. We now develop hypotheses relating these different 
dimensions of patient empowerment to therapy non-adherence.
3. The Effect of Patient Empowerment on Therapy Non-Adherence
The current belief that patient empowerment leads to lower therapy non-adherence finds its 
roots in self-determination theory, which shows that behavior which is based on intrinsic 
motivations - a true sense of volition and autonomous choice –leads to more confidence 
and higher persistence than behavior that is motivated by external pressure or control 
(Ryan and Deci 2000; Williams et al. 1996). Yet, self-determination theory posits that for 
higher motivation and persistence in behavioral change requires such behavioral change to 
be deeply internalized, which is only achieveable if it is perceived as autonomously 
motivated rather than externally imposed (Williams et al. 1996). Thus, the mainstream 
interpretation that patient empowerment during clinical encounters leads to lower non-
adherence implicitly assumes that all forms of patient empowerment contribute positively 
to the perception, by the patient, that theapy choice has been intrinsically motivated. In
addition, self-determination theory neglects other key drivers of unintentional and reasoned 
non-adherence such as patient comprehension, persuasion and capacity to recall the 
physician advice (Wroe 2002).
In effect, mainstream interpretation of self-determination theory also assumes that 
patients are both receptive and capable of processing non-diagnostic information and 
engaging in choice autonomy. Yet, if the patient doesn’t comprehend the non-diagnostic 
information shared by the physician, she will be unable to recall the physician’s advice 
later on, preventing her from correctly following the treatment plan even if that was her 
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intention, resulting in higher unintentional non-adherence. Moreover, some patients may 
actually expect the physician to be in charge of the medical encounter and, thus, be less 
persuaded by a physician who deviates from her expected role (McNutt 2004). In such 
cases, the patient may be less convinced of the benefits of the recommended therapy and, 
consequently, less motivated to follow and persist in such treatment plan. In such cases the 
patient may deliberately deviate from the physician’s advice, resulting in higher reasoned 
non-adherence.
In order to accommodate these effects, we build on theories from cognitive psychology 
to theorize on the effects of different dimensions of patient empowerment on therapy non-
adherence. First, episodic trace models of memory, which belong to the class of spreading 
activation models, are some of the most validated theories in cognitive psychology 
(Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1992) and are frequently used in marketing to model 
information comprehension (Mick 1992) as well as encoding and recall (Puntoni, De 
Langhe and Van Osselaer 2009; Wedel and Pieters 2000). These models establish that 
when exposed to a message (e.g. a treatment advice) people encode it by storing several 
traces in memory, each of which referring to a distinct piece of information (Anderson 
1983). For example, in a therapy advice, one memory trace could store dosing, another 
could store the exact times of intake, and yet another the treatment duration. During the 
encoding process, the level of comprehension depends on the extent to which the receiver 
of a message initiates self-motivated meaning-making process (Mick 1992). Later ease-of-
recall of each memory trace is determined by its salience when compared with competing 
traces (Anderson 1983; Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1992).
Second, even if a patient is able to comprehend and recall therapeutic advice, the 
patient will only follow the treatment plan if she has a positive attitude towards the therapy 
and is confident of her capacity to implement and persist with the treatment plan 
(Rosenstock 1974; Taylor 1990). Argument structure theory suggests that more complete 
arguments are better able to persuade consumers (Areni 2002). 
Finally, self-determination theory argues that a key benefit of patient empowerment is 
the positive impact on patient confidence on her capacity to execute and persist in the 
treatment plan, which is perceived as intrisincally-motivated. Yet, self-determination 
theory ignores the fact that increasing patient autonomy in decision-making may also lead 
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to patient overconfidence. Overconfidence - the tendency of people to overestimate their 
ability or the reliability of their knowledge (DeBondt and Thaler 1995) - is one of the most 
common regularities of human judgment, especially in situations where decision feedback 
is delayed (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 1998). 
Figure 4.2 Conceptual framework: Patient empowerment and therapy non-
adherence
Figure 4.2 summarizes our framework to study the effect of patient empowerment on
therapy non-adherence. We now build on the theories just discussed to develop our 
hypotheses – many of which in direct contradiction to self-determination theory - for the 
effects of different dimensions of patient empowerment on therapy non-adherence.
Decisional Empowerment and Therapy Non-Adherence
In contradiction to self-determination theory, we expect decisional empowerment to 
increase both unintentional and reasoned non-adherence. First, choice autonomy 
presupposes that, instead of focusing on diagnosing a patient’s illness and choosing the 
best option to treat such illness, the physician will spend part of the medical encounter 
discussing non-diagnostic information, and alternative treatment options, with the patient. 
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The problem is that physicians are severely time-constrained (McNutt 2004). Therefore, 
allocating scarce time to the discussion of the benefits and costs of multiple treatment 
alternatives means that less time is spent in the discussion of the treatment that is 
ultimately chosen. According to spreading activation theories of memory recall, this means 
that the focal memory traces that the patient needs to recall to be able to follow therapy 
advice will be less salient and harder to recall (Anderson 1983; Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 
1992).  To make matters worse, when trying to process the information needed for therapy 
choice - a process which can often be perceived as stressful (Quill and Brody 1996) -
patients tend to suffer from attentional narrowing, a phenomenon that limits the patient’s 
attention and makes it harder for her to remember and follow the physician’s advice later 
on (Kessels 2003). Hence, we hypothesize: 
H1a: Decisional empowerment increases unintentional non-adherence.
In addition, social-cognitive theories suggest that increasing a person’s autonomy leads 
to higher self-confidence (Ozer and Bandura 1990). Hence, decisional empowerment 
should contribute to increase patients’ belief in their capacity to make treatment decisions, 
which is often mentioned as a main advantage of empowerment. However, psychologists 
have established that people tend to generalize self-efficacy perceptions (like treatment 
self-confidence) from the focal domain of empowerment to domains outside the original 
scope of empowerment (Weitlauf et al. 2001). According to this line of reasoning, 
decisional empowerment may lead patients to become more self-confident in their capacity 
to make their treatment choices but, also, in their capacity to discern when or whether to 
alter or discontinue treatment, reducing reasoned non-adherence. In fact, Bowman, 
Heilman and Seetharaman (2004), to justify their finding that patients who request a 
specific brand of medication from their physician are more likely to non-adhere to the 
recommended treatment plan, conjecture that “the associated perception of empowerment 
and control [triggered by decisional empowerment] should persist such that the patient 
also believes that he or she is capable of changing dosage or stopping usage altogether 
without physician consultation” (p. 325). Therefore, we expect decisional empowerment to 
increase reasoned non-adherence:
103
H1b: Decisional empowerment increases reasoned non-adherence.
Doctor-initiated Information Exchange and Therapy Non-Adherence.
The benefits accredited to doctor-initiated informational empowerment assume physicians 
are able to clearly communicate non-diagnostic information to their patients. Nevertheless, 
for many conditions and treatments, medical science’s information base is limited, noisy, 
complex or unknown (McNutt 2004). This means that discussing non-diagnostic 
information with patients entails discussing complex information that could otherwise be 
omitted (e.g. information regarding medical symptoms, interaction between patient 
lifestyle and her health, etc). A consequence of discussing these additional topics is that the 
focal memory traces that the patient will need to recall for therapy adherence (dosing, 
schedule of intake and duration of treatment, for instance) will now have to compete with a 
myriad of other memory traces. Spreading activation theories of memory recall suggest 
that such additional memory trace competition makes the therapy less salient in the 
patient’s memory and the physician’s advice harder to recall (Anderson 1983; Raaijmakers 
and Shiffrin 1992). Hence, we hypothesize:
H2a: Doctor-initiated information exchange increases unintentional non-adherence to 
medical treatment. 
In terms of reasoned non-adherence, higher physician-initiated information exchange 
results in an increased usage of consultation time by the physician to share non-diagnostic 
information with the patient, necessarily at the expense of time reserved for reinforcing the 
exchange of diagnostic information or answering patient questions. Health communication 
scholars consider that a higher ratio of physician to patient talk is an indication of 
physician control of communication or “verbal dominance” (Roter and McNeilis 2003, p. 
127), which can hinder, rather than help, patients’ perceived autonomy (Roter et al. 1997). 
In this account, doctor-initiated informational empowerment may not act as a valid source 
of empowerment, as it violates one of the tenets of self-determination theory by increasing 
patients perceptions that the treatment plan is extrinsically motivated, reducing their 
intrinsic motivation to persist in the treatment (Ryan and Deci 2000). Moreover, prior 
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research in marketing demonstrates that when experts provide unsolicited information, and 
that information contradicts consumers’ initial impressions, consumers become reactant 
and intentionally deviate from their advice (Fitzsimons and Lehmann 2004). Such tensions 
and disagreement could also lead the patient to disagree with the doctor’s recommendation. 
We therefore hypothesize: 
H2b: Doctor-initiated information exchange increases reasoned non-adherence to
medical treatment.
Patient-initiated Information Exchange and Therapy Non-Adherence.
According to subjective comprehension theory (Mick 1992), a self-initiated meaning-
making process contributes to deeper levels of comprehension. Patient-initiated 
information exchange should then be more likely to result in discussion of information that 
the patient finds personally relevant and needed for her meaning-making process. In other 
words, patient-initiated information exchange should facilitate the activation and storage of 
the necessary and relevant pieces of information (or cognitive units) which the patient 
deems necessary to understand and be able to recall the recommended therapy during 
treatment duration. Hence, the patient-guided meaning making should reduce the number 
of competing memory traces that need to be stored during the medical encounter, and as a 
consequence ensure that the relevant memory traces for therapy adherence become salient 
in the patient’s memory. Salience of the focal memory traces should result in higher ease-
of-recall of the treatment advice (Anderson 1983; Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1992):
H3a: Patient-initiated information exchange decreases unintentional non-adherence to 
medical treatment.
Patient-initiated information exchange should also facilitate patient persuasion for the 
recommended therapy. First, deeper levels of comprehension facilitate the activation of 
positive attitudes toward a message’s content (Mick 1992). Thus, patients who take 
initiative to ask their physicians for non-diagnostic information, should be more easily 
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persuaded by the physician advice. Second, if patients take the initiative to discuss non-
diagnostic information with their physician, they should also perceive the physician 
argumentation in favor of the recommended therapy as more complete. According to 
argument structure theory, argument completeness should also facilitate patient persuasion 
(Areni 2002). Third, when patients actively ask questions to their physician, they signal 
their belief in their capacity to learn more about the treatment from such dialogue, not 
necessarily to make treatment decisions on their own. Such capacity, known as dialogical 
capability, is in fact a key predictor of consumers’ willingness to collaborate in the 
production of value together with a service provider (Ballantyne and Varey 2006). Thus, 
patient-initiated information exchange should facilitate patient persuasion, persistence and 
confidence in her capacity to understand and learn about the therapy, which leads us to 
hypothesize:
H3b: Patient-initiated information exchange decreases reasoned non-adherence to 
medical treatment.
Control Variables
When examining the role of patient empowerment in therapy non-adherence, we need to 
control for other drivers of unintentional and reasoned non-adherence. First, in addition to 
its direct effect on therapy non-adherence, physicians’ initiative to discuss non-diagnostic 
information with patients may influence patients’ initiative to participate in the medical 
encounter. In fact, one of the most common claims by patient empowerment enthusiasts is 
that physicians need to create an atmosphere, during clinical encounters, that facilitates 
patient participation in treatment deliberation (Charles, Gafni and Wheelan 1999; Epstein, 
Alper and Quill 2004). We control for this effect by including, in our model, the path 
between doctor-initiated information exchange to patient-initiated information exchange.
In addition, we control for observed patient heterogeneity in the baseline level of 
adherence using the sociodemographic predictors of non-adherence typically used in the 
medical literature (age, education, gender, socioeconomic status, income and patient health 
status, see DiMatteo 2004). We also build on the marketing literature and control for time 
since the patient’s last clinical encounter (Bowman, Heilman and Seetharaman 2004), 
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patient’s health motivation (Moorman and Matulich 1993) and patient-physician 
relationship quality and strength. We follow existing literature in relationship marketing 
and define relationship quality as a higher-order construct that captures how much the 
patient values the relational interaction she maintains with her physician, a construct 
determined by different but interrelated relational dimensions (De Wulf, Odekerken-
Schröder and Iacobucci 2001; Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 1995). There is no 
agreement about which exact dimensions should be included in relationship quality 
measures, but the two more consensual ones are trust and commitment, either taken 
together (Morgan and Hunt 1994), or even trust (Doney and Canon 1997) or commitment 
(Anderson and Weitz 1992) in isolation. Furthermore, patient-physician relationship 
strength can also be influenced by the perceived similarity between the patient and the 
physician, or homophily (Dellande, Gilly and Graham 2004) and by the age of the 
relationship and frequency of interaction between the patient and the physician (Doney and 
Cannon 1997). 
4. Method
Data Collection
We investigate the effect of patient empowerment on therapy non-adherence using a
unique dataset in terms of its size and geographical scope. We surveyed 11,735 patients in 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States 
of America. To the best of our knowledge, this is the largest study of the relationship 
between patient empowerment and therapy non-adherence to date. We contracted SSI 
(Survey Sampling International) to execute our survey on their online panels. Recruiting 
and rewarding procedures for SSI panels are constantly evaluated in terms of sample 
representativeness and respondent’s attention and motivation (see Table 4.1 for sample 
descriptives). 
We constructed the original survey in English and organized its translation to the 10 
native languages (Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, French, German, Italian, Japanese, 
Polish and Portuguese) that are spoken in the 17 countries included in our sample, by 
native speakers. The native speakers we used as translators were all doctoral students in 
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social sciences attending programs at our respective universities, which are located in 
Europe and the U.S., both having a large international student population. The vast 
majority of these graduate students are familiar with survey research methods, often 
through their coursework, which allowed us to discuss survey items, and their meanings, in 
great detail. 
We organized the translation process in accordance to best-practices in international 
survey research. First, for each language, the English version was translated by a native 
speaker (the translator) who was proficient in English. Second, another native speaker (the 
back-translator) translated the survey from his native tongue back to English. Third, we 
discussed the translated surveys with both translators and back-translators, iteratively, until 
we were sure that the final survey retained exactly the same meaning in all languages. 
Our selection of countries was guided by three major criteria. First, we wanted to obtain 
sufficient cross-cultural variation, in order to test whether our hypothesized relationships 
are culturally sensitive. Second, we only selected countries in which patients are free to 
choose their physician and typically develop repeated interactions with the same physician. 
Third, we screened out countries that were too expensive to survey in (> USD 10,000 per 
country). Table 4.1 presents some key descriptives of our dataset. In addition, our sample
LVVXEMHFWWRWZRH[FOXVLRQFULWHULDLLW¶VRQO\FRPSRVHGRIDGXOWV\HDUVRIDJHDQG
(ii) each respondent needed to have had at least 3 visits with their current general 
practitioner, in order to guarantee respondent ability to assess the relationship with her 
physician.
Measurement
We operationalize all measures in accordance to existing literature. We provide our 
measures (including the item operationalization), their respective sources and, when 
applicable, the mean Cronbach’s alpha across the 17 countries in Table 4.2. In order to 
fine-tune our instruments we discussed all items with researchers in medical decision-
making and health psychology (including two doctoral students in medicine and several 
colleagues working in health marketing). 
We found our scales to be highly reliable. The only scale with reliability below .6 was 
the two-LWHPPHDVXUHIRUSDWLHQWKHDOWKPRWLYDWLRQ6SHDUPDQ¶Vȡ ,QRXUILQDOVFDOHV
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we used multiple items to measure unintentional non-adherence (4 items), reasoned non-
adherence (5 items), doctor-initiated information exchange (4 items), patient-initiated 
information exchange (3 items), relationship quality (6 items) and health motivation (2 
items). In the case of decisional empowerment, the measurement object (treatment 
decision) and its associated attribute (who is in charge of treatment choice) can both be 
easily envisioned by respondents and, consequently, a single-item measure should be used 
(Bergkvist and Rossiter 2007). Therefore, we use a direct item to ask respondents who, in 
their clinical encounters with their physician, has more influence determining the treatment 
chosen. We also used single items for health status (in line with Safran et al. 1998), age, 
education, gender, income, socioeconomic status, relationship duration, interaction 
frequency and time since last visit.
5. Model
Figure 4.3 summarizes our model specification28. In order to avoid bias in our parameter 
estimates due to patient heterogeneity in their response to patient empowerment, we 
specify a finite-mixture structural equation model (FM-SEM), which is the most 
appropriate approach when existing evidence characterizing such heterogeneity is scarce 
(Jedidi, Jagpal and DeSarbo 1997). Estimation of FM-SEM’s is not straightforward but 
Bayesian MCMC techniques have recently been shown to offer a robust and practical 
approach to these problems (e.g. Zhu and Lee 2001; Van Der Lans et al. 2009). We now 
formalize our model specification.
28 Note: For simplicity of exposition, instead of linking all exogenous control variables to 
the endogenous latent variables of interest, we opted to depict these relationships per block
(sociodemographics, relationship strength and heaOWKGULYHUV7KHEROGHGSDUDPHWHUVȖN-
ȖNGHQRWHYHFWRUVRIXQNQRZQSDUDPHWHUVWREHHVWLPDWHGIRUWKHUHVSRQVHVLQWHUPVRI
unintentional and reasoned therapy non-adherence, to the control variables.
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Model Specification 
Whenever we use mathematical symbols, i indexes respondents (i=1,…,N with N= 
11,735), k indexes clusters of respondents (k=1,…,K), c indexes countries (c=1,…,C with 
C=17), p indexes the response items we used to measure our constructs (p=1,…,P with 
P=36), q indexes the endogenous constructs (q=1,…,Q with Q=3) and r indexes the 
exogenous constructs (r=1,…,R with R=15). We now collect all response items in a 
common (Pu1) vector, which for simplicity of notation we denote yi. We also define a 
[(Q+R)u1] vector Zik, which we partition as Zik=( TT ikik ȟȘ , )T. Now, we explicitly consider 
response heterogeneity by specifying cluster-specific measurement equations as follows:  
ikikkki İȦȁĲy  k|  (4.1) 
where Ĳk is a (Pu1) vector of measurement intercepts, ȁk is a [Pu(Q+R)] matrix of factor 
loadings, and İik is a (Pu1) random vector of residuals which is assumed to be normally 
distributed as N(0,<k), where <k is a (PuP) diagonal covariance matrix conditional on 
cluster k. We also assume İik and Ȧik are independent.  
We now define our structural model as: 
ikikkikkik įȟīȘȆȘ   (4.2) 
where Ȇk is a (QuQ) and īk a (QuR) matrix containing the unknown parameters we want 
to estimate, such that (I-Ȇk) is nonsingular, įik is a (Qu1) vector of residuals (assumed 
independent of ȟik) and distributed as N(0,<Gk), where <Gk is a (QuQ) diagonal covariance 
matrix and ȟik is distributed according to N(0,ĭk), where ĭk is a (RuR) diagonal matrix. 
Let us now collect all unknown coefficients to be estimated in a cluster-specific 
parameter vector șk which will thus contain /k,)k, 3k, *k, <k, <Gk. The implied 
covariance structure of the model specified in Equations (1)-(2) is:  
¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§

 

kkkk
kkkkįNkkkk
ȦN ĭȆIīĭ
ĭīȆIȆIȌīĭīȆIȈ TT
TT
])[(
)(]))[(()(
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 (4.3) 
Equations (1)-(3) clarify that we explicitly model heterogeneity in both the 
measurement and the structural models, in the spirit of DeSarbo et al. (2006). We now 
introduce a latent allocation variable zi, which allows us to classify respondents in the 
different clusters (in line with Zhu and Lee 2001):  
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ki kzp S  )( , for k = 1,…,K (4.4)
ZKHUHʌk are latent mixing proportions that need to satisfy Sk>0 and S1+S2+…+SK=1. Let Ĳ
= {Ĳ1,…,ĲK}, ʌ = {ʌ1,…,ʌK} and let ș ={ș1,…,șK} denote the parameter vector across 
clusters. 
Model Estimation and Identification
Let us now collect all the observations in the matrix Y=(y1,…,yN), all latent variables in 
the matrix ȍ=(Ȧ1,…,ȦN), with Ȧi = (Zi1,…, ZiK), and define a matrix for the allocation 
variables Z=(z1,…,zN), we can write the complete-data model likelihood (i.e. the joint 
likelihood of the data and the latent variables) as follows: 
 ¦
  
 
 
N
i
K
k
kk f
pL
1 1
,|,
),,|,,(),,(
kkiki șĲȦy
ʌĲșȍZYʌĲș
S
(4.5)
where K is the number of clusters and  kkiki șĲȦy ,|,kf is the (multivariate normal) 
probability density function of the observed data and unobserved latent variables, for 
respondent i allocated to cluster k. Please note that the marginal 
likelihood      ³  Zdfff kkk kkikkkikikki șĲȦșĲȦyșĲy ,|,|,,| is thus 
distributed according to N(Ĳk,Ȉkșk)) with Ȉkșk   ȁkȈȦNȁkTȌk. As standard in 
covariance structure models, we need to guarantee that our model is identified by imposing 
additional identification restrictions to avoid over-parameterization. We follow the normal 
practice of setting the factor loading of one item per construct to unity. Moreover, a 
common concern in finite-mixture structural equation models is the fact that the 
distribution of observed responses is invariant to the classification of each respondent in 
different clusters, which can generate the well-known problem of label switching (see e.g. 
Rossi, Allenby and McCulloch 2005). We solve this problem by implementing an ordering 
in the latent mixing proportions, such that S1<S2 <…<SK, in line with Lenk and DeSarbo 
(2000). A convenient way to implement this ordering involves specifying an ordered 
Dirichlet prior for these mixing probabilities (De Jong and Steenkamp 2010).
Conditional upon the identification restrictions just discussed we sample the model 
parameters from their posterior distributions using the Gibbs sampler (see Casella and 
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George 1992 for a review) together with data augmentation, which allows us to sample the 
latent constructs and allocation variables alongside the model parameters (Tanner and 
Wong 1987). Our Gibbs sampler starts with m=0. We first sample the latent indicators for 
each patient’s cluster membership (Z) conditional on the model parameters (T) and latent 
constructs (:). Next, defining the number of clusters as K, and given the assignment of 
respondents to each of these clusters, data augmentation is used to update the latent 
variables from K independent multivariate normal distributions. Finally, conditional on 
these latent variables and on the cluster membership assignment, model parameters (factor 
loadings, structural parameters, error variances) are again sampled from K independent 
multivariate normal distributions. In sum, at each iteration, m, our sampling scheme cycles 
over the following conditional distributions:
Step 1: Sample Z(m+1) from p(Z|Y,T(m))
Step 2: Sample :(m+1) from p(:|Y,T(m), Z(m+1))
Step 3: Sample T(m+1), from p(T|Y, :(m+1), Z(m+1))
For brevity, we relay the details on the computation of the prior distributions and 
conditional posteriors used for the remaining parameters in ș to Appendix IV.B. 
6. Results
Model Selection
We follow the approach of Lenk and DeSarbo (2000) and estimate several models, each of 
which with a different number of clusters, and select the model with largest posterior 
probability. We used the two measures suggested by Jedidi, Jagpal and DeSarbo (1997) for 
the selection of the number of clusters in finite-mixture SEM’s: (i) the consistent Akaike 
Information Criterion (or CAIC; Bozdogan 1987) and (ii) the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (or BIC; Schwarz 1978). We also provide the log-marginal densities (LMDs), 
computed according to Newton-Raftery’s (1994) procedure. All three measures indicate 
that a three-cluster solution fits the data much better than alternative models (e.g. 
LMD(K=3) = -514,400 while LMD(K=2) = -538,300 and LMD(K=4) = -552,400). We 
compared the median factor loadings for each cluster across the three-cluster solution and 
found that all clusters had a very similar factor structure, which is evidence of 
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measurement and configural invariance in line with the tests proposed by Steenkamp and 
Baumgartner (1998).
We let all chains converge and used subsequent 5,000 draws for posterior inference. 
The estimates we present below are the posterior medians obtained from the MCMC 
chains from our Gibbs-sampler and, within brackets, their 95% Credible Intervals (which 
we abbreviate to ‘95% CI’ and where the lower value is the 2.5th percentile and the higher 
value the 97.5th percentile of the distribution of MCMC draws). 
Estimation Results
Table 4.2 present the estimates for the focal structural paths in our model using a pooled 
structural equation model (i.e. the model with K=1, colored in grey) and from our three-
cluster FM-SEM of patients’ response – in terms of unintentional and reasoned non-
adherence – to patient empowerment. The first important finding from the FM-SEM is that 
there is substantial patient heterogeneity, with the models allowing for cluster-specific 
response parameters fitting the data much better than the pooled model (LMDpool = -
1,311,500). Second, about 25% of all patients were classified in cluster 1, 36% in cluster 2 
and 39% in cluster 3. Third, and importantly, even though the magnitude (and 
significance) of the relationships is quite different between clusters (see Table 4.2), there 
are no sign reversals and the findings from the pooled model are not threatened by 
considering patient heterogeneity. For parsimony, we thus test our hypotheses using the 
pooled model estimates. 
Decisional empowerment leads to both higher unintentional non-DGKHUHQFHȖ1 = .03; 
95% CI = [.014; .039]) and reasoned non-DGKHUHQFHȖ2 = .05; 95% CI = [.040; .065]), in 
support of hypotheses H1a and H1b. We also find that doctor-initiated information exchange 
increases both unintentional non-adherence (Ȗ3 = .27; 95% CI = [.229; .319]) and reasoned 
non-DGKHUHQFHȖ4 = .23; 95% CI = [.181; .269]), in support of H2aand H2b. In contrast with 
decisional empowerment and doctor-initiated information exchange, however, patient-
initiated information exchange leadVWRORZHUXQLQWHQWLRQDOȕ1 = -.14; 95% CI = [-.176; -
.100]) and reasoned therapy non-DGKHUHQFHȕ2 = -.04; 95% CI = [-.080; -.005]), in support 
of H3a and H3b.
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Table 4.2 Estimation Results: Patient Empowerment and Therapy Non-adherence
Response Cluster Decisional empower.
Doctor-
initiated 
info. exch.
Patient-
initiated 
info. exch.
Unintentional non-adherence Pooled .03 .27 -.14
[.01; .04] [.23; .32] [-.18; -.10]
1 .04 .06 -.05
[.02;.07] [-.01;.13] [-.13;.02]
2 .01 .41 -.20
[-.01;.03] [.29;.83] [-.26;-.14]
3 .01 .44 -.28
[-.02;.03] [.34;.56] [-.37;-.20]
Reasoned non-adherence Pooled .05 .23 -.04
[.04; .07] [.18; .27] [-.08; -.01]
1 .05 .01 .03
[.03;.07] [-.05;.08] [-.04;.10]
2 .05 .24 -.05
[.02;.07] [.14;.66] [-.11;-.00]
3 .02 .48 -.22
[-.01;.04] [.38;.60] [-.31;-.14]
Control Variables.
We also controlled for several antecedents of unintentional and reasoned non-adherence.
Table 4.3 presents the estimation results for these control variables. In addition, we control 
for a possible feedback effect between doctor-initiated information exchange and patient-
initiated information exchange. For simplicity we report here the pooled model estimates 
(the results of the three-cluster solution are very similar and available upon request). Most 
results are in line with existing literature. 
First, doctor-initiated information exchange seems to motivate higher patient-initiated 
information exchange (in the pooled model, the path from doctor-initiated information 
exchange to patient-LQLWLDWHG LQIRUPDWLRQ H[FKDQJH LV Ȗ5 = .57; 95% CI = [.548; .589]). 
This finding is in line with medical literature showing that when physicians share non-
diagnostic information with their patients, patients perceive the atmosphere in the clinical 
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encounter as more open for their participation in therapy deliberation and choice (Charles, 
Gafni and Wheelan 1999; Epstein, Alper and Quill 2004; Lerman 1990). Yet, the net effect 
of doctor-initiated information exchange on both unintentional and reasoned non-
adherence is still positive.
Second, in terms of patient sociodemographics, older patients show lower therapy non-
DGKHUHQFHȖ6,1 = -.11; 95% CI = [-.121; -@DQGȖ7,1 = -.09; 95% CI = [-.105; -.078]), 
which is consistent with recent research in marketing (Neslin, Rhoads and Wolfson 2009). 
More educated patients show higher levels of therapy non-adherence, but the effect is only 
PDUJLQDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW Ȗ6,2   &, > @DQGȖ7,2 = .01; 95% CI = [.000; 
.024]). Prior research in medicine typically finds a negative effect of education on non-
adherence, but the effect is also rather modest and limited to patients suffering from 
chronic conditions (DiMatteo 2004). 
3DWLHQWJHQGHULVQRWFRUUHODWHGQHLWKHUZLWKXQLQWHQWLRQDOȖ6,3 = .01; 95% CI = [-.019; 
.037]) nor with reasoned non-adKHUHQFHȖ7,3 = .00; 95% CI = [-.032; .023]), in line with 
research in medicine (DiMatteo 2004). Higher patient income and socioeconomic status 
lead to lower levels of non-DGKHUHQFHȖ6,4 = -.01; 95% CI = [-@DQGȖ7,4 = -.02; 
95% CI = [-.022; -.0@Ȗ6,5 = -.01; 95% CI = [- @DQGȖ7,5 = -.03; 95% CI = [-
.043; -.017]), which is also in line with existing literature (Benner et al. 2002; DiMatteo 
2004).
Third, in terms of relationship strength, higher quality of the patient-physician 
relationship results in lower unintentional non-DGKHUHQFHȖ8,1 = -.58; 95% CI = [-.629; -
.522]) and in lower reasoned non-DGKHUHQFH Ȗ9,1 = -.72; 95% CI = [-.776; -.670]). This 
finding is consistent with the relationship marketing literature, which shows that 
relationship quality facilitates the achievement of mutual goals (Palmatier et al. 2006) and 
with the medical literature which sees trust as the cornerstone of patient-physician 
relationships (Kao et al. 1998). 
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Table 4.3 Pooled Model Results : Control Variables
Control Variable Unintentional Non-Adherence
Reasoned 
Non-Adherence
Age -.11 -.09
[-.121; -.093] [-.105; -.078]
Education .02 .01
[.008; .031] [.000; .024]
Gender .01 .00
[-.019; .037] [-.032; .023]
Income -.01 -.02
[-.014; -.003] [-.022; -.011]
Socioeconomic status -.01 -.03
[-.024; .003] [-.043; -.017]
Relationship quality -.58 -.72
[-.629; -.522] [-.776; -.670]
Age homophily .00 .00
[-.016; .009] [-.011; .014]
Gender homophily -.02 .01
[-.043; .012] [-.016; .038]
Relationship duration -.03 -.01
[-.039; -.013] [-.022; .003]
Interaction frequency .02 -.01
[.005; .029] [-.018; .005]
Time since last visit .00 .01
[-.012; .014] [.000; .026]
Health status -.04 .00
[-.053; -.022] [-.017; .013]
Health motivation -.08 .03
[-.103; -.061] [.007; .048]
Age and gender concordance, or homophily, are not related to therapy non-adherence 
Ȗ8,2 = .00; 95% CI = [-@DQGȖ9,2 = .00; 95% CI = [-@Ȗ8,3 = -.02; 95% 
CI = [- @ DQG Ȗ9,3 = .01; 95% CI = [-.016; .038]), which is in line with prior 
research in marketing (Dellande, Gilly and Graham 2004). Relationship duration leads to 
lower unintentional non-DGKHUHQFHȖ8,4 = -.03; 95% CI = [-.039; -.013]) but not reasoned 
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non-DGKHUHQFHȖ9,4 = -.01; 95% CI = [-.022; .0033]), while frequency of interaction leads 
(marginally) to higher unintentional non-DGKHUHQFH Ȗ8,5 = .02; 95% CI = [.005; .029]). 
Reasoned non-DGKHUHQFHDOVRWHQGVWRPDUJLQDOO\LQFUHDVHEHWZHHQYLVLWVȖ9,6 = .01; 95% 
CI = [.000; .026]), a finding with high face validity (Cramer, Scheyer and Mattson 1990). 
This result may be driven by the fact that, as time since last visit to the physician elapses, 
complacency may creep in increasing the likelihood that the patient decides to stop 
following the treatment based on a (potentially erroneous) belief that the therapy is no 
longer needed (Bowman, Heilman and Seetharaman 2004). 
Finally, in terms of health drivers of therapy non-adherence, we find that better health 
status leads to lower uninteQWLRQDOȖ10,1 = -.04; 95% CI = [-.053; -.022]) but not reasoned 
non-DGKHUHQFH Ȗ11,1 = .00; 95% CI = [-.017; .013]) and higher patient health motivation 
OHDGVWRORZHUXQLQWHQWLRQDOȖ10,2 = -.08; 95% CI = [-.103; -.061]) but higher reasoned non-
adherence Ȗ11,2 = .03; 95% CI = [.007; .048]). The first finding is consistent with prior 
literature, which has documented that non-adherence increases when patients’ health status 
requires them to more frequently take drugs (Bowman, Heilman and Seetharaman 2004) or 
as treatments become more complex (WHO 2003). The effect of patient health motivation 
on unintentional non-adherence is consistent with existing literature (Dellande, Gilly and 
Graham 2004), while the positive effect on reasoned non-adherence seems to reinforce the 
finding that patient motivation interacts with health behaviors in complex manners, with its 
impact depending on the specific health behavior under analysis (Moorman and Matulich 
1993).
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the link between patient empowerment and therapy non-
adherence. According to self-determination theory, patient empowerment increases 
patients’ perceived autonomy and leads to increased persistence in desirable behaviors, 
resulting in lower therapy non-adherence (Williams et al. 1996). Based on these 
arguments, medical scholars and public health officials increasingly voice patient 
empowerment as a desirable new paradigm for patient-physician relationships, with many 
advocates claiming it should be defended both due to moral considerations and due to 
expected positive effects of empowerment in patient adherence. However, physicians often 
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complain that despite the grandiose ideal of shared decision-making and its moral appeal, 
when offered unrequested non-diagnostic information or asked to choose among 
alternative treatments, most patients react negatively often retorting “you’re the physician, 
you tell me what to do” (McNutt 2004, p.2518). The scant existing empirical evidence is 
insufficient to inform practitioners and pharmaceutical firms about the desirability of 
patient empowerment as a strategy to improve patient adherence.
We have collected a very large and geographically dispersed dataset with self-reported 
data on adherence and patient empowerment perceptions from 11,735 patients in 17 
countries. We find that, even though patients are heterogeneous in their responses to
patient empowerment, several robust and systematic patterns emerge. Patient 
empowerment is only beneficial when intrinsically motivated. That is, if patients request 
more information from their physicians such additional interaction will result in better
comprehension, persuasion, easier recall and better treatment self-confidence and 
persistence, contributing to lower therapy non-adherence. In contrast, if patients directly 
participate in treatment choice (decisional empowerment) or if physicians push 
unrequested information during the medical encounter, non-adherence tends to increase. 
Decision empowerment may be cognitively and emotionally taxing for patients and also 
lead patients to become overconfident about their capacity to make treatment decisions
(including the decision to stop or alter treatment). Doctor-initiated informational 
empowerment, in turn, may be perceived by patients as “verbal dominance” (Roter and 
McNeilis 2003), leading to lower rather than higher perceived autonomy. 
These are troubling findings, if we take into account that both the medical profession 
and pharmaceutical industry are currently convinced that asking patients to participate in 
the medical encounter is actually a good strategy to reduce non-adherence. If direct-to-
consumer advertising (DTCA), for example, increases brand requests but also therapy non-
adherence, that may explain why many researchers conclude that the effect of DTCA in 
drug prescriptions is null or very modest (Donohue and Berndt 2004; Manchanda, Xie and 
Youn 2008).
These findings are thus important both for marketers and policy makers willing to 
reduce therapy non-adherence (which results in higher sales, better patient health and 
lower costs for the healthcare system). Specifically, our study suggests that patient-
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initiated information exchange should be promoted via disease-awareness or 
empowerment-awareness campaigns rather than via physician facilitation during medical 
encounters.  
Like all studies, our research suffers from certain limitations which can open new 
avenues for future research. First, it would be interesting to test some of our hypotheses 
using revealed preference data, rather than self-reports. The inferences one can make with 
such data are necessarily less rich in terms of characterization of patients’ beliefs and 
attitudes (e.g. distinguishing unintentional versus reasoned non-adherence would be nearly 
impossible). Yet, researchers with enough resources to collect revealed behavioral data 
with sufficient geographical and cultural scope could help generalizing our findings. 
Second, future research could also try to get data from the physician population and jointly 
model patient and physician beliefs in order to better understand dyadic processes that may 
be driving therapy non-adherence. We think this is a fruitful area for future research in 
therapy non-adherence. Third, we follow the tradition of health psychology of looking at 
therapy non-adherence as a behavioral trait of patients (DiMatteo et al. 1993). Also in 
marketing, scholars have recognized that patients do have a baseline propensity for 
adherence (Bowman, Heilman and Seetharaman 2004). Still, it would be interesting to 
explore differences in the effect of patient empowerment on therapy non-adherence across 
disease categories29. Finally, we believe the effects we document here are generalizable to 
many other types of credence services. However, this claim needs further scrutiny.
In sum, before pushing the patient empowerment agenda even further, public policy 
officials, physicians and managers in the pharmaceutical industry need to first guarantee 
that enough effort is put on educating the patient population about their new role in patient-
physician relationships and on understanding the benefits and limitations of different 
dimensions of patient empowerment.
29 We actually have also collected disease-specific data in our survey. We have checked 
the robustness of our results using this data. Our focal results are generally applicable to 
disease-specific measures of therapy non-adherence, but a more detailed study would still 
be worthwhile. 
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Appendix IV.B 
In order to discuss the details of our model, please let us expand the expression in Equation 
5 in the main text. For this we use the allocation of respondents to clusters as well as the 
distributional assumptions discussed in the main text. We can thus rewrite the complete 
model likelihood as follows:  
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 (A.4.1) 
 
Conditional on the identification restrictions discussed in the model estimation and 
identification section of the main paper, we sample the parameters from our FM-SEM 
model from their respective posterior distributions using a Gibbs sampler (see Casella and 
George 1992, for a review) together with data augmentation for the latent variables 
(Diebolt and Robert 1994; Tanner and Wong 1987). As explained in the paper, we first 
sample the latent indicators for each patient’s cluster membership (Z) conditional on the 
model parameters (T) and latent constructs (:). Next, defining the number of clusters as K, 
and given the assignment of respondents to each of these clusters, data augmentation is 
used to update the latent variables from K independent multivariate normal distributions. 
Finally, conditional on these latent variables and on the cluster membership assignment, 
model parameters (factor loadings, structural parameters, error variances) are again 
sampled from K independent multivariate normal distributions. In sum, at each iteration, 
m, our sampling scheme cycles over the following conditional distributions: 
 
Step 1: Sample Z(m+1) from p(Z|Y, T(m)) using: 
¦
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SS  (A.4.2)  
Step 2: Sample :(m+1) from p(:|Y, T(m), Z(m+1)). To simplify notation let us first define 
k
1
kk
1
ȦNk ȁȌȁȈC   T we can then use, for a respondent i assigned to cluster ț:  
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Step 3: Generate T(m+1), from p(T|Y, :(m+1), Z(m+1)). This is the most complex 
conditional distribution in our Gibbs sampler. Yet, sampling from it can be made easier by 
assuming that the prior distribution of S is independent of the prior distributions for Ĳ and 
ș, which are also assumed independent between themselves, and that - conditional on ȍ(m) 
- the priors for {3k,*k,<k,)k} are also assumed independent of {/k ,<Gk} such that (see 
Lee 2007, section 11.3):  
p(TĲʌ) = p(ʌ) p(Ĳ) p(3k, *k, <k, )k)p(/k ,<Gk) (A.4.4) 
Which, together with the model definition, allows us to write the joint conditional posterior 
of T in a computationally more convenient form: 
> @ > @
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which allows to sample the marginal densities p(ʌ|Ɣ), p(Ĳ,/k,<Gk|Ɣ) and p(3k,*k,<k,)k|Ɣ) 
one at a time. 
First, with the ordered Dirichlet prior discussed above for S, i.e., with hyperparameters 
Ț (that is p(ʌ~Ord-D(Ț)), we sample ʌ form the following posterior which is also ordered 
Dirichlet: 
 p(S | Ɣ) ~ Ord-D( Ț ) (A.4.6) 
whereƔrefers to the remaining parameters on which we condition this draw. A slice 
sampler is used to draw from this ordered Dirichlet distribution. 
We specify the following priors for the model parameters in T. Let Yk and :k be the 
submatrices of Y and : where only the data and latent variables from respondents 
assigned to cluster k are collected (i.e. all the ith observations where țzk are deleted). Also, 
let us define a joint matrix for the endogenous and exogenous latent variables /Zk = 
(3k*k). We use the following conjugate priors, which have been shown to work well in 
Bayesian analysis of mixture models30 (Roeder and Wasserman 1997): 
                                                          
30 In fact, as pointed out by Roeder and Wasserman (1997), standard reference priors of the 
fully uninformative type, do not work well with mixture models as they often lead to 
improper posteriors, thus the current priors are a practical and well-accepted solution for 
the complexities associated with estimation of FM-SEM’s.  
127
),(~ 0kk ȈĲĲ N ,
with 3 kĲ and P0 IȈ  5
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),(~| ypkpkpk Ǿȁȁ pkpk N \\ ,
with ȁpk being the pth row of ȁk, R)(Qpk Țȁ  , R)(QȚ  a (Q+R) vector of 
ones, ȥpk being the pth diagonal element of Ȍkand R)(Qypk IǾ  5 .
(A.4.8)
),(~| ȦTNȦTNȦTN Hȁȁ kqkq N GG \\ ,
with ȦTN
ȁ a (Q+R)-dimensional vector of zeros, kqG\ being the qth diagonal 
element of ȌįN and R)(QȦTN IH  5 .
(A.4.9)
 pkpkpk srGammaInverse ,~ 0\ , with 20  pkr and 2 pks . (A.4.10)
 kqkqkq srGammaInverse GGG\ ,~ 0 , with 20  kqr G and 2 kqs G . (A.4.11)
),(~ 0U01k Rĭ Wish ,
withR0 = .1ÂIR and ȡ0 = R+1.
(A.4.12)
Let :1k and :2k be subsets of the matrix :k containing the Q rows of Kk and the 
remaining R rows of [k. Given these definitions and the priors above, we can specify the 
conditional posteriors we use to sample p(T|Y, :(m+1), Z(m+1)) by applying standard results 
from Bayesian analysis, i.e.:
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ypkypkkkpk AaȍYȁ pkpkpk N \\W ,~,,,| 1 (A.4.14)
 pkpkkpkpk srnGamma ,2~,,| 01  W\ kk ȍY (A.4.15)
),(~,,| 1 ȦNTįTNkkȦTN AaȍYȁ  kqkq N GG \\ (A.4.16)
),2(~,| 0
1
kqkqkqk srnGamma GGG\  kk ȍY (A.4.17)
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 1  Tkk1ypkypk ȍȍǾA (A.4.20)
 pk1ypkpkypk1ypkypkpkpk ȁǾȁaAaYY   TTTpkpk ss ~~5.0 (A.4.21)
 T1qkkȦTN1ȦTNȦTNįTN ȍȍȁHAa   , with   1  kk1ȦTNȦTN ȍȍHA T (A.4.22)
 ȦTNȦTNȦTNįTN1ȦTNįTN1qk1qk ȁHȁaAaȍȍ 15.0   TTTTkqkq ss GG (A.4.23)
In these expressions, pkY
~
is the pth row of kY
~ , which is a matrix whose columns are 
equal to the columns of Yk minus Ĳk, and :1qk is the qth row of :1k.
Model Convergence.We assess model convergence using Geweke’s (1992) convergence 
diagnostic test and by visually inspecting plots of the log-likelihood and of parameters’ 
posterior draws, which confirmed that the chains had converged. Specifically, all focal 
parameters had unimodal and relatively narrow posterior densities and autocorrelation was 
not a problem.
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CHAPTER 5: PATIENTS’ PROPENSITY AND PHYSICIANS’ 
RESPONSE TO BRAND REQUESTS: A SOCIAL EXCHANGE 
PERSPECTIVE31.
Many consumer choices are made in a dyad or group setting (Aribarg, Arora and Bodur 
2002), and such group choices typically deviate from the choices individuals would make 
in isolation (Ariely and Levav 2000; Kurt, Inman and Argo 2011; Yang and Allenby 
2003). Dyadic choices necessarily involve some degree of negotiation and mutual 
influence to achieve a desirable choice outcome (Su, Fern and Ye 2003). Such dyadic 
bargaining is, more often than not, unequal in nature. Potentially asymmetric dyads include 
familial decisions such as in parent-teen dyads (Aribarg, Arora and Kang 2010), certain 
choices among husband and wives (Baumeister and Vohs 2004) and decision delegation to 
experts (Fitzsimons and Lehmann 2004; Li and Suen 2004). There are many examples of 
joint decision-making between consumers and experts, including consumer choice among 
alternative legal options, financial investments, available technologies or health-related 
products and services.  
In this article, we develop and test a theoretical model to the study of consumer-expert 
dyadic decision-making in the context of prescription drug choices. Due to its economic 
and welfare relevance, prescription choice in the patient-physician dyad is a prime example 
of dyadic decision-making (Ding and Eliashberg 2008). We focus on two key behavioral 
interactions occurring during patient-physician negotiation and therapy choice: (i) patient 
requests of drugs by brand name and (ii) physician accommodation of such requests. In 
addition, we also examine whether physician accommodation of patient requests influences 
patients’ intention to voice more requests in the future. Existing evidence shows that 
patients make a request for a specific medication in about 10% of all office visits and 
outright rejection of such requests by physicians is rare (Paterniti et al. 2010). When asked 
whether they ever requested a drug by brand name from their physicians, about a third of 
all patients in France, Germany, U.K. and U.S. admit having made such a request at a 
certain point (Calabro 2003).
31This Chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Stefan Stremersch and 
Martijn De Jong. Please do not reproduce or cite without authors’ permission.
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Physician accommodation of patient requests, in turn, leads to more positive patient 
evaluation of care (Kravitz et al. 2002), while refusals have been associated with patient 
dissatisfaction (Bell, Wilkes, and Kravitz 1999). Hence, patient requests have been shown
to influence physician prescription behavior. For example, using a panel with physician 
prescription behavior in three major therapeutic categories (statins, gastroinstestinal and 
coagulation drugs, and erectile dysfunction), Venkataraman and Stremersch (2007) show 
that patient requests increase physicians’ prescriptions of the requested brand. In fact, 
physician accommodation of patient requests has even been found in settings where the 
condition suffered by the patient could perhaps influence her judgment, like in psychiatric 
consultations (Kravitz et al. 2005; Paterniti 2010). 
Physician accommodation of patient requests sparks enormous controversy among 
physicians, medical scholars and public health officials, who often blame direct-to-
consumer advertising (DTCA) or direct-to-consumer information broadcasted via mass 
media channels for the rise in patient requests (Bell, Kravitz and Wilkes 1999; 
Government Accountability Office 2006; Hollon 1999; McKillen 2002). The controversy 
is so strong that the assumed relationship between direct-to-consumer information and 
patient requests is arguably the most contentious topic for the pharmaceutical industry, 
with some authors claiming that it “has the potential to fundamentally alter the roles of 
doctor and patient” (Wilkes, Bell, and Kravitz 2000, p.122). Take the case of Pfizer’s ad 
campaign “Viva Viagra,” launched in July 2007. Shortly after its launch, Michael 
Weinstein - at the time the President of the AIDS Healthcare Foundation – criticized (and 
later sued) Pfizer claiming that its campaign was promoting patient requests and, 
ultimately, the usage of the erectile dysfunction blockbuster, thereby increasing consumer 
exposure to sexually transmitted diseases (CBS News 2007). These controversies 
surrounding direct-to-consumer information have also led medical scholars and lawmakers 
to express concern for FDA’s weak enforcement of existing laws (Donohue, Cevasco and 
Rosenthal 2007) and the need for more regulation (Government Accountability Office 
2006).  
The exact drivers of patient requests and physician accommodation of such requests 
are not yet known, and the existing controversy is based on non-empirical arguments. For 
instance, there are at least two major macro-level trends which could also explain the rise
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in patient requests to their physicians. First, post-industrialization and economic 
development has triggered important cultural changes, notably an inclination for more 
participatory values and for higher self-expression (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Second, 
today we live in an information-rich environment, which challenges traditional knowledge 
asymmetries that helped sustain unequal relations and traditional reinforcement schemes 
between partners. For example, in the context of the patient-physician relationship, the 
advent of health information on the Internet has been dubbed “most important techno-
cultural medical revolution of the past century” (Ferguson and Frydman 2004, p.1149). In 
fact, patients can now easily interact with other patients using health social-networks 
online like PatientsLikeMe.com or even with healthcare professionals, using websites like 
WebMD.com, which often host blogs of healthcare professionals32. Thus, more than ever 
before, a complete understanding of dyadic decision-making processes requires us to 
consider how consumers’ knowledge and access to different sources of information (like 
peer-to-peer communications and exposure to marketing) affect their decisions and 
behavior. 
In the present article, we build on social exchange theory (Blau 1964; Homans 1958; 
Thibaut and Kelley 1959) to help us illuminate the importance of different drivers of 
patient requests and physician accommodation of such requests. With its roots in 
economics, psychology and sociology, social exchange theory postulates that human 
relationships can be understood as an exchange between partners which is maintained 
through repeated cost-benefit analyses (Emerson 1976). Despite its more than 50 years of 
existence, applications of social exchange theory continue to be very popular both in 
psychology (e.g. Baumeister and Vohs 2004; Kamdar and Van Dyne 2007) and in 
economics (Dur and Roelfsema 2010). We see prescription choices as a culturally-shaped 
transaction between the physician and the patient, where the degree of interaction between 
the patient and the physician, in therapy choice, depends on the value of the resources each 
party brings to the negotiation. 
The current literature on dyadic decision-making in general, and patient-physician 
relationships in particular, suffers from two main limitations. First, prior literature has 
32 See e.g. http://blogs.webmd.com/cosmetic-surgery/, the professional blog of Robert 
Kotler, MD, a cosmetic surgeon in Beverly Hills.
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neglected a crucial determinant of patient willingness to participate in therapy choice: 
personal values, which will be an important consideration of the current paper. In our 
setting, personal values refer to patients’ goals that serve as life guiding principles and 
which tend to be trans-situational and relatively homogenous within a certain society or 
social group (Schwartz et al. 2001). The literature so far has neglected patient values as a 
possible driver of request behavior. However, asking for a specific drug brand can be seen 
as a form of empowerment and education (Holmer 1999) or as a distortion in the 
traditional patient-physician relationship (Hollon 1999; Wilkes, Bell and Kravitz 2000). 
The extent to which requests are seen, by the consumer, as a disruption or as a legitimate 
form of self-expression will probably be dictated by her values, a topic that has not been 
explored neither in the marketing nor in the medical literature (Charles et al. 2006). In 
addition, the scarce literature on patient requests and accommodation so far has been 
focused on data from the U.S. or Canada, limiting the generalizability of its findings, given 
the variance on personal values across countries all around the world.
Second, there is basically no empirical evidence quantifying the strength of different 
drivers of patient requests and physician accommodation of such requests. In particular, 
there is no empirical evidence comparing the strength of different sources of therapeutic 
and health information on patient request behavior. Yet, very different public policy 
implications emerge if patient requests are mainly driven by direct-to-consumer 
information, by word-of-mouth (with healthcare providers or with other consumers), by 
pharmaceutical marketing activities (like free samples and branded materials displayed in 
physicians’ offices) or by patients’ personal values and beliefs. 
In this paper we try to contribute on both fronts. We collect patient-level data on 
requests and physician propensity for request accommodation, which allows us to explore 
in greater depth the drivers of this dyadic decision. We have conducted a survey among 
11,735 patients in 17 countries located in four continents, the largest study we are aware 
of, on the drivers of patients’ requests and physician accommodation of such requests. Our 
selection of countries was chosen with the objectives of maximizing variation in patients’ 
personal values, which are known to vary across countries. We use this data to study if 
different sources of therapy and health information, as well as patient values are capable of 
driving patient requests, controlling for other patient, physician and dyad characteristics. 
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We compare the impact of different non-partisan sources of information (word-of-mouth 
from peers or from healthcare professionals), therapy information distributed through mass 
media channels (which can be firm-generated or generated by other parties) and direct-to-
physician marketing efforts (samples and promotion materials in physicians’ offices) on 
patients’ propensity to request drugs by brand name and physician accommodation of such 
requests. 
Several interesting findings emerge from our study. First, there is strong cross-national 
heterogeneity in patient requests and physician accommodation of such requests. For 
example, the percentage of patients answering that they have requested a drug by brand 
name to their physician in the past ranged from 16% in Japan to 81% in Brazil. The 
percentage of patients saying that, when they request a drug by brand name, their doctor 
often or very often accommodates their requests (versus never, rarely or sometimes 
accommodates) also ranged from 46% in Singapore to 83% in Denmark. Second, we find 
that patient requests are more driven by direct-to-physician marketing, especially free 
samples, and by word-of-mouth than by information patients gather from mass media. We 
also find that direct-to-physician marketing (sampling and promotion materials) do not 
seem to influence physician accommodation of drug requests, which are mainly driven by 
characteristics of the physician and of the patient-physician dyad. Third, patients’ cultural 
values matter. Patients with strong self-transcendence values, i.e. those who are very 
concerned with the welfare of other people and preservation of human relations, make 
fewer requests to their physicians when compared with patients who value power and 
achievement. Yet, if physicians accommodate the requests of these self-transcendent 
patients, they become significantly more likely to repeat such requests in the future. 
We organize the paper as follows. We first discuss the two theories that will guide our 
hypotheses development. Next, we discuss our hypotheses for patient requests and 
physician accommodation of such requests and present our method. We conclude the study 
by presenting the results of our analyses, interpreting these results from a managerial and 
public-policy standpoint and proposing avenues for future research. 
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2. Theoretical Background
The Patient-Physician Relationship as a Social Exchange
At least since Homans (1958) and Thibaut and Kelley (1959), that scholars in social 
psychology recognize long-term relationships between two parties - rather than individual
decisions - as the fundamental unit of analysis. Social Exchange Theory postulates that the 
attitudes and behaviors of different parties in a relational exchange depend on the costs and 
benefits each party extracts from the interaction (Blau 1964). Despite its long tradition, 
social exchange theory still garners significant interest among social scientists. For 
example, social exchange theory has recently been used to study interaction between 
workers and their supervisors (Kamdar and Van Dyne 2007; Dur and Roelfsema 2010), 
interaction between clients and public sector organizations (Alford 2002), alliances 
between firms (Das and Teng 2002), and even negotiation of sexual activity between 
partners in a relationship (Baumeister and Vohs 2004).
With its focus on the relational unit, social exchange theory provides an ideal 
theoretical backbone for a model of patient-physician relationships capable of explaining 
patient requests and physician accommodation of such requests. Let us use the prototypical 
exchange described by Emerson (1976, p.357) to illustrate the traditional patient-physician 
interaction in the context of social exchange theory. In the traditional model of the patient-
physician relationship, the physician applies her biomedical knowledge to paternalistically 
choose the therapy on behalf of the patient33 (Emanuel and Emanuel 1992). In terms of 
social exchange theory, such a “white-coat” model would be seen as a simple exchange
where (i) the physician possesses biomedical knowledge as a resource, (ii) the patient 
possesses money as a resource and (iii) both parties value a common output – patient’s 
health restoration - the patient because she seeks physical and mental welfare and the 
physician because she seeks reassurance of her professional competence, reputation and 
recurring financial rewards for her services. Hence, in a white-coat model, the patient 
simply exchanges money for the physician knowledge and then uses the physician advice 
33An assumption implicitly made by perfect agent models as well, which are very popular 
in economics (e.g. Phelps 1992) and marketing (e.g. Narayanan, Manchanda and 
Chintagunta 2004).
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as input in order to restore her own health, an effort that is observable by the physician. 
There is no role for patients’ opinion and requests.
However, boosted by the availability of health information and by current trends 
toward consumer self-expression, patients are assuming an increasingly participatory role 
in therapy choice (Charles, Gafni, and Whelan 1999). A more participatory patient-
physician relationship goes beyond the simple exchange of biomedical knowledge for 
money discussed above. In modern patient-physician interactions, the physician and the 
patient jointly contribute with their respective knowledge to the “production” of health 
restoration, with the patient still having to pay the physician for the additional expertise she 
brings to the decision-making process, but assuming an increasingly active role in therapy 
choice. In the terminology of social exchange theory, patients’ access to health information 
and knowledge transforms the patient-physician dyad from one focused on a simple 
exchange to one focused on a productive exchange (Emerson 1976). Furthermore, 
according to social exchange theory, patient power in treatment choice - translated into 
more requests for specific medication brands or higher physician accommodation of their 
requests - depends on patients’ ability to bring more value (i.e. information or knowledge) 
to the interaction. 
Patients may acquire therapy-related information from several sources. Moorman and 
Matulich (1993) define health information acquisition as the degree to which consumers 
acquire health information from different sources including word-of-mouth from non-
experts (e.g. friends, family and healthcare professionals like nurses or pharmacists), from 
experts (e.g. specialist physicians, nurses or pharmacists) and the mass media (which 
includes direct-to-consumer ads but also therapy-related information made available over 
the Internet, books, newspapers or pamphlets). Yet, not all sources of information are 
perceived by the patient, by physicians and public health officials, as having the same 
information value. For example, healthcare professionals, like nurses, from whom patients 
may request a second opinion are seen as trustworthy sources of information both by 
patients and by physicians (see e.g. Guadagnoli and Ward 1998). Mass-media sources of 
health information, in contrast, are often seen with great suspicion. In particular, people, 
namely physicians, are often worried with the independence, quality and reliability of 
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health information disseminated via mass media (Berland et al. 2001; Moynihan et al. 
2000). 
Due to its negative image, therapy and health information disseminated via mass-
media channels is often accused of being the culprit of consumer (both patient and 
physician) overexcitement with therapy leading patients to voice more requests for specific 
brands of medication and physicians to accommodate more of such requests (Almasi et al. 
2006; Moynihan et al. 2000). This belief persists despite evidence that the effect of other 
sources of information may be more relevant. For instance, word-of-mouth is a known 
driver of consumer preferences and choices (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Godes and 
Mayzlin 2004, 2009; Manchanda et al. 2008). Patients can obtain therapy information from 
other consumers (non-expert word-of-mouth) or from healthcare professionals (expert 
word-of-mouth, i.e. second opinions from another physician, a nurse or a pharmacist). In 
addition, direct-to-physician marketing efforts may not only influence the physician’s 
accommodation decision but, indirectly, also the patient’s inclination to request drugs by 
brand name. 
The Role of Patient Personal Values
Prior research applying social exchange theory to study dyadic decision-making neglected 
a crucial driver of relational interactions: personal values. In part, this gap may stem 
exactly from social exchange theory’s focus on the relationship as the unit of analysis, 
which is also its major strength. For instance, Emmerson (1976) explicitly states that, by 
choosing to focus on the relationship between two agents, social exchange theory 
researchers typically neglect people’s values when explaining an individual’s behavior. 
Yet, we expect patient behavior in the patient-physician dyad, specifically patient 
propensity to voice requests for specific medications, to be strongly driven by personal 
values.
A major goal of our study is, hence, to enhance the framework suggested by social 
exchange theory by allowing patient values to drive patient request behavior. In our study, 
we rely on the framework proposed by Schwartz (1992), which measures people’s goals
that serve as life guiding principles. According to Schwartz’s Values Theory, people’s 
values tend to be trans-situational and relatively homogenous within a certain society or 
139
social group (e.g. Schwartz et al. 2001). The theory organizes people’s values around their 
perceptions about the importance of 10 life-guiding principles (see Figure 5.1): (1) power -
social status and prestige, control over people and resources, (2) achievement – personal 
success through demonstrating competence according to social standards, (3) hedonism –
pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself, (4) stimulation – excitement, novelty, and 
challenge in life, (5) self-direction – independent thought and action-choosing, creating, 
exploring (6) universalism – understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the 
welfare of all people and for nature, (7) benevolence – preservation and enhancement of 
the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact, (8) tradition –
respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or 
religion provide the self, (9) conformity – restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses 
likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms and (10) security –
safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships, and of self. 
Figure 5.1 depicts the prototypical motivational continuum underlying Schwartz’s 
Values Theory, where the closer two values are of each other in multidimensional space, 
the more they share underlying motivations (Schwartz et al. 2001). This structure has been 
found in 95% of samples studying human values in 63 nations: 8 of the 10 values are 
distinctively mapped in multidimensional space and 2 (conformity and tradition) are often 
intermixed both in theory and in empirical studies (Schwartz and Sagiv 1995). The 
distinctiveness of the 10 values in Schwartz’s Values Theory is also one of the more robust 
findings in cultural research, supported by studies in more than 200 samples from 60 
countries from every continent, involving over 100,000 persons (Schwartz et al. 2001). 
As it becomes clear from Figure 5.1, the 10 values in Schwartz’s Values Theory can 
be conveniently summarized by four higher-order values which define two orthogonal 
dimensions: (i) self-enhancement - driven by power and achievement values - is opposed to 
self-transcendence – driven by benevolence and universalism values and (ii) openness to 
change – driven by values of self-direction and stimulation - is opposed to conservatism –
driven by values of security, conformity and tradition (Schwartz et al. 2001). Hedonism is 
a more ambivalent value that tends to load highly both on self-enhancement and openness 
(Schwartz et al. 2001). In general, we expect values which lie on the left half of Figure 5.1
(which tend to praise more participatory behaviors) to lead to more patient requests and 
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values which lie on the right part of Figure 5.1 (which tend to praise more harmonious or 
conforming behaviors) to lead to less patient requests.
Figure 5.1 Structural relation among the 10 values in Schwartz’s Values Theory 
and two higher-order orthogonal dimensions
Source: Schwartz et al. 2001
3. Hypotheses: Drivers of Patient Requests and Physician Accommodation
Our proposed model focuses on two related patient and physician behaviors: patient 
requests of medications by brand name and physician accommodation of such requests. In 
addition, we also examine whether physician accommodation influences patients’ future 
request intentions (i.e. patient intentions to request medications by brand name in the 
future). Figure 5.2 depicts our model. The solid arrows depict the conceptual relationships 
we are interested in while the dashed arrows depict the response process for the three 
dependent variables just discussed (where REQi denotes a respondent’s answer to the 
Self-direction
Stimulation
Hedonism
Achievement
Power Security
Universalism
Benevolence
Conformity
Tradition
OPENNESS TO 
CHANGE SELF-
TRANSCENDENCE
SELF-
ENHANCEMENT
CONSERVATION
141
question on past requests of medications by brand name and FUTREQi her future request 
intentions), using a tree diagram (Bradlow and Zaslavsky 1999). 
We examine three sets of antecedents of these variables: (i) health and therapy 
information acquired by the patient (which include information obtained from mass-media, 
expert word-of-mouth and non-expert word-of-mouth, see Moorman and Matulich 1993), 
(ii) direct-to-physician marketing (namely samples and promotion materials distributed to 
physicians) and (iii) patient values (Schwartz et al. 2001). We now develop hypotheses on 
the effects of these antecedents on patient requests and physician accommodation of 
patient requests.
Figure 5.2 Conceptual Model
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Therapy and Health Information Acquisition Behaviors
According to social exchange theory, different actors in a social relation possess different 
resources, or abilities, which give them the capacity to reward or punish their partners 
(Emerson 1976). In the context of the patient-physician relationship, biomedical 
knowledge – i.e. knowledge regarding illnesses and possible therapies to treat such 
illnesses – is the key resource determining power in therapy choice. 
Patients nowadays have access to a plethora of sources for therapy and health 
information, which they may bring to the medical encounter in order to jointly produce 
health restoration with their physician. However, acquiring such information is costly and 
not all patients will be equally motivated to incur in such cost (Moorman and Matulich 
1993). According to social exchange theory, we thus hypothesize that patients who acquire 
more information will become more participatory, i.e.:
H1a: Patients who more actively acquire therapy and health information are more likely 
to request drugs by brand name.
A key question we need to ask, however, is which sources of health information are 
more capable of driving patients’ requests for branded medications.  As discussed above, 
physicians and policy-makers see mass-media sources of therapeutic and health 
information with suspicion. Hence, the belief that information with lower credibility is 
significantly driving patient requests implicitly assumes that patients do not share the same 
discomfort with such information sources. Yet, patients willing to learn about existing 
therapies also seem to share the same concerns. A recent survey conducted by the 
marketing research agency iCrossing (2008) shows that, when acquiring health and therapy 
information, patients trust their own physician in the first place and, afterwards, specialist 
physicians, nurses and pharmacists. Mass media, pharmaceutical companies and TV were 
among the least trusted sources and relatives and friends fell somewhere in between 
(iCrossing 2008). This finding may explain why recent studies suggest that, across many 
diseases and brands, patient requests triggered by mass-media information or direct-to-
consumer-advertising occur in less than 3% of visits (Verilogue 2009). 
According to social exchange theory, the influence of different sources of therapy and 
health information on patients’ propensity to make request drugs by brand name depends 
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on the value of such information as perceived by the patient.  When compared with less 
trusted sources (like mass media), more trusted sources (like expert word-of-mouth) will 
make the patient feel more capable of bringing value to a productive exchange (instead of a 
simple exchange) with her physician. Hence, in contrast with current belief that therapeutic 
and health information in mass-media is the main driver of patient requests, we expect 
word-of-mouth to have a stronger influence, in particular word-of-mouth from expert 
consumers, a phenomenon akin to the responsiveness of physicians to key opinion leaders 
(Nair, Manchanda and Bhatia 2010), i.e.:
H1b: Patients who learnt about a medication by acquiring therapy and health 
information via word-of-mouth are more likely to request drugs by brand name than 
patients who acquire such information via mass-media. 
H1c: Patients who learnt about a medication by acquiring therapy and health 
information via word-of-mouth with expert consumers (e.g. healthcare professionals) 
are more likely to request drugs by brand name than patients who acquire such 
information via word-of-mouth with other consumers. 
By the same token, we believe physicians will not regard sources of information 
which they believe have low credibility (e.g. mass-media) as a sufficiently strong resource 
to allow the exchange with the patient to move from a simple to a productive exchange. 
We thus expect physicians to accommodate more readily requests from patients who 
acquired health information from expert sources like expert word-of-mouth (e.g. a second 
opinion from a specialist physician, a pharmacist or a nurse) rather than patients who 
acquired health information from peers or mass media, thus: 
H2a: Physicians are more likely to accommodate drug requests by brand name from 
patients who learnt about a medication via word-of-mouth, than from patients who 
learnt about a medication via mass-media. 
H2b: Physicians are more likely to accommodate drug requests by brand name from 
patients who learnt about a medication via word-of-mouth with expert consumers (e.g. 
healthcare professionals), than from patients who learnt about a medication via word-
of-mouth with other consumers. 
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Direct-to-Physician Marketing
Although direct-to-patient information is an increasingly important marketing tool for
pharmaceutical firms, the bulk of pharmaceutical firms’ marketing resources is still 
invested in direct-to-physician marketing (DTP). The two major types of DTP are samples 
and detailing visits, which entails having sales reps visiting physicians to discuss therapy 
information (Shankar 2008). In 2005, the total retail value of distributed free samples in 
the U.S. amounted to USD 18.4 billion, total spending in detailing to USD 6.8 billion 
while DTCA represented USD 4.2 billion (Donohue, Cevasco and Rosenthal 2007). 
Although the main target of DTP is the physician, there are reasons to expect DTP to also 
influence patient requests. 
From each dollar invested in DTP, about 62 cents are invested in free samples (using 
retail value of such samples, see Donohue, Cevasco and Rosenthal 2007). Physicians then 
dispense these free samples to their patients in order to pass financial savings to their 
patients, to educate patients about the appropriate usage of a medication or to facilitate 
immediate start of therapy (Chew et al. 2000; Morgan et al. 2006). Sample-dispensing by 
physicians has been shown to correlate positively with patient requests (Venkataraman and 
Stremersch 2007) and to affect future physician prescription choices (Morelli and 
Koenigsberg 1992). When physicians dispense free samples to patients, they also tend to 
transfer important information regarding the dispensed therapy to the patient. Such 
knowledge, transmitted by a highly trusted source (their physician), should make patients 
feel more knowledgeable about their illness and existing therapies and better prepared to 
participate, in future visits, in therapy choice by voicing their requests for specific 
medications, thus:
H3a: Patients who have received free samples in the past are more likely to request 
drugs by brand name. 
The second major marketing expenditure by pharmaceutical firms is detailing, i.e. 
sending sales reps to the physician office to discuss therapy information. Besides 
discussing drugs, sales reps often leave gifts or “freebies” like textbooks or branded 
stethoscopes, pens and pads (Shankar 2008). Physicians and policy-makers are often 
concerned with the effects of these “freebies” on physician prescription behavior. Their 
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concern stems from evidence from social sciences suggesting that self-serving biases lead 
physicians to unintentionally reciprocate these gifts by changing their prescription 
behavior (Dana and Loewenstein 2003). Yet, branded gifts, which are typically visible in 
physicians’ offices, may also have a secondary effect on patient behavior, namely on 
patients’ propensity to voice requests for specific brands of medication. 
If the patient is exposed to branded gifts in the physician’s office, the physician’s main 
resource in the productive exchange – her independent biomedical knowledge – may be 
devalued by the perception that such gifts may be driving her advice, increasing the 
patient’s perceived right to request drugs by brand name. Research in medicine indeed 
shows that patients see gifts as inappropriate influencers of physician advice (Gibbons et 
al. 1998). Such perceptions alter the value of the physician’s advice, altering the prevailing 
exchange rate in a productive exchange (i.e. voicing a request becomes relatively 
“cheaper” for the patient). 
This process of marketing-induced devaluation of physician advice is also supported 
by prevailing theories in modern sociology. According to Giddens (1991), the social roles 
of agents participating in a dyadic relation, are constantly being revised given new 
knowledge or information, a process known as reflexivity. Reflexivity implies that patient 
trust in the physician’s expertise and independence is constantly being re-evaluated in a 
process of reflexive doubt (Giddens 1991). A well-known source of consumer skepticism 
towards expert advice are compromising relations between the expert and non-partisan 
corporations (Beck 1999). Hence, any cues alerting the patient that her physician may have 
been exposed to non-partisan sources of information will increase patient doubt in the 
independence of the advice, reducing its value. We thus hypothesize:
H3b: Patients exposed to branded promotion materials in a physician’s office are more 
likely to request drugs by brand name.
When a firm engages in DTP it seeks to influence physician prescription behavior 
through provision of information. In a detailing visit, which typically lasts two to five 
minutes, a sales representative discusses information (dosing, side effects, efficacy, new 
formulations…) regarding one to three of her company’s drugs (Zigler et al. 1995). 
Through the detailing visit, physicians will have the opportunity to learn more about the 
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promoted medication. For example, in a recent physician survey of 251 physicians, 73% 
replied that they rely on information provided by sales reps when prescribing a new drug 
(29% reported they rely on such information “often” or “almost always”, and 44% of the 
physicians reported they “sometimes” rely on such information). Higher physician 
exposure to therapy information increases the value of the physician participation in the 
productive exchange with the patient. Such increase should make the exchange rate tilt in 
favor of the physician, making her less likely to accommodate a patient’s requests for a 
specific brand of medication:
H4a: Physicians who receive free samples are less likely to accommodate drug 
requests by brand name from their patients.
H4b: Physicians who have visible branded promotion materials in their office are less 
likely to accommodate drug requests by brand name from their patients.
Physician Accommodation and Future Patient Requests
A basic tenet of social exchange theory is the psychological principle of reinforcement, 
clearly defined by Homans’ (1974) success proposition, which simply states that people 
tend to repeat actions that have been rewarded in the past. In the case of the patient-
physician encounter, patients who have voiced a request for a specific brand of medication 
(operant behavior) to their physician are more likely to repeat such requests if physicians 
accommodate their requests (i.e. accommodation acts as the reward leading to 
reinforcement). Hence: 
H5: Physician accommodation of patient requests for drugs by brand name 
significantly increases patients’ intention to voice more requests in the future.
Patient Personal Values
We expect patient values to have both a direct effect on patient requests and to moderate 
patients’ reaction to physician accommodation of requests (i.e. the reinforcement 
hypothesis H5). First, voicing a brand request in a medical encounter can be perceived by 
the patient both as a personal achievement (“I’m so well informed that I’m able to 
influence my physician’s prescription choices”) and as an expression of power (“I’m the 
one in charge of my own health, so I should choose my treatment”). For these patients, 
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accepting a simple exchange interaction is particularly costly. Therefore, we expect 
patients with high self-enhancement values to be more likely to request drugs by brand 
name.
In contrast, according to Schwartz’s Values Theory, the two life-guiding values 
characterizing self-transcendence both express a personal concern with the welfare of 
others, be it of other people who are close to oneself (benevolence) or the welfare of 
mankind and natural environment –(universalism; see Schwartz 2007). We expect patients 
who praise such benevolence and universalism values to be particularly concerned with 
conflict-avoidance and maintaining a good relationship with their physician. In terms of 
social exchange theory this means that, for patients with high self-transcendence values, 
refraining from requesting drugs by brand name is perceived as having an important 
relational benefit, one for which they are willing to pay the cost of not voicing their 
opinion. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H6a: Patients high in power and achievement values (i.e. who have high self-
enhancement) are more likely to request drugs by brand name.
H6b: Patients high in benevolence and universalism values (i.e. who have high self-
transcendence) are less likely to request drugs by brand name.
Second, according to Schwartz’s Values Theory, patients who are more open to 
change are those who prioritize independent thought and action-choosing in their system 
of values (self-direction), as well as novelty and change (stimulation). In contrast, more 
conservative patients tend to prioritize values of conformity, tradition and security instead. 
Consequently, self-directed patients should feel comfortable with a more participatory role 
and perceive voicing a request as a relatively low cost activity. In contrast, more 
conservative patients value preservation of the traditional patient role more than they value 
their right for self-expression, and thus hold back their self-determination in order to avoid 
violation of socially imposed roles and norms (Schwartz and Bilsky 1990). Thus: 
H7a: Patients high in self-direction and stimulation values (i.e. who have high 
openness to change) are more likely to request drugs by brand name.
H7b: Patients high in security, conformity and tradition values (i.e. who have high 
conservatism) are less likely to request drugs by brand name.
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Third, we expect those personal values which motivate patients to refrain from 
requesting drugs by brand name (i.e. conservatism and self-transcendence) to moderate the 
patient reaction toward physician accommodation of prior requests. In fact, patients who 
have high conservatism and self-transcendence values refrain from requesting drugs by 
brand name in order to be consistent with their life-guiding principles. Conservative 
patients suppress drug requests because they believe in the acceptance of the customs and 
ideas that tradition or religion provides them and are willing to restraint from actions likely 
to upset the status quo or endanger their safety and the safety of their relations. Self-
transcendent patients believe strongly that the value preserving of the welfare of others, in 
this case the value of preserving physician welfare and relational harmony, is larger than 
the cost of suppressing their opinion and preference for a certain brand of medication. 
However, if for some reason a conservative or self-transcendent patient voices a request 
for a specific medication brand and the physician accommodates such request, such 
agreement signals to the patient that – contrary to her own initial belief – requesting drugs 
by brand name is a permissible form of self-expression in the relationship with her 
physician. In terms of Giddens’ reflexivity (1991), conservative and self-transcendent 
patients thus use physician accommodation to reflexively alter their beliefs about the 
appropriateness of patient requests and change their perception of their role in therapy 
choice: 
H8a: For patients high in security, conformity and tradition values (i.e. who have high 
conservatism), physician accommodation of their requests for drugs by brand name 
leads to higher intention to voice more requests in the future.
H8b: For patients high in benevolence and universalism values (i.e. who have high 
self-transcendence), physician accommodation of their requests for drugs by brand 
name leads to higher intention to voice more requests in the future.
Control Variables
Although they are not the focus of our study, we control for a series of physician, patient 
and dyad characteristics which may influence patient requests and physician 
accommodation of such requests. The variables included are: (i) physician age and gender, 
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(ii) patient age, education, gender, health consciousness, health motivation and confidence, 
health status, income and propensity to self-disclose and (iii) doctor-initiated information 
exchange, gender concordance, patient power in therapy choice, patient-initiated 
information exchange, frequency of visits, relationship duration and relationship quality. 
4. Method
Data Collection
We calibrate our model on unique dataset in terms of its size and geographical/cultural 
scope. We surveyed 11,735 patients in Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the largest study of the relationship between patient empowerment and 
therapy non-adherence to date. We contracted SSI (Survey Sampling International) to 
execute our survey on their online panels. Recruiting and rewarding procedures for SSI 
panels are constantly evaluated in terms of sample representativeness and respondent’s 
attention and motivation (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 for sample descriptives). 
We constructed the original survey in English and organized its translation to the 10 
native languages (Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, French, German, Italian, Japanese, 
Polish and Portuguese) that are spoken in the 17 countries included in our sample, by 
native speakers. The native speakers we used as translators were all doctoral students in 
social sciences attending programs at our respective universities, which are located in 
Europe and the U.S., both having a large international student population. The vast 
majority of these graduate students are familiar with survey research methods, often 
through their coursework, which allowed us to discuss survey items, and their meanings, in 
great detail. 
We organized the translation process in accordance to best-practices in international 
survey research. First, for each language, the English version was translated by a native 
speaker (the translator) who was proficient in English. Second, another native speaker (the 
back-translator) translated the survey from his native tongue back to English. Third, we 
discussed the translated surveys with both translators and back-translators, iteratively, until 
we were sure that the final survey retained exactly the same meaning in all languages. 
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Our selection of countries was guided by three major criteria. First, we wanted to 
obtain sufficient cross-cultural variation, in order to test whether our hypothesized 
relationships are culturally sensitive. Second, we only selected countries in which patients 
are free to choose their physician and typically develop repeated interactions with the same 
physician. Third, we screened out countries that were too expensive to survey in (> USD 
10,000 per country). Table 5.1 presents some key descriptives of our dataset. In addition, 
our samplHLVVXEMHFWWRWZRH[FOXVLRQFULWHULDLLW¶VRQO\FRPSRVHGRIDGXOWV\HDUV
of age) and (ii) each respondent needed to have had at least 3 visits with their current 
general practitioner, in order to guarantee respondent ability to assess the relationship with 
her physician.
Tbale 5.1 Descriptives: Patient Requests and Physician Accommodation
Country
Patient Requests Frequency of Accommodation
N
% Yes
(past 
req.)
% Yes
(fut. 
req.)
N
(REQ=1)
None 
of the 
time
Rare-
ly
Some-
times
Most 
of the 
time
All of 
the 
time
Belgium 669 47.83 32.44 320 0.63 6.25 26.56 51.56 15.00
Brazil 785 81.40 49.94 639 0.63 4.23 23.47 46.01 25.67
Canada 540 40.00 20.19 216 1.39 3.70 26.39 48.15 20.37
Denmark 570 39.12 17.54 223 0.45 2.69 13.45 56.95 26.46
Estonia 523 21.80 11.28 114 0.88 4.39 21.93 61.40 11.40
France 776 39.56 24.36 307 1.63 12.38 36.16 38.76 11.07
Germany 783 18.26 15.84 143 2.10 2.80 20.98 44.06 30.07
India 521 62.38 44.34 325 2.46 8.92 41.54 39.08 8.00
Italy 818 76.77 50.49 628 0.32 3.03 25.32 55.25 16.08
Japan 758 16.23 18.47 123 0.00 4.07 35.77 43.90 16.26
The Netherlands 795 28.18 12.45 224 1.79 1.79 24.55 30.36 41.52
Poland 760 72.76 49.61 553 0.90 5.61 24.05 53.71 15.73
Portugal 524 42.94 29.20 225 0.44 5.33 28.44 33.78 32.00
Singapore 815 34.72 24.29 283 0.00 3.18 50.88 40.64 5.30
Switzerland 547 31.63 19.20 173 1.16 4.05 20.81 52.60 21.39
U.K. 781 32.52 15.11 254 1.18 3.54 33.46 48.82 12.99
U.S.A. 770 41.69 24.16 321 0.62 2.18 23.36 52.65 21.18
Total 11,735 43.21 27.35 5,071 0.39 2.05 12.08 20.54 8.16
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Measures
Dependent variables. In order to measure patient requests (REQ), we first asked 
respondents whether they have ever requested a drug by its brand name. If the respondent 
answered ‘yes’ to this question, we then measured doctor’s frequency of accommodation 
(Dr.Acc.) by asking the same respondent how often did her doctor accommodate her 
requests, a question they had to answer using a 5-point frequency scale ranging from 
‘None of the time’ to ‘All of the time’ (see Table 5.1). Irrespectively of the respondent’s 
answer to the patient requests question (REQ) we then asked the respondent to indicate 
whether it was likely that, in her next 3 encounters with her doctor, she would request a 
drug by its brand name (F-REQ). Table 5.1, above, provides descriptives for our dependent 
variables.
Table 5.2 Therapy and Health Information Acquisition and Direct-to-Physician 
Marketing
Construct Operationalization (items) Response Scale
Therapy and Health Information Acquisition Behaviors (Based on Moorman and Matulich 1993)
Mass-media information
…the mass media (for example Internet, 
Television and radio programming, ads, books, 
newspapers, magazines or  pamphlets about 
health)
1 = "strongly 
disagree,"  2 = 
"disagree," 3 = 
"neither agree nor 
disagree," 4 = "agree," 
and 5 = "strongly 
agree."
Expert word-of-mouth 
information
…other healthcare professionals (specialists, 
nurses, physical therapists, pharmacists)
Non-expert word-of-
mouth information
…other people (friends, spouse, parents, relatives, 
work associates or patient support organizations)
Direct-to-Physician Marketing (Own Development)
Samples
Did your doctor ever give you a medicine for 
which you did not have to pay for (e.g. a sample 
from his or her cabinet)?
Dummy: 1 = "yes,"
and 0 = "no."
Promotion materials Does your doctor have visible promotional materials from branded drugs in his or her office?
Dummy: 1 = "yes," 
and 0 = "no."
Independent variables. In Table 5.2 we present our measures for the therapy and health 
information and direct-to-physician marketing, including item operationalization. Recall 
that we developed hypotheses on the likelihood of patients requesting a drug by brand 
name, and physician accommodation of such requests, after patients learnt about the 
medication via (i) mass-media or word-of-mouth with (ii) expert consumers or (iii) non-
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expert consumers. Thus, we introduced the questions regarding therapy and health 
information acquisition behaviors with the following statement: “I can imagine myself 
asking my doctor for a specific drug if I learned about it through….” We then measure the 
level of each information source using the items indicated on Table 5.2 (based on 
Moorman and Matulich 1993). 
We measure cultural values using the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ), a more 
concrete and less cognitively taxing alternative to the often used Schwartz Values Survey 
(see Schwartz et al. 2001). The idea of the PVQ is to ask respondents to rate how close to 
his or her own values are the goals, aspirations and wishes of different people presented to 
them using “verbal portraits” (see Schwartz et al. 2001 for the specific portraits used). In 
our online survey, gender was asked at the start and then the gender used in the portrait 
examples was made congruent with the respondent’s gender to facilitate the comparison 
task and improve response reliability. 
We describe our remaining measures, all based in existing literature, for physician (i.e. 
age and gender) and dyad characteristics (patient- and doctor-initiated information 
exchange, relationship quality, decisional empowerment, age homophily, gender 
homophily, duration of the patient-physician relationship and frequency of interaction) in 
Appendix V.A. Our measure of relationship quality contains items measuring trust, 
satisfaction and commitment (in line with the current tradition in relationship marketing, 
see Palmatier et al. 2006), plus four items measuring the quality of patient-physician 
communication, which is seen as an important driver of patient-physician relationship 
quality (Kao et al. 1998). 
Finally, we found our scales to be highly reliable (see Table A.5.1 in Appendix V.A). 
No scale had a reliability below .6 and the scale with lowest reliability was health 
motivation and confidence which contained 4 items, two measuring patient motivation 
toward healthy behaviors and two measuring patient confidence in her capacity to prevent 
and cure illness (see Moorman and Matulich 1993). All sociodemographic and dyadic 
characteristics items were operationalized in line with existing literature. We compute each 
construct by averaging, across the items measuring each construct, a respondent’s score on 
these items.
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Table 5.3 Sample Descriptives
Mean Std. Dev.
Physician
Doctor age (raw score) 48.52 8.05
Doctor gender (0 = “female,” 1 = “male”) 0.70 0.46
Patient-physician Dyad
Doctor-initiated information exchange 3.58 0.81
Gender concordance  (1 = “same gender”, 0 = “otherwise”) 0.55 0.50
Patient-initiated information exchange 3.70 0.70
Relationship duration (in years, raw score) 10.82 8.65
Relationship quality 4.00 0.61
Patient
Age (raw score) 46.03 12.92
Gender (0 = “female,” 1 = “male”) 0.48 0.50
Health consciousness 3.36 0.76
Health motivation 3.56 0.60
Health status 2.76 0.91
Knowledge about medical treatment 3.33 0.91
Self-disclosure 3.23 1.12
Conservatism 3.05 0.85
Openness 2.61 0.91
Self-enhancement 3.09 0.79
Self-transcendence 3.68 0.78
Note: unless otherwise noted, all variables are measured in a 5-point scale. Scales are 
assumed to have interval properties.
Sample Descriptives
:HVXUYH\HG DGXOW SDWLHQWV  \HDUV RI DJH UHJLVWHUHG LQ66,SDQHOV5HFUXLWLQJ DQG
rewarding procedures, as well as sample composition, are constantly supervised by SSI in 
order to guarantee both sample representativeness and respondent’s motivation. All 
patients in our sample had visited their general practitioner at least 3 times, to guarantee 
that they could reliably evaluate the relationship they maintain with their doctor. Finally, 
the selection of countries was (i) made with the goal of obtain sufficient cross-cultural 
variation, in order to obtain generalizable findings, (ii) restricted to countries where 
patients can freely choose their physician and typically develop long-term relationships 
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with the same physician and (iii) restricted to countries where sampling costs were 
considered reasonable (we did not include countries where the survey would cost USD 
10,000 or more). For sample descriptives, see Table 5.3.
Model Estimation
We have three dependent variables: past requests (REQi), physician accommodation 
(ACCi) and likelihood (i.e. intention) of future requests (FUTREQi). Our first and third 
dependent variables are dummy variables (1 = “yes,” 0 = “no”) while ACCi was measured 
using a 5-point frequency scale (see Table 5.2). Moreover, please recall that we only 
observe ACCi for a part of the sample as only patients who answered that they had made a 
request in the past (i.e. those with REQi=1) were asked the accommodation question, 
which means that we face a sample selection issue. Please note that as ACCi is used as 
independent variable in the future requests equation, we also face a selection issue in the 
regression of FUTREQi due to missing values, thus we need to account for this in our 
estimation.
We estimated a binary Probit model for the requests (REQi) and future requests 
(FUTREQi) equations and a linear regression model for the accommodation equation 
(ACCi). However, due to the sample selection issues already discussed, it is well known 
that OLS regression of ACCi and FUTREQi on the independent variables of interest leads 
to inconsistent parameter estimates (unless one could safely assume that the errors of the 
requests equation and the accommodation and future requests equations were 
uncorrelated). Hence, for the accommodation equation we apply a Heckit estimator, which 
augments the OLS regression with an estimate of the omitted drivers of self-selection (i.e. 
the drivers of past patient requests) to solve the sample selection issue (Greene 2003). For 
the future requests equation, we estimate a bivariate Probit model to account for possible 
correlation between the requests equation and the future requests equation.
Thus we first estimate the equation for patient requests. In the nomenclature of 
Heckman’s (1979) Heckit estimator this is the “participation” or “selection” equation: 
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where for. Also please note that 12V can then be rewritten as 21 ACCVU  , where ȡ1 is the 
FRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQİi1 DQGİi2.
Given this assumption, we can now estimate the accommodation, or “outcome”, 
equation as follows: 
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where i2Q is the error term (still not corrected for possible correlation between physician 
accommodation and patient requests), REQȕˆ is the vector of estimated coefficients 
obtained from Equation 5.1 and   ¹¸
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captures  0*2 !ii REQE H and c2J is a fixed effect controlling for unobserved country-
specific drivers of physician accommodation of patient requests. 
Please note that the error variance we are interested in for our inferences ( 2ACCV ) is 
not directly obtained from OLS estimation of Equation 5.2, unless 012  V (in which case 
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there is no evidence for a selection effect and OLS estimation of the “outcome” equation 
would yield unbiased and consistent estimates). In order to obtain 2ACCV , we first save the 
OLS residuals from the estimation of Equation 5.2 ( i2Qˆ ), then compute the estimated 
inverse Mills ratio as   ¹¸
·
©¨
§   ¦
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2ˆ ACCV using the 
following truncated variance (Cameron and Trivedi 2005): 
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WKHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQİi1 DQGİi2 can then be obtained simply by ACCVVU ˆˆˆ 121  .
In terms of model identification, besides setting the variance of the error term of the 
first Probit equation to 5.1 (i.e. 12  REQV ), exclusion restrictions in the “outcome” 
equation are advisable to ensure model identifiability (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). 
Fortunately, in our case, those restrictions emerge rather naturally. Given that patient 
values are personal life-guiding principles of the patient, which are unobservable by the 
physician, there is no reason to believe that patient values drive physician accommodation 
behavior, thus we exclude patient values from the accommodation equation. 
For the estimation of the likelihood of future requests equation, which is our second 
“outcome” equation, we use a bivariate Probit model (Greene 2003). The future requests 
analysis suffers from a problem of missing values as we now use ACCi as a covariate, 
which creates a situation of sample selection bias very similar to the one above for the 
accommodation equation (as the missing value is determined by the fact that request is 
either 1 or 0). The main difference between the two “outcome” equations is that we now 
need to use a binary Probit model, which means that the Heckit estimator is not appropriate 
and, instead, joint estimation of both equations should be done using a bivariate Probit 
model estimated by full maximum likelihood (Freedman and Sekhon 2010).  The full 
maximum likelihood approach yields consistent and essentially unbiased estimates (see 
Freedman and Sekhon 2010), it is also an efficient estimator with asymptotically correct 
estimates of standard errors (Murphy and Topel 1985).
Let us first define the specification of the likelihood of future requests equation as:
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contains patient i’s answer to the accommodation question (ACCi) and the interactions 
between physician accommodation and the four higher-order patient values (openness to 
change, conservatism, self-enhancement and self-transcendence), į is a 5-dimensional 
vector with the parameter estimates for the direct feedback effect and the four interactions 
discussed in H5 and H8a and H8b.
Following Greene (2003, pp. 710-713), we now assume that the error terms of the 
requests and likelihood of future requests equations are correlated as follows: 
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where ȡ2 LVWKHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQİi1 DQGİi3. 
In order to construct the log-likelihood for the future requests equation we now define 
two auxiliary variables (i) qiREQ = 1, if REQi = 1 and -1 if REQi = 0 and (ii) qiFUTREQ = 1 if 
FUTREQi = 1 and -1 if FUTREQi = 0. Now let *iiREQiREQ REQqw  and 
*
iiFUTREQiFUTREQ FUTREQqw  and 2*2 UU  iFUTREQiREQi qq .
We can now write the model log-likelihood as: 
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where we IROORZ*UHHQH¶VQRWDWLRQXVLQJWKHVXEVFULSWLQĭ2 to denote the cdf of 
a bivariate normal distribution. From Equation 5.7, it becomes clear that although we use 
all the sample to infer the correlation between the requests and future requests equations 
(allowing us to control for selection bias and obtain consistent estimates), our focal 
parameters of interest (į) are estimated only from the sub-sample of patients who ever 
made a request in the past.  
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5. Results
Table 5.4 shows the estimation results of the requests and physician accommodation 
equations. We also estimated two models for the likelihood of future requests equation, a 
first model with only main effects of patient personal values and a second model following 
the specification in Equation 5.5.
Therapy and Health Information Acquisition Behaviors
Patients who actively search and acquire therapy and health information are, irrespective of 
the source of such information, more likely to request drugs by brand name, in support of 
H1a. Yet, not all sources of therapy and health information are equally influential in driving 
patient requests. Therapy and health information acquired via word-of-mouth either from 
healthcare providers, i.e. expert word-of-mouth (ȕREQ,EXP-WOM = 0.12; 95% CI = [0.09;
0.15]; stdz-ȕREQ, EXP-WOM = 0.27), or from other consumers (ȕREQ,WOM = 0.09; 95% CI = 
[0.06; 0.12]; stdz-ȕREQ,WOM = 0.21), has a stronger influence in patient requests than health 
information patients acquired from mass-media sources like the Internet, direct-to-
consumer ads or Television and radio programming (ȕREQ,MMEDIA = 0.05; 95% CI = [0.02; 
0.07]; stdz-ȕREQ,MMEDIA = 0.11), in support of H1b.Yet, even though the mean estimate of the 
effect of expert word-of-mouth (ȕREQ,EXP-WOM) is larger than the effect of peer-to-peer 
word-of-mouth (ȕREQ,WOM), the difference is not significant, which leads us to reject H1c.
Turning to the accommodation equation, the first interesting finding is that ȡ is very 
close to zero (ȡ ). This means that the error in the patient request equation is basically 
uncorrelated with the error in the accommodation equation, suggesting that there is no 
serious selection effect in this case. Furthermore R2 = 0.13, thus the estimated model is 
able to explain 13% of the variance in physician accommodation requests. Next, we find 
that neither word-of-mouth (expert or peer) nor mass-media information influence 
physician accommodation of patient requests (ȕACC,MMEDIA = 0.01; p = 0.29; ȕACC,EXP-WOM =
0.02; p = 0.34; ȕACC,WOM = -0.01; p = 0.76). Thus we reject hypotheses H2a and H2b. Taken 
together, the results from the requests and accommodation indicate that the current outrage 
among physicians and policy-makers against pharmaceutical firms’ direct-to-consumer 
information and therapy and health information distributed via mass-media doesn’t seem 
justified. In fact, therapeutic and health information distributed via mass-media seems to 
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have no effect in physician accommodation and, even though it drives patients’ intention to 
voice future requests, other sources of information seem more influential.
Table 5.4 Parameter Estimates for Requests (REQ) and Accommodation (ACC)
Patient Requests Physician Accommod.
Param.
estimate
Stndrd. 
param. 
estimate
p-value 
(two-
tailed)
Param.
estimate
Stndrd. 
param. 
estimate
p-value 
(two-
tailed)
Health information sources
Mass media 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.29
Word-of-mouth (other HCP's) 0.12 0.27 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.34
Word-of-mouth (peers) 0.09 0.21 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.76
Marketing pressure
Sample dispensed 0.24 0.24 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.79
Promotional materials 0.04 0.03 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.54
Patient values
Conservatism -0.02 -0.03 0.45
Openness 0.04 0.06 0.06
Self-enhancement 0.05 0.08 0.01
Self-transcendence -0.04 -0.06 0.09
Physician
Doctor age (z-score) 0.01 0.01 0.66 -0.02 -0.03 0.05
Doctor gender -0.02 -0.02 0.52 0.06 0.03 0.02
Patient-physician Dyad
Doctor-initiated inf. exch. 0.00 0.00 0.94 -0.03 -0.03 0.11
Gender concordance 0.02 0.02 0.55 0.02 0.01 0.44
Patient-initiated inf. exch. 0.13 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.04
Interaction frequency 0.06 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.66
Relationsh. duration (z-score) -0.01 -0.03 0.33 0.02 0.03 0.07
Relationsh. quality -0.10 -0.12 0.00 0.33 0.25 0.00
Patient
Age (z-score) 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.00
Education 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.28
Gender -0.08 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.20
Health consciousness -0.03 -0.05 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.88
Health motivation -0.03 -0.04 0.18 0.04 0.03 0.10
Health status -0.04 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.21
Income 0.00 -0.01 0.75 0.00 0.01 0.33
Knowledge 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.05
Self-disclosure 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92
N = 11,735; LL = -6,781 N = 5,071; LL = -5,918
AIC = 1.16 AIC = 2.35; R2 = 0.13
ȡ ı2ACC = 0.61
ı12 = 0.01
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Direct-to-Physician Marketing
In support of H3a, we find that patients who have received free samples in the past are more 
likely to request drugs by brand name to their physician (ȕREQ,SAMPLES = 0.24; 95% CI = 
[0.18; 0.30]; stdz-ȕREQ,SAMPLES = 0.24). In contrast, patient exposure to branded promotion 
materials in a physician’s office has an insignificant effect in the likelihood of patients 
requesting drugs by brand name from their physician (ȕREQ,PROMO = 0.04; 95% CI = [-0.02; 
0.09]; stdz-ȕREQ,PROMO = 0.03), thus we reject hypothesis H3b. It seems that samples are, as 
predicted, capable of making patients more vocal in the patient-physician dyad, most likely 
because patients receive not only the free sample but, also, valuable therapeutic 
information from their physician (e.g. regarding dosing and usage of the medication), who 
is a highly-trusted source of information for patients. Promotion materials in the 
physician’s office, however, do not increase the likelihood that patients request drugs by 
brand name, contrary to our expectations. In addition, we also do not find evidence either 
samples (ȕACC,SAMPLES = -0.01; p = 0.79) or branded promotion materials (ȕACC,PROMO = 0.02; 
p = 0.54) increase the likelihood that physicians accommodate patient request for drugs by 
brand name. Thus we reject hypotheses H4a and H4b.
Physician Accommodation and Future Patient Requests
We now turn to the likelihood of future requests equation. According to the prediction of 
social exchange theory, we find – using a model that allows only for a direct effect of 
physician accommodation and patient personal values - that physician accommodation of 
patient requests has a psychological reinforcement effect, i.e. it leads to a higher likelihood 
of future patient requests (įFUTREQ,ACC = 0.24; 95% CI = [0.20; 0.29]; stdz-įFUTREQ,ACC =
0.44). Moreover, if we compare the standardized coefficients from this model, we find that 
physician accommodation of patient requests is actually strongest driver of future patient 
requests intention. Thus, we find strong support to our hypothesis H5. It seems that patients 
may see physicians’ accommodation of patient requests as a signal that it is acceptable for 
the patient to request drugs by brand name, leading to more future requests. However, 
below, when testing our hypotheses H8a and H8b, we explore moderating effects of patient 
values on this reinforcement effect, which suggest that the reinforcement effect is stronger 
for a specific segment of patients (those with high self-transcendence values).
161
Patient Personal Values
Turning to the effects of patient personal values on the likelihood that patients request 
drugs by brand name, the first important conclusion from our requests equation is that 
patient personal values matter. First, patients high in power and achievement values, i.e. 
with high self-enhancement (ȕREQ,S-Enhanc. = 0.05; 95% CI = [0.01; 0.08]; stdz-ȕREQ,S-Enhanc. =
0.08; ȕFREQ,S-Enhanc. = 0.07; 95% CI = [0.02; 0.11]; stdz-ȕFREQ,S-Enhanc. = 0.12) and patients 
high in self-direction and stimulation values, i.e. with high openness to change (ȕREQ,Openness
= 0.04; 95% CI = [0.00; 0.08]; stdz-ȕREQ,Openness. = 0.06; ȕFREQ,Openness = 0.09; 95% CI = 
[0.04; 0.14]; stdz-ȕFREQ,Openness. = 0.16) are more likely to request drugs by brand name, 
which supports H6aand H7a.
Second, in line with hypothesis H6b, patients high in benevolence and universalism 
values, i.e. who have self-transcendence are less likely to request drugs by brand name, 
even though the effect is only marginally significant (p = 0.09; ȕREQ,S-Transc. = -0.04; 95% 
CI = [-0.08; 0.01]; stdz-ȕREQ, S-Transc. = -0.14). Thus we find evidence that the concern of 
patients high in benevolence and universalism with the welfare of other people leads them 
to suppress their opinions and preferences and become less vocal in the patient-physician 
relationship, which supports hypothesis H6b.
Third, we did not find evidence that more conservative patients (i.e. those high in 
security, conformity and tradition values) are less likely to request drugs by brand name 
(ȕREQ,Conserv. = -0.02; 95% CI = [-0.06; 0.03]; stdz-ȕREQ,Conserv.=-0.03). It may be that patients 
who value security – one of the three personal values forming conservatism (the others 
being conformity and tradition), which emphasizes safety and threat avoidance – actually 
believe that requesting drugs by brand name helps them feel more secure about the 
treatments they follow, thus cancelling the hypothesized negative effect of conformity and 
tradition values on patient requests. Thus, we reject hypothesis H7b.
Finally, we find clear evidence that patient values moderate the psychological 
reinforcement effect of physician accommodation of brand requests. We find - when we 
look at the estimates from the model allowing not only for a direct effect of physician
accommodation but also for a moderating effect between physician accommodation and 
patient personal values - that the reinforcement effect postulated in H5 is actually driven 
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solely by the effect of physician accommodation on the request behavior of patients high in 
benevolence and universalism values (i.e. high in self-transcendence). In fact, in this model 
the direct effect of physician accommodation on patients’ request intentions is no longer 
significant (įFUTREQ,ACC = 0.08; 95% CI = [-0.14; 0.30]; stdz-įFUTREQ,ACC = 0.15). 
Interestingly, if we look at the coefficient of patient personal values in the likelihood of 
future requests, we find that patients high in benevolence and universalism (i.e. who have 
high self-transcendence) are significantly less likely than other patients to plan requesting 
drugs by brand name in the future(ȕFUTREQ,S-Transc. = -0.42; 95% CI = [-0.69; -0.14]; stdz-
ȕFUTREQ,S-Transc. = -0.73; p<0.01). The coefficients for the remaining patient personal values 
were not significant (ȕFUTREQ,S-Enhanc. = 0.15; p = 0.18; ȕFUTREQ,Openness = 0.11; p = 0.38; 
ȕFUTREQ,Conserv. = 0.14; p = 0.32). Looking at the moderation effects hypothesized in H8a and 
H8b, we find no support for the hypothesis that, for patients high in conservatism, physician 
accommodation has stronger feedback effect on their future request intentions (i.e. 
įFUTREQ,Dr.Acc*Conserv. = -0.03; 95% CI = [-0.10; 0.04]; stdz-įFUTREQ,Dr.Acc*Conserv. = -0.27, 
p=0.42). We thus reject H8a.
Yet, in line with H8b, when patients high in self-transcendence do request a drug by 
brand name, physician accommodation of such request results in a strong increase in their 
intention to voice more requests in the future (įFUTREQ,Dr.Acc*S-Transc. = 0.09; 95% CI = [0.02; 
0.16]; stdz-įFUTREQ,Dr.Acc*S-Transc = 0.88; p = 0.02). Hence, in support of H8b, for patients high 
in benevolence and universalism values – i.e. high in self-transcendence - physician 
accommodation (or non-accommodation) of patient requests sends a strong signal to the 
patient that requesting drugs by brand name is not (or is) disruptive of their relational 
exchange. The fact that we do not find the same effect for conservative patients may 
indicate that the suppression of a patient request is driven more by a concern with 
relational harmony and the welfare of the physician, than by a concern with non-violation 
of socially-determined roles. In such case, physicians’ signals about appropriateness of 
patient participation are less relevant for conservative patients than for patients with high 
self-transcendence, who are mainly worried with physician welfare and the quality and 
harmony of the relationship they maintain with their physician. The strong moderation by 
self-transcendence of the effect of physician accommodation of patient requests may 
explain why physicians’ accommodation of drug requests tends to trigger more patient 
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requests in certain countries but not in others34, a finding that can have important 
consequences for pharmaceutical firms’ marketing strategies.
Control Variables
We also included several control variables in our models. The results indicate that our 
model has high face-validity. First, in terms of patient characteristics, patients are more 
likely to request drugs by brand name when they perceive their health status to be worse 
(ȕREQ,H.Status = -0.04; 95% CI = [-0.07; -0.01]; stdz-ȕREQ,H.Stauts. = -0.07) or when they believe 
they have higher knowledge and experience concerning medical treatment of diseases 
(ȕREQ,Pat.Knowl. = 0.09; 95% CI = [0.06; 0.12]; stdz-ȕREQ,Pat.Knowl. = 0.16). Chronically-ill
patients are typically more knowledge about their illness and therapies they take, so both 
effects were expected. Patient self-disclosure (trait) is associated with higher likelihood to 
request drugs by brand name (ȕREQ,SDisc. = 0.05; 95% CI = [0.03; 0.07]; stdz-ȕREQ,SDisc. =
0.11). Patient income is not a significant predictor of patient likelihood to request drugs by 
brand name (p=0.75), but patients with higher education are more likely to request drugs 
by brand name (ȕREQ,Education = 0.04; 95% CI = [0.02; 0.06]; stdz-ȕREQ,Education = 0.09).
Second, in terms of patient-physician dyad characteristics, doctor-initiated information 
exchange has no effect on the likelihood that patients request a drug by brand name (p =
0.94). In addition, it seems that the more frequently and deeply patients interact with their 
physician, the higher the likelihood that patients request drugs by brand name, as we can 
see from the effects of interaction frequency (ȕREQ,IntFreq. = 0.06; 95% CI = [0.04; 0.08]; 
stdz-ȕREQ,IntFreq. = 0.19) and patient-initiated information exchange (ȕREQ,PatInit = 0.13; 95% 
CI = [0.09; 0.18]; stdz-ȕREQ,PatInit = 0.19). Yet, if the patient feels he maintains a high 
quality relationship with the physician (high trust, satisfaction, commitment and good 
communication), then she is less likely to request drugs by brand name (ȕREQ,RelQual. = -0.10; 
95% CI = [-0.16; -0.04]; stdz-ȕREQ,RelQual. = -0.12). 
34 We find that physician accommodation leads to more future patient requests in Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, India, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, The Netherlands and United 
Kingdom but not in Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Japan, United States of America 
and Singapore. This discrepancy can be driven by the prevalence of self-transcendence 
values in these countries, a question that may deserve future scrutiny.
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Third, physician accommodation of patient requests, contrary to patient requests per se,
is influenced by physician age and gender. Older physicians, presumably more experienced 
and more used to a white-coat model, are less likely to accommodate patient requests 
(ȕACC,Dr.Age = -0.02; 95% CI = [-0.05; 0.00]; stdz-ȕACC,Dr.Age. = -0.03) and male physicians 
are more likely than female physicians to accommodate patient requests (ȕACC,Dr.Gender =
0.06; 95% CI = [0.01; 0.11]; stdz-ȕACC,Dr.Gender. = 0.03). 
Fourth, physicians are more likely to accommodate requests from patients who take 
more initiative to ask questions and interact with their physician during medical encounters 
(ȕACC,PatInit = 0.05; 95% CI = [0.00; 0.10]; stdz-ȕACC,PatInit. = 0.04), from patients with whom 
they have a longer relationship (ȕACC,Rel.Dur. = 0.02; 95% CI = [-0.00; 0.05]; stdz-ȕACC,Rel.Dur.
= 0.03), from patients with whom they maintain a relationship with higher quality 
(ȕACC,Rel.Qual. = 0.33; 95% CI = [0.28; 0.39]; stdz-ȕACC,Rel.Qual. = 0.25), from older patients 
(ȕACC,Pat.Age. = 0.06; 95% CI = [0.03; 0.08]; stdz-ȕACC,Pat.Age. = 0.07) or from patients with 
higher perceived knowledge and experience regarding medical treatment of diseases 
(ȕACC,Pat.Knowl. = 0.03; 95% CI = [-0.00; 0.06]; stdz-ȕACC,Pat.Qual. = 0.03). All these findings 
seem to (i) add to the face-validity of our model and (ii) be sensible from a patient-
centered care perspective, potentially reducing concerns of physicians and policy-makers 
regarding physician accommodation of patients’ requests.
6. Conclusion
In this study we rely on social exchange theory (Blau 1964; Baumeister and Vohs 2004) 
and Schwartz’s (1992) values theory to test a culturally-sensitive theory of patient requests 
and physician accommodation of such requests. We view the dyadic negotiation between a 
patient and a physician – needed for prescription choices to be made – as a values-shaped 
transaction between the two parties where the “share-of-voice” of each party depends on 
the value of the knowledge each party brings to the negotiation. Patients acquire 
knowledge from three main sources: word-of-mouth with peers, word-of-mouth from 
expert consumers (i.e. other healthcare professionals) and mass-media (which includes 
direct-to-consumer ads, but also therapeutic and health information broadcasted via the 
Internet, TV, radio, newspapers or magazines…). We show that even though mass-media 
information is indeed associated with more patient requests, word-of-mouth (from peers or 
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experts) is a significantly stronger driver of patient requests than mass-media, which may 
help reducing concerns by physicians and policy-makers regarding the effects of health 
and therapy information disseminated through mass media.
Moreover, the fact that patients learn about a certain therapy by gathering information 
through mass-media (or through any other source) doesn’t seem to influence physician 
accommodation of patient requests. Interestingly, we find that samples dispensed by 
physicians (but not promotion materials visible in the physician’s office) lead to more 
patient requests, but not to more physician accommodation of patient requests. The reason 
may be that samples dispensed to patients are a good opportunity for the physician to 
explain how the therapy works (dosing, usage…), which results in patients being able to 
gather information from a highly-trusted source by receiving a free sample. The additional 
knowledge patients acquire from a free sample dispensed by their physician thus seems to 
empower the patient in the patient-physician relationship, making her more likely to 
request drugs by brand name. 
For policy makers, these results suggest that instead of investing most monitoring 
resources to screen advertising and therapeutic information online, regulatory agencies like 
FDA should be more worried with regulating what happens in channels where word-of-
mouth is generated (like social media) and with the spillover effects of direct-to-physician 
marketing, namely free samples, on patient likelihood of requesting drugs by brand name. 
For marketers, these results suggest that direct-to-patient marketing strategies should be 
more focused in facilitating patient-to-patient and patient-to-expert interaction (including 
brand-focused interactions with their physician, which needs to occur when free samples 
are dispensed) and in increasing the quality and credibility of health and therapeutic 
information broadcasted via the mass-media. 
Importantly, we also find that patient values matter. Patients who hold stronger values 
of openness to change (i.e. people who value self-direction and a higher level of 
stimulation) or self-enhancement (achievement and power) are more likely to request drugs 
by brand name from their physician, in contrast with patients who hold stronger self-
transcendence values (benevolence and universalism), who are less likely to request drugs 
by brand name. Physicians’ accommodation of drug requests provides a strong 
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psychological reinforcement to patients, in the sense that it motivates patients’ intentions to 
request a drug in the future, as predicted by social exchange theory. 
Interestingly, this “psychological reinforcement” effect seems to influence exclusively 
the request behavior from patients who have high self-transcendence values. These 
patients, who are by definition highly concerned with the welfare of other people, seem to 
need a signal from their physician that it’s appropriate to request a drug by brand name, 
which may explain why the prevalence of patient requests – and the effect of physician 
accommodation in patient requests – is very different across countries. For marketers this 
suggests that direct-to-patient marketing efforts aimed at triggering patient participation in 
prescription choice may need to be complemented by direct-to-physician marketing efforts. 
Our study shows samples and gifts do not seem to influence physician accommodation 
behavior. Therefore, firms may need to consider engineering their sales calls in order to 
motivate physicians for the importance of patient empowerment and the need to not only 
allow but actually motivate patients to request drugs by brand name35.
Limitations and directions for future research
A first limitation of our study is that we rely solely on patient self-reported data. Even 
though self-reported data is commonly used in medicine and public health research (e.g. 
Haynes et al. 1980; Osterberg and Blaschke 2005; Walsh, Mandalia and Gazzard 2002), 
ideally we would not only survey patients but also their physicians for an even deeper 
understanding of patient requests and subsequent physician accommodation of such 
requests. Given that a major goal of our study was to ensure that our results were culturally 
and cross-nationally generalizable, we collected self-reported data from 17 countries which 
makes the dyadic-response approach infeasible. Yet, it would be interesting if future 
research, using a more limited set of countries, could test whether our results are robust 
under such a paradigm. 
35The challenge, if we consider the results from Chapter 4 on the effects of patient 
empowerment on therapy adherence, is to facilitate patient empowerment while avoiding 
overwhelming the patient with information and while alerting patients for the risks of 
overconfidence regarding health and therapy decision-making. A solution may be to make 
these risks salient to the patient in order to persuade her to follow the treatment as 
prescribed by the physician, and for its full duration, even when patients were asked to 
participate in treatment choice.
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Second, we model patient (past and future) requests as driven by three sources of health 
and therapy information only: mass-media, expert word-of-mouth and word-of-mouth. 
Moreover, patients report the extent to which they use these sources of information to 
gather information capable of leading to a patient requests. Future research could test a 
model with a more fine-grained distinction between alternative information sources. For 
instance, including different types of direct-to-consumer information, information provided 
by different sources and possibly manipulating source credibility are all interesting 
avenues for future research. In addition, behavioral (i.e. secondary) data on consumer 
usage of information and subsequent patient requests, if available, could be used to test the 
robustness of our findings with a different type of data. 
Third, we assume that the patient-physician relationship is well-captured by a social 
exchange paradigm. Even though social exchange theory is very well-supported by 
applications in many different contexts, it would be interesting to use observational or 
qualitative research to test whether, in real medical practice, physicians and patients 
understand their relationship, and engage in therapy negotiation, in terms of cost-benefit 
analyses and if they see their relationship as a simple or a productive exchange. Collecting 
more evidence about how patients and physicians view their relational interactions could 
perhaps help researchers developing more informed, process-based models of this very 
important dyadic exchange. 
Finally, although we control for observed heterogeneity at the patient and physician 
level (including patient personal values), other sources of unobserved heterogeneity could 
also be modeled. Given our large set of controls, we don’t expect this assumption to bias 
any of our results. Still, future research could propose an extended version of our model 
which could account for unobserved heterogeneity and thus be usable with less rich data.
In general, this study shows that the current outrage of policy-makers and physicians 
against therapy and health information distributed via mass-media channels may be 
exaggerated and that other sources of health information, including direct-to-physician 
marketing efforts, seem more influential in driving patient requests. For managers, this 
study highlights that sample-dispensing is a powerful marketing tool, probably because it
motivate patients and physicians to engage in meaningful therapy-related information 
exchange, allowing brand-related information to be transferred to the patient from a very 
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credible and highly trusted source their physician. Finally, patient personal values matter. 
Given that the prevalence of different personal values is very different in different regions 
of the Globe, both managers and policy-makers willing to increase patient requests 
(marketing) or to control either patient requests or physician accommodation of such 
requests (policy-making) need to devise culturally sensitive strategies to achieve their 
goals.
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Appendix V.A
Table A.5.1 - Patient Characteristics
Variable Operationalization (items) Relia-bility Source
Age "How old are you?" SSI
We use the standardized score of the patient's age.
Education "Which of these best describes your highest level of education?"
1 = "no formal education," 2 = "education up to age 12," 3 = 
"education up to age 14," 4 = "education up to age 18," 5 = "higher 
education," 6 = “university.”
Steenkamp, 
Van 
Heerde and 
Geyskens 
(2010)
Gender "What is your gender?"; Dummy: 1 = men, and 0 = women. SSI
Income "Please indicate the total yearly income of all wage earners in your 
household before taxes, from all sources including salaries, rents, 
dividends, self-employment income, etc."; 1 = "up to [$2,000] per 
year," 2 = "between [$2,000] and [$4,999] per year," 3 = "between 
[$5,000] and [$9,999] per year," 4 = "between [$10,000] and 
[$19,999] per year," 5 = "between [$20,000] and [$39,999] per 
year," 6 = "between [$40,000] and [$74,999]
Own 
developme
nt
Health 
status
"In general, would you say your health is…" Safran et 
al. (1998)1 = "poor," 2 = "fair," 3 = "good," 4 = "very good," 5 = 
"excellent."
Health 
motivation 
and 
confidence 
(HM)
I try to prevent health problems before I feel any symptoms. 0.61 Moorman 
and 
Matulich 
(1993)
I try to protect myself against health hazards I hear about.
I have a lot of confidence in my ability to cure myself once I get 
sick.
There is a lot I can do to prevent illness.
Health 
consc. 
(HC)
(1) I consider myself as very health conscious... / (2) I think I do 
very much for my health... / (3) I value my health so much that I 
sacrifice many things for it...
0.79 Oude 
Ophuis 
(1989)
Self-
disclosure 
(SD)
Think now about a very good friend you now have, or ever had. 
Please indicate to what extent you have discussed the topics below 
with him or her. I have discussed with my friend…
(1) …things I have done or thought that I feel guilty about / (2) 
...my deepest feelings / (3) …what things I don’t like about myself / 
(4) …what is important for me in life / (5) …my biggest fears / (6) 
…my deep relationships with other people/
0.93 Based on 
Miller, 
Berg, and 
Archer, 
(1983)
Response scale: from 1 = "not discussed at all," to 5 = "discussed it 
completely."
Patient 
knowledge 
(PK)**
Regarding medical treatment of diseases you consider yourself… 
The response scale for the first question ranged from 1 = "not at all 
knowledgeable," to 5 = "very knowledgeable."; The response scale 
for the second question ranged from 1 = "not at all experienced," to 
5 = "very experienced." 
0.76 Adapted 
from 
Stremersch 
et al.  
(2003)
* Unless otherwise noted, all items were measured using the scale 1 = "strongly disagree," 2 = "disagree," 
3 = "neither agree nor disagree," 4 = "agree," 5 = "strongly agree."
** This construct was measured with two items, hence reliability is measured using two-tailed Spearman's 
correlation between these two items
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Table A.5.1. (Cont.) – Physician and Dyad Characteristics
Variable Operationalization (items) Reliab. Source
Physician Age "What is approximately your doctor’s age?" SSI
Respondents tended to round their doctor's age around 5-
year intervals (i.e. 30, 35, 40, 45…). We use the 
standardized score of the physician age as reported by the 
patient.
Physician 
Gender
"What is your doctor’s gender?"; Dummy: 1 = men, and 0 
= women.
SSI
Patient-
initiated 
information 
exchange (PI)
(1) I ask my doctor to explain to me the treatments or 
procedures in detail / (2) I ask my doctor a lot of questions 
about my medical symptoms / (3) I give my opinion 
(agreement or disagreement) about the types of test or 
treatment that my doctor orders / (4) I am typically 
involved in treatment decisions.
0.78 Lerman et al. 
(1990)
Doctor-
initiated 
information 
exchange (DI)
(1) My doctor asks me about how my family or living 
situation might affect my health / (2) My doctor shares 
with me the risks and benefits associated with alternative 
treatment options / (3) My doctor asks me what I believe 
is causing my medical symptoms / (4) My doctor 
encourages me to give my opinion about medical 
treatments.
0.83 Kao et al. 
(1998)
Lerman et al. 
(1990)
Relationship 
Quality
(RQ)
(1) I trust my doctor’s judgment about my medical care / 
(2) I trust that my doctor performs necessary medical tests 
and procedures regardless of cost / (3) I trust that my 
doctor performs only medically necessary tests and 
procedures / (4) The relationship I have with my doctor is 
something I am very committed to / (5) The relationship I 
have with my doctor is something I intend to maintain 
indefinitely / (6) I am satisfied with my doctor’s caring 
and concern for me / (7) I am satisfied with my doctor’s 
social skills (interactions with your doctor are fulfilling, 
gratifying and easy) / (8) I am satisfied with my doctor’s 
professional skills (medical expertise / (9) quality of 
treatment decisions) / (10) I am satisfied with the 
thoroughness of my doctor’s physical examinations when 
checking a health problem I might have / (11) My doctor 
gives me enough time to explain the reasons for my visit / 
(12) When I ask questions to my doctor, I get answers that 
are understandable / (13) My doctor takes enough time to 
answer my questions / (14) I get as much medical 
information as I want from my doctor / (15) I trust my 
doctor’s judgment about my medical care / (16) I am 
satisfied with my doctor’s caring and concern for me / 
(17) I am satisfied with the thoroughness of my doctor’s 
physical examinations when checking a health problem I 
might have
0.94 Kao et al. 
(1998)
Morgan and 
Hunt (1994)
Geyskens and 
Steenkamp 
(2000)
* Unless otherwise noted, all items were measured using the scale 1 = "strongly disagree," 2 = "disagree," 3 =
"neither agree nor disagree," 4 = "agree," 5 = "strongly agree."
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Table A.5.1. (Cont.) –Dyad Characteristics
Variable Operationalization (items) Source
Age 
homophily
-1*ZAgeDiff; 
where ZAgeDiff = Standardized score of the difference, in 
absolute value, between the patient and the physician's 
age.
Own development
Gender 
homophily
Dummy: 1 = patient and physician of the same gender, 
and 0 = otherwise. Own development
Relationship 
duration
"For how long have you been seeing your doctor? (please 
indicate the number of years; if you have been seeing your 
doctor for less than a year please indicate 1)".
Own development
Interaction 
frequency
"How regularly do you visit your doctor?"
1 = "Usually less than once every two years," 2 = "At least 
once every two years," 3 = "At least once a year," 4 = 
"Usually once every six months," 5 = "Once every three 
months," 6 = "Once every month," 7 = "Every other 
week," 8 = "Once a week or more."
Own development
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CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
In this dissertation I have explored important topics in health marketing. My main goal
was to study key issues in the consumer side of healthcare industry. Studying the process 
leading to consumer decisions and building theory-rich models and hypotheses allows us 
to better understand not only consumer behavior but, importantly, key industry and market 
dynamics. To quantify such dynamics, and guarantee generalizability of our findings, 
decision-making models need to be calibrated in real world individual-level data. 
Moreover, we also need robust theoretical roots and knowledge of the institutional context 
surrounding the decisions under study for the hypothesized processes to be descriptively 
valid (i.e. for internal validity). Hence, in an effort to combine external and internal 
validity, I have used theories from cognitive, social and cross-cultural psychology to 
develop econometric models to be calibrated in real world data: a patient-level panel of 
prescription behavior in Chapter 2 and a very large international survey conducted among
11,735 patients in 17 countries in Chapters 4 and 5. In each of the chapters and especially 
in Chapter 3, I also critically reviewed medical decision-making literature in order to better 
understand current trends and dynamics on patient and physician decision-making. I now 
very briefly summarize the results from each chapter.
2. Summary of Main Findings
In Chapter 2, I investigated physician learning about the quality (and adoption) of a new 
drug (in our case, AstraZeneca’s Symbicort). By collaborating with the Erasmus Medical 
School, I had access to a physician- and patient-level panel of prescription behavior in the 
asthma and COPD category. Physicians in this panel use paperless offices, meaning that all 
their prescription behavior gets registered in the data, creating a very rich dataset for the 
study of consumer learning. I show that salience effects interfere with physician learning, 
which is reflected in the fact that switching patients (those who abandon a treatment) are 7 
to 10 times more influential during physician’s quality belief formation than patients that 
refill their therapy. I extend the Bayesian learning model to account for these salience 
effects and show that salience slows down adoption of new drugs, which makes the finding 
important for pharmaceutical firms but also public policy officials.
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In Chapter 3, I have critically reviewed current trends in patient-physician decision-
making. One of the main conclusions of the chapter is that patient empowerment – a
movement that defends more active patient participation in medical decision-making – is 
an emerging paradigm in medicine. The chapter reviews evidence showing that the vast 
majority of medicine and public health scholars currently believe that patient 
empowerment is a desirable goal for patient-physician relationships. The benefits 
accredited to patient empowerment include increased patient trust in the physician, patient 
satisfaction with care and therapy adherence. However, the definition of patient 
empowerment is fragmented over the literature and needs to be systematized. Perhaps as a 
consequence of this gap, empirical evidence demonstrating the benefits of patient 
empowerment is still rare, especially with respect to tangible health outcomes, like therapy 
adherence or improvements in health status. In this Chapter I review the antecedents of this 
trend, and the consequences for firms and policy-makers. For example, I discuss why 
patient needs and preferences regarding participation in medical decisions need to be taken 
into account (some patients are better prepared to be empowered than others…) and why 
they are a promising variable for patient-level segmentation. Finally, the current trends in 
medical decision-making and patient-physician relationships suggest that the patient may 
become increasingly central in pharmaceutical marketing strategies (increased focus on 
preventive medicine, niche-marketing strategies, etc) and in medical decision-making 
research. I discuss a major implication of this trend for life sciences firms: the need to put 
the patient at the center of marketing strategies.
In Chapter 4, I have studied the relationship between patient empowerment and therapy 
adherence. I develop a decision-making model for therapy adherence and discuss the 
influential role of self-determination theory – which defends that people persist more and 
have better performance in behavior that is based on a true sense of volition - in fostering 
the currently widely held belief that patient empowerment increases therapy adherence. 
This belief persists despite very scarce empirical evidence attesting its validity. I rely on 
psychological theories to make predictions regarding the effects of different forms of 
patient empowerment (doctor-initiated informational empowerment, patient-initiated 
informational empowerment and decisional empowerment) on therapy non-adherence. I 
find support for many of the hypotheses, many of which in direct contradiction to self-
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determination theory. Specifically, I show that only patient-initiated informational 
empowerment leads to lower therapy non-adherence and that decisional empowerment and 
doctor-initiated informational empowerment actually lead to higher therapy non-
adherence. I discuss the implications of these findings for managers and policy makers 
willing to reduce therapy non-adherence.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I study dyadic therapy choice, in particular the drivers of patient 
requests of medications by brand name and physician accommodation of such requests. I 
show that even though health and therapy information disseminated via mass-media -
typically indicated by policy-makers as the culprit for patient requests and physician 
accommodation of such requests (and consequent rise in prescription costs) - is indeed 
associated with more patient requests, word-of-mouth (from peers or experts) is a clearly 
stronger driver of patient requests. Moreover, the fact that patients learn about a therapy 
through mass-media (or through any other source) doesn’t influence physician 
accommodation of patient requests. 
Looking to direct-to-physician marketing efforts, I show that a major driver of patient 
requests are free samples dispensed by physicians. Samples need to be dispensed by 
physicians to their patients, which affords an opportunity for the physician to explain to the 
patient how the therapy works (dosing, usage…). Thus, most likely this effect occurs 
because samples result in patients receiving brand-related information from a highly-
trusted source (their physician), which has a stronger effect in patient request behavior than 
other, direct-to-patient, sources of therapy-related information. Importantly, I also find that 
patient values matter. Patients who are more open to change and have more power and 
achievement ambitions are more likely to request drugs by brand name. In contrast, 
patients who care more about the welfare of others (benevolent and universalistic patients), 
are less likely to request drugs by brand name. 
For policy makers, these results suggest that mass-media information may not be the 
best focus of their attention, if the goal is to reduce patient requests for medications by 
brand name. Instead, monitoring resources should be invested in better understanding what 
happens in channels where word-of-mouth is generated (like social media) and with the 
spillover effects of direct-to-physician marketing, in particular free samples, on patient 
likelihood of requesting drugs by brand name. For managers, this chapter suggests that 
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direct-to-patient marketing strategies should be more focused in facilitating patient-to-
patient and patient-to-expert interaction and increasing the quality and credibility of health 
and therapeutic information broadcasted via the mass-media. Moreover, such strategies 
need to be culturally-sensitive.
3. Future Research in Health Marketing
Future research in health marketing and in patient and physician-decision-making is very 
promising. Three factors combine to make this period particularly exciting for scholars 
interested in developing models of consumer decision-making, especially for health 
marketing: (i) the exponential growth in the availability of individual-level datasets (e.g. 
prescription data, Internet clickstream data…), (ii) recent developments in econometric 
methods and computers’ computational resources (allowing the estimation of heavy 
Bayesian or simulation-based algorithms) and (iii) the consolidation of the body of 
knowledge of behavioral economics (allowing a richer exploration, using revealed 
preference data, of patient or physician behavior). At the same time, important trends 
reviewed in this thesis (see Chapter 3) - like population aging, increasingly participatory 
consumers in their health decisions and connectedness of patients and healthcare 
professionals - ensures that there is no shortage of questions to be answered. I believe that 
this journey is still in its infancy and I now suggest some future research topics.
Who is the customer for therapeutic offerings?
Traditionally, pharmaceutical marketers have focused on the physician as their key 
customer. Under the traditional model, a pharmaceutical company seeks to develop a new 
therapy, market it as the new best-in-class (the search for a blockbuster drug), determine its 
pricing and push it via direct-to-physician marketing. Important topics to inform 
managerial decisions in this traditional model include understanding key physician opinion 
leaders and developing models to segment the physician population and optimally allocate 
detailing and samples. These may be, today, mature areas in terms managerial and 
academic interest, but that doesn’t mean that we fully understand therapy consumption and 
marketing. In fact, this traditional model is endangered by many of the trends revisited in 
this dissertation, namely the trend towards patient empowerment, widespread availability 
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of therapy and health information and the emergence of new stakeholders. Future research 
is needed to better understand therapy consumption in this new environment.
First, in many situations the customers are not limited to the patient and the physician 
and therapy choice is influenced by other parties. For example, when in 1998 Eli Lilly 
partnered with ICOS, a biotech startup, to launch the erectile dysfunction drug Cialis, it 
opted to target both sufferers of the disease and their partners, in a strategic marketing 
approach aimed at triggering the couple’s interest in the therapy. This was a very elegant 
marketing move. Eli Lilly started by identifying that a major hurdle in the adoption of 
erectile dysfunction therapies is the tendency of male patients to deny, often for a long 
period, that they suffer from the disease. Using the drug’s 36-hour effectiveness as an 
important point-of-difference, Lilly targeted its communications to the couple, promising 
them they would enjoy “tender moments.” Such an approach gained the acceptance of 
patients’ partners, contributing to the drug’s successful penetration in the erectile 
dysfunction market36.
Marketing models to better understand triadic decision-making contexts, like the one 
suggested by the Cialis example, are a fruitful area of research. Other important examples 
of triadic choices include therapy choice for elderly patients (who often bring their younger 
relatives to the clinical encounter), pediatric patients (who depend on parent’s judgment, 
but also the child’s cooperation) and patients suffering from psychiatric conditions and 
stigma-related conditions (like alcoholism and other addictions, which, like erectile 
dysfunction, often trigger denial effects). In these contexts, firms need to better understand 
which customers they should target and how should they streamline marketing actions to 
influence different decision-makers. Thus, both new models and substantive results are 
needed.
Even within the traditional patient-physician dyad there are many open questions. For 
instance, relationships often get sour, ultimately culminating in legal battles between 
patients and their physicians (see Gawande 2005). This liability climate, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, severely impacts patient-physician relationships and the behavior of both 
patients and physicians. For instance, antecedents and consequences of defensive medicine 
36See for example Elie Ofek’s (2004) case study HBR 505038, “Product Team Cialis:  
Getting Ready to Market.”
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- the practice of medical care with the primary purpose of avoiding malpractice liability, 
rather than maximizing patient health – are very important topics for future research. 
Moreover, within the patient-physician relationship it is important to better understand 
drivers of perceived quality of medical care, and whether supposedly irrelevant patient 
characteristics or patient-physician attitudes, influence physician or patient therapy and 
health decisions. For instance, do patients disclose more to physicians whom they like 
more? And would they also adhere more to therapy? All these questions deserve future 
scrutiny.
Beyond Blockbuster Rx’s
Most research in pharmaceutical marketing focus on prescription drugs  from blockbuster 
categories like pulmonology, gastrointestinal drugs, cardiology, hypertension, 
antidepressants, erectile dysfunction, etc. Less attention has been devoted to more complex
therapies and treatments, for example those indicated for oncology and central nervous 
system (CNS) patients. Given their magnitude and welfare consequences, it is important to 
devote research attention to the study of therapy development, launch and promotion in 
these more complex disease areas.
On the other side of the therapy-complexity spectrum we have over-the-counter 
(OTC) drugs, for which patients do not need a physician prescription. Thus, OTC also pose 
their unique challenges to firms, patients and regulators. Although some research exists on 
OTC markets, I believe that there are many research opportunities in this area. For 
instance, we can certainly learn from our current knowledge on consumer behavior in other 
categories (e.g. high-involvement brands) and test whether it is also applicable to OTC 
drugs. For example, what is the role of the retailer and of the pharmacist in promoting 
OTC brands? Do patients trust more their pharmacist’s or retailer’s recommendations than 
information available via mass-media (e.g. direct-to-consumer advertising)? What about 
pricing – what drives consumers’ willingness to pay for OTC brands? 
In addition, given the macro-trend towards population aging, preventive medicine and 
patient empowerment (see Chapter 3), research focusing on drivers of self-medication may 
provide valuable insights for producers of OTC drugs, and even for marketing of 
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prescription drugs (as self-medication may lead to drop-out or brand switching without 
consultation of the physician). 
In many countries, notably in the U.S. and U.K., there is also a trend away from 
traditional brands (e.g. Losec) towards either pure generics (e.g. Omeprazole) or branded 
generics (e.g. Omeprazole Ratiopharm), which creates important challenges for 
pharmaceutical firms37. This shift is often related to a shift of power, in therapy choice,
away from the physician and to other stakeholders, like the pharmacist. Indeed, in many 
countries, pharmacists are not only allowed but incentivized to replace physicians’ 
prescriptions of branded drugs by generic bioequivalents, which suggests that research 
needs to address the decision-making process of these stakeholders. Moreover, questions 
like how well do patients adhere to generic therapy and whether there are differences in the 
perceived performance of generics (vis-à-vis branded generics and branded medications), 
despite their bioequivalence, are important and currently largely unaddressed38.
Social Interactions and Therapy Choice
The exploding ease-of-interaction among patients, physicians and other stakeholders 
(pharmacists, regulators or even payers), for example using web 2.0, also brings substantial 
challenges to firms. These, in turn, tend to translate into ample opportunities for research. 
For example, many pharmaceutical firms are trying to understand how to leverage the 
power of social-media. Yet, patient behavior and motivations on these social networks is, 
at present, poorly understood. As a consequence, firms are often slow and even sloppy in 
their reactions to customers in social media. For example, a well-known case in 
pharmaceutical companies’ social media efforts is the story of Shirley Ledlie, a patient 
who suffered from permanent baldness - a rare side effect of Sanofi-Aventis’ 
chemotherapy drug Taxotere - and who decided to share her experience in one of Sanofi-
Aventis’ pages on Facebook. Sanofi-Aventis was slow to react to Ledlie’s initiative. First, 
37McKinsey. 2007. India Pharma 2015-Unlocking the Potential of the Indian 
Pharmaceutical Market: 
http://www.mckinsey.com/locations/india/mckinseyonindia/pdf/India_Pharma_2015.pdf
38 For an example of a laboratory experiment that could shed light in some of these 
processes see: Waber, R.L., B. Shiv, Z. Carmon, D. Ariely. Commercial Features of 
Placebo and Therapeutic Efficacy. Journal of the American Medical Association299(9) 
1016-1017.
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it seemed to ignore her comments. Later, the company overreacted by cancelling the 
patient’s account and all her comments in their Facebook pages. The consequence of 
Sanofi-Aventis strict reaction was a militant campaign initiated by Shirley Ledlie against 
the company in social media (including Twitter, Facebook, blogs…) and intense reactions 
from the patient community. The story is now widely known among pharmaceutical circles 
and patient community. Pharmaceutical firms need answers regarding how to deal with 
patient-generated content and with health and therapy information distributed and 
discussed in social media. Immediate concerns include how to detect and deal with 
influential patients, with adverse events reported by patients in social media platforms and 
with the regulatory implications of such reporting39. Thus, questions that need to be 
urgently addressed include: What can firms do to better understand and promptly respond 
to the voice of the patient in social media? How to avoid the substantial damage to public 
image that they can create?
Consumer-generated content deserves a special mention. Many consumers (both 
patients and physicians) invest their time and energy in filtering, creating and sharing 
information regarding their diseases on web 2.0 (blogs, forums, social media platforms…).
This effort has been facilitated by the emergence of health-related social networks like 
patientslikeme.com (where patients share experiences with each other) and sermo.com
(where physicians interact with each other). It is important to understand how physicians 
deal with this information, who are the key online opinion leaders and how to interact with 
them. Moreover, on the patient side, some of the most vocal consumers become “patient 
opinion leaders”, i.e. very respected opinion-makers who can radically influence other 
patients with their opinions. Research on how patients (or physicians) learn from the 
experiences of others can thus have wide applicability in the near future. The 
pharmaceutical industry is already well-versed in the targeting and usage of physician 
opinion leaders. Yet, new research needs to be conducted to better understand the 
formation and the influence of these “patient opinion leaders.”  
To clarify what I mean by patient opinion leader, let me give you the example of 
Leighann Calentine. Leighann is the founder and main author of D-Mom Blog 
(http://www.d-mom.com/), a weblog where Leighann gives advice and shares her own 
39http://www.doseofdigital.com/2009/01/myth-adverse-event-reporting/
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experiences on parenting children with Type 1 diabetes. In her blog, Leighann frequently 
voices her opinion about different therapies and devices. For firms, it is crucial to monitor 
this type of content (e.g. via blog sentiment analysis), as it can bring very important and 
timely information on brand buzz and market dynamics. Yet, it is also crucial to 
understand how other consumers use patient opinion leader’s information, and how 
influential are their opinions in patient behavior.
Marketing Resource Allocation
Pharmaceutical companies also need better tools, i.e. models and metrics, to facilitate 
optimal allocation of marketing dollars to different stakeholders. There is a growing belief, 
within the pharmaceutical industry, that effectiveness of targeting physicians with detailing 
efforts is decreasing, making it a less attractive investment40. The challenge is to 
understand which stakeholders firms should target, and which marketing channels are 
more appropriate for each stakeholder. 
There are many important stakeholders besides physicians and patients. In fact, any 
agent who has a direct influence in therapy choice may be considered a possible target for 
pharmaceutical firms’ marketing strategies. These stakeholders include regulators (e.g. 
regulatory agencies like FDA and EMEA), policy-makers (including local regulators and 
producers of medical guidelines), payers (including health insurance companies and health 
maintenance organizations), pharmacists (can be a very important stakeholder, especially 
with respect to generic drugs and OTC  brands), nurses (can be pivotal in promoting 
therapy comprehension, persuasion and adherence) or hospital administrators (a very large 
market for pharmaceutical drugs involves drugs supplied to hospitals, where the decision-
making process is heavily influenced by administrators; there is still little research in this 
domain).  
Research highlighting how to better interact with these stakeholders, many of which 
are increasingly powerful, can thus be very valuable. For example, a very important topic 
that has not received enough attention in marketing is the definition of pre-launch 
negotiation strategies. How can pharmaceutical firms be better prepared to negotiate with 
regulators, present evidence in favor of their new therapies and influence pricing and 
40BusinessWeek. 2007. The Doctor Won’t See You Now. A. Weintraub, Feb. 5.
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reimbursement decisions? Research in this area will fall in the intersection between 
marketing, decision-making and legal studies. 
Health Marketing Research Related to Current Macro-Trends
Finally, there are many research topics in health marketing that can address current macro-
trends like the colossal growth in therapy consumption in emerging countries like the 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). A recent report by McKinsey, for example, 
estimates that – due to an explosive growth of its middle class - the Indian pharmaceutical 
market alone will demand US$ 20 billion in pharmaceutical drugs by 2015, becoming the
10th largest market in the world41. Many issues need to be researched in these markets. 
First, unique cultural values may influence the way physicians and patients see medicine 
and, hence, change therapy choice and consumption patterns. A better understanding of 
these emerging consumers is therefore urgently needed. Second, the specific context in 
these countries may create both threats and opportunities to firms that need to be studied. 
For example, the level of counterfeiting, especially for generics (whose brands are 
unfamiliar) is much higher in these markets than in the Western world. This creates both a 
public health problem, and a trust issue – with consumers having low trust in the efficacy 
and safety of generics and be willing to pay a premium for branded generics, which garner 
consumer trust42.
Marketing scholars can also contribute with research in health marketing that goes 
beyond therapy choice. The study of nutrition and obesity, addiction, behaviors that may 
increase the risk of sexually-transmitted diseases and the effects of marketing in health-
threatening (e.g. violence in movies and computer games) or health-improving behaviors 
(e.g. lifestyle changes introduced by products like wii fitness) are just a few examples of 
exciting topics for which marketing scholars can contribute with their knowledge and 
methods. These topics have, in recent years, garnered the attention of researchers in the 
41McKinsey. 2007. India Pharma 2015-Unlocking the Potential of the Indian 
Pharmaceutical Market: 
http://www.mckinsey.com/locations/india/mckinseyonindia/pdf/India_Pharma_2015.pdf
42New York Times. 2010. Drug Firms Apply Brand to Generics, by N. Singer: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/business/16generic.html?_r=1
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area of transformative consumer research43, who have mainly taken a consumer behavior 
approach, namely by using laboratory experiments. Yet, if data from recent services like 
Philips DirectLife (http://www.directlife.philips.com/) - an activity program by Philips 
where consumers, with the help of a counselor, set goals for 12 week activity plans and 
record their daily activity using a specialized device – becomes available to researchers, 
this represents a fantastic opportunity to build models to study many of these health-related 
behaviors using secondary data. For example, building a psychologically-grounded 
structural model of motivation, goal-setting and achievement using this type of data would 
certainly be a valuable topic of future research. Other topics on self-control issues, 
adherence to exercise and preventive health behaviors can also be studied in depth with 
this type of data or even with scanner panel data (e.g. eating habits over time).
Finally, other non-therapy related topics in health and marketing that I can think of 
include: (i) data and privacy-related issues – how are consumers reacting to the increasing 
levels of health data available to them? Is it changing their health behaviors?, (ii) how do 
patients choose between physicians, clinics and hospitals?, (iii) How will the current trend 
towards home-based care (triggered by technological advances and increased cost of care) 
interfere with patients’ treatment decisions? 
Another topic that deserves further research is how to streamline communication of 
public health concerns by governments and public health officials. For example, in 
pandemics there is often a paradoxical tension between creating enough awareness for a 
certain health risk and guaranteeing effectiveness of the government’s health risk 
communications in the long run. That is, if a campaign is very successful raising awareness 
and motivating patients to engage in active prevention of a certain health threat, then such 
threat may never materialize, or materialize in much smaller scale. Yet, if risks don’t 
materialize consumers may not pay sufficient attention or even trust future warnings – a
dynamic model quantifying this effect would be a good contribution to the literature.
I hope my dissertation has, on top of the substantive and methodological contributions 
presented in Chapters 2-5 achieved three goals: (i) demonstrated the importance of 
43Mick, D.G. 2006. Meaning and Mattering Through Transformative Consumer Research.
Presidential address to the Association for Consumer Research, in Advances in Consumer 
Research33 C. Pechmann, L.L. Price. Eds. Provo, UT: Association for Consumer 
Research, 1–4.
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developing models and theories to study health-related consumer decisions, (ii) stimulated 
interest among marketing scholars to examine health topics, including therapy choice but 
also other health-related topics and even health consequences of marketing actions and (iii) 
emphasized the importance of developing models of consumer decision-making for better 
understanding of market dynamics. Despite considerable progress made in the literature on 
pharmaceutical and health marketing in the last years, many interesting and highly-
influential topics in health marketing remain unexplored, making this area a promising area 
for future scholarly work in marketing. I trust the next few years will bring many novel 
contributions, by marketing scholars, to the health field.
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SUMMARY IN ENGLISH
In this dissertation, I focus on physician and patient behavior. I model patient and 
physician decisions by integrating robust insights from different behavioral sciences (e.g. 
economics, psychology and sociology) in econometric models calibrated on individual 
data. This approach allows me to bring novel insights for managers, policy-makers and 
patients on three main topics. First, when studying physician learning from patient 
feedback about the quality of a new drug, I find that switching patients are 7 to 10 times 
more salient, in physicians' memory, than patients who refill their medication. Second, 
when studying the relationship between patient empowerment and patient non-adherence 
to physician advice, I show that it is important to go beyond the logic of self-determination 
theory, which predicts that empowering patients during medical encounters is always 
beneficial, and consider side effects like patient overconfidence. In the case of therapy 
adherence, these side effects actually make patient empowerment undesirable, as it 
decreases therapy adherence. Third, when studying the main drivers of patient drug 
requests by brand name and the physician’s accommodation of such requests, I find that 
health information obtained via mass-media is less important than patient values, word-of-
mouth from other patients and word-of-mouth from expert consumers (e.g. other 
healthcare professionals).
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH)
In dit proefschrift richt ik me op het gedrag van de arts en patiënt. Ik modeleer beslissingen 
van de arts en patiënt door belangrijke inzichten vanuit verschillende 
gedragswetenschappen (b.v. economie, psychologie en sociologie) te integreren in 
econometrische modellen die zijn ontwikkeld op basis van werkelijke individuele data. 
Deze aanpak maakt  het mogelijk om  nieuwe inzichten voor managers, beleidsbepalers en 
consumenten te verkrijgen betreffende drie belangrijke onderwerpen.  Ten eerste, tijdens 
het bestuderen van hoe een arts leert van opmerkingen van een patiënt met betrekking tot 
de kwaliteit van een nieuw medicijn, is aangetoond dat volgens de arts, patiënten die 
wisselen van medicijn 7 tot 10 keer meer tevreden zijn dan patiënten die niet wisselen van 
medicijn. Ten tweede, tijdens het bestuderen van de relatie tussen een patiënt die actief 
participeert en een patiënt die niet zich niet aan het advies van de arts houdt, toon ik aan 
dat het belangrijk is om verder te gaan dan de vanzelfsprekende zelfbeschikkingstheorie, 
welke voorspelt dat een patiënt die actief participeert tijdens een medische ontmoeting daar 
altijd baat bij heeft, en rekening houdt met andere factoren zoals een overmoedige patiënt. 
In het geval dat een patient zich aan de voorgeschreven therapie houdt, maken deze andere 
factoren een actieve patiënt participatie ongewenst, omdat het de kans dat de patient zich 
aan de therapie houdt verlaagd. Ten derde, tijdens het bestuderen van de belangrijke 
aspecten van het aanvragen van een medicijn met een merknaam en de bereidheid van de 
arts om aan deze aanvraag te voldoen, heb ik aangetoond dat informatie verkregen via 
massamedia minder belangrijk is dan patiënt waarden, mond-tot-mond informatie van 
andere patiënten en mond-tot-mond informatie van experts (b.v. professionals actief in de 
gezondheidszorg). 
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RESUMO EM PORTUGUÊS (SUMMARY IN PORTUGUESE)
A presente dissertação debruça-se sobre o comportamento do médico e do paciente. Nela 
desenvolvo modelos que integram resultados robustos provenientes de diferentes ciências 
sociais e comportamentais (nomeadamente economia, psicologia e sociologia) em modelos 
econométricos calibrados em dados não-laboratoriais recolhidos ao nível individual (um 
painel com dados de prescrições médicas e dados recolhidos através de questionários). Esta 
combinação de modelos e dados permitiu-me obter resultados generalizáveis que 
descrevem factos novos para gestores, legisladores, médicos e pacientes em três áreas 
principais. Em primeiro lugar, estudo como aprendem os médicos – através das suas 
interacções com os seus pacientes - acerca da qualidade de um novo medicamento. Neste 
estudo, demonstro que o feedback de pacientes que abandonam o novo medicamento fica 
entre 7 e 10 vezes mais saliente na memória do médico do que o feedback de pacientes que 
persistem no novo medicamento. Dado que estes pacientes são exactamente os que tiveram 
experiências menos felizes com o novo medicamento, este fenómeno comportamental 
traduz-se num pessimismo prolongado dos médicos acerca desse medicamento. Em 
segundo lugar, estudo a relação entre poder do paciente na escolha de tratamentos e
aderência às recomendações de tratamento do médico. Neste estudo, demonstro a 
importância de considerar argumentos para além da teoria de auto-determinação que prevê 
que transferir poder para os pacientes é sempre benéfico. Por exemplo, ao incorporar 
fenómenos psicológicos como sobre-confiança, demonstro que a transferência de poder 
para o paciente pode ser indesejável, pois resulta em menor adesão do paciente à
terapêutica recomendada pelo médico. Em terceiro lugar, estudo os principais antecedentes 
da decisão de pacientes em diversos paíes de pedirem medicamentos ao seu médico 
utilizando a marca, e da decisão do médico de acomodar tais pedidos. Neste estudo,
demonstro que a informação acerca de saúde distribuída via mass-media tem menor 
impacto nesses pedidos que o contacto com outros pacientes, com profissionais de saúde e 
do que os valores culturais do próprio paciente.
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ESSAYS ON PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT DECISION-MAKING
In this dissertation, I focus on physician and patient behavior. I model patient and phy -
si cian decisions by integrating robust insights from different behavioral sciences (e.g. eco -
nomics, psychology and sociology) in econometric models calibrated on individual data.
This approach allows me to bring novel insights for managers, policy-makers and patients
on three main topics. First, when studying physician learning from patient feedback about
the quality of a new drug, I find that switching patients are 7 to 10 times more salient, in
physicians’ memory, than patients who refill their medication. Second, when studying the
relationship between patient empowerment and patient adherence to physicians’ therapy
advice, I show that it is important to go beyond the logic of self-determination theory,
which predicts that empowering patients during medical encounters is always beneficial,
and consider side effects like patient overconfidence. In the case of therapy adherence,
these side effects actually make patient empowerment undesirable, as it decreases
therapy adherence. Third, when studying the main drivers of patient drug requests by
brand name and the physician’s accommodation of such requests, I find that health
information obtained via mass-media is less important than patient values, word-of-
mouth from other patients and word-of-mouth from expert consumers (e.g. other  health -
 care professionals).
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